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Introduction
The latter half of the twentieth century witnessed an ‘intensional
revolution’: a great collective effort to analyse notions which are
absolutely fundamental to our understanding of the world and of
ourselves – from meaning and information to knowledge, belief, cau-
sation, essence, supervenience, conditionality, as well as nomological,
metaphysical, and logical necessity – in terms of a single concept.
This was the concept of a possible world: a way things could have
been.
Possible worlds found applications in logic,metaphysics, semantics,
game theory, information theory, artificial intelligence, the philosophy
of mind and cognition. In 1986, inOn the Plurality of Worlds, David
Lewis called possible worlds ‘a philosophers’ paradise’. Whatever
view one had on the kinds of things possible worlds are, there was
widespread agreement on their being an indispensable theoretical
tool.
That paradise has turned out to be full of problems. These
have emerged in piecemeal fashion, as difficulties for this or that
application of the possible worlds paradigm. It seems to us, however,
that the difficulties revolve around a single issue. Most of those
fundamental notions are hyperintensional: they require distinctions
the standard possible worlds apparatus cannot easily make.
When we set out to write about impossible worlds – ways things
could not have been – we decided to set our narrative against the
background of an envisaged twenty-first century ‘hyperintensional
revolution’. A number of accounts have been developed, which
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qualify as hyperintensional in some sense. They range from two-
dimensional semantics (Chalmers 2006), to theories of aboutness
(Yablo 2014), truthmaker semantics (Fine 2017), metaphysical
grounding (Correia and Schnieder 2012), structured propositions
(King 2011), transparent intensional logic (Duzi et al. 2010), and
various non-classical logical approaches (Dunn and Restall 2002).
How such theories, or families thereof, are connected to each other
and how their relative merits can be assessed, are at present largely
open questions. But whatever position impossible worlds take in this
landscape, we believe that they will play a role in the revolution, and
we felt the time was ripe for a book providing guidance through the
burgeoning literature on the subject.
This book includes an opinionated introduction to theories and
uses of impossible worlds. (A shorter and simplified presentation
can be found in our ‘Impossible Worlds’ entry in the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy.) We have our own preferences on the
metaphysics of impossible worlds and the logical and philosophical
applications they afford. We don’t hide those preferences; but we
have tried to provide fair accounts of the alternative views and to
assess them in a balanced way.
The book also includes our own original proposals on a number of
topics involving impossible worlds. Some of these have appeared
previously in print, although often not in the form they appear
here. We have drawn on material from Berto’s papers ‘Impossible
Worlds and Propositions’ (The Philosophical Quarterly, 2010), ‘On
Conceiving the Inconsistent’ (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
2014), ‘Impossible Worlds and the Logic of Imagination’ (Erkenntnis,
2017), ‘Conceivability and Possibility: Some Dilemmas for Humeans’
(with Tom Schoonen, Synthese, 2018), ‘Truth in Fiction, Impossible
Worlds, and Belief Revision’ (with Chris Badura,Australasian Journal
of Philosophy, 2018), ‘Williamson on Counterpossibles’ (with Rohan
French, Graham Priest, and Dave Ripley, Journal of Philosophical
Logic, 2018), and on Berto’s bookOntology and Metaontology (with
Matteo Plebani, Bloomsbury, 2015).We have drawn on material from
Jago’s papers ‘Against Yagisawa’s Modal Realism’ (Analysis, 2013),
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‘The Content of Deduction’ (Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2013),
‘Recent Work in Relevant Logic’ (Analysis, 2013), ‘The Problem of
Rational Knowledge’ (Erkenntnis, 2013), and on Jago’s book The
Impossible (Oxford University Press, 2014). We are very grateful to
all the editors and publishers for permission to use these works.
Outline of the Book
The book is divided into three parts. Part I deals with foundational
issues. In Chapter 1, we survey a number of applications of possible
worlds; find them all wanting; trace the problem back to hyperinten-
sionality; and suggest that impossible worlds may help.We present
various definitions of the notion of an impossible world from the
literature. Such worlds make sense only if we can genuinely think
about the impossibilities they represent. We argue that we can.
A central philosophical issue with worlds, possible or impossible, is
how they represent what they represent. This is obviously connected
to the problem of what kind of things they are. In Chapter 2, we
discuss a number of different proposals. Perhaps impossible worlds
are metaphysically different from possible worlds, and represent in
a different way. Or perhaps they are metaphysically on a par with
possible worlds. Impossible worlds may be taken as ‘genuine’ entities
which, like Lewisian possible worlds, represent something as being an
F by having a real F as a part. Or, they may be taken as non-existent
objects. Or as abstract entities which, like the objects of general object
theory, represent by encoding. Or they may be taken as primitive
entities, with no questions asked on how they represent. Or maybe
there are no such worlds: we should take a fictionalist stance, and
just make believe that there are.
We argue that all such views face difficulties, and conclude
that some ersatz approach fares the best. After characterizing the
notion of an ersatz world in general terms, we notice that there
are different ways to specify the view.We delve into the options in
Chapter 3. Ersatz possible worlds can be understood as maximal
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states of affairs, maximal properties, recombinations of bits of
actuality, maps, or things built out of propositions or sentences.
We argue that, when extended to impossible worlds, most of these
approaches face issues: they either collapse into other views, or are
not general enough to accommodate all the impossibilites we may
want.We conclude that linguistic ersatzism, which views worlds as
constructions from sentences of a ‘worldmaking’ language, is the most
promising metaphysics of impossible worlds. We close Chapter 3 by
discussing a problem it, together with the other variants of ersatzism,
faces: the problem of aliens.
Parts II and III of the book are about the logical and philosophical
applications of impossible worlds. The boundary between logic and
philosophy is to some extent arbitrary, as is our partition of the
topics. Part II covers epistemic, doxastic, and various non-classical
logics. Part III covers applications connected to issues in mainstream
epistemology, information theory, the philosophy of fiction, and
topics in semantics and the philosophy of language. But Part II is
not completely free from philosophical discussion and Part III is
not completely devoid of formalism, although we have tried to keep
technicalities under control throughout the book.
In Part II, Chapter 4, we introduce normal modal logics and
their frame semantics. We then show how impossible worlds can
be used to model non-normal modal logics, in which the Rule of
Necessitation is not valid. We discuss further uses, involving non-
adjunctiveness and non-primeness. Two general patterns emerge in
these applications. Firstly, impossible worlds are generally understood
as ‘logic violators’: worlds where some logical law fails. Secondly,
in semantics of this kind truth conditions are often not spelled out
uniformly: they differ between possible and impossible worlds. This
raises a philosophical problem, whose discussion is postponed until
Part III: what of compositionality, a basic requirement for a theory
of meaning?
Chapter 5 deals with applications in epistemic and doxastic logic.
Here the central topic is the problem of logical omniscience. The
standard view models agents as knowing or believing all logical
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truths and all logical consequences of what they know or believe.We
discuss some approaches to avoiding this consequence which don’t
use impossible worlds, and find them wanting. A naïve impossible
worlds approach can easily deliver a view which avoids this problem.
But it faces a deeper problem of bounded rationality: how should
the accessible impossible worlds be constrained, so as to model a
moderately rational though not logically omniscient agent? We argue
that closing worlds under a weaker-than-classical logic won’t help.We
also critically discuss a dynamic approach using impossible worlds,
on which epistemic states evolve gradually towards closure.
Chapter 6 deals with the role impossible worlds play in the
semantics of relevant logics. These are non-classical logics that aim
to avoid the paradoxes of the material and strict conditional. The
mainstream semantics here includes non-normal points of evaluation,
which are naturally interpreted as impossible worlds. The discussion
has revolved around making sense of the truth conditions for the
relevant conditional and negation.We discuss information-theoretic
interpretations of impossible worlds in this setting, and raise some
issues. We also discuss interpretations guided by general views on
conditionality and an interpretation in terms of truthmaking.
Chapter 7 presents an application of impossible worlds to mod-
elling acts of imagination.We focus on a semantics for hyperinten-
sional operators capturing a kind of mental simulation.We discuss
a number of plausible constraints on such operators, including
non-monotonicity, non-primeness, and a ‘Principle of Imaginative
Equivalents’ that limits the hyperintensional anarchy of imagining.
In Part III, Chapter 8 revolves around a very general philosophical
issue: is hyperintensionality a genuine phenomenon? Or is it a feature
to be explained away, and which therefore does not require us
to amend the standard possible worlds apparatus? We consider
arguments for the latter view, and find them unsuccessful. We then
focus on a general notion of hyperintensional content, and discuss two
issues concerning it. Firstly, any hyperintensional theory of content
must address the problem of granularity: how fine-grained must the
relevant hyperintensional distinctions be? Secondly, we return to the
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issue, flagged in Chapter 4, of non-uniform truth conditions, which
raises a compositionality objection for theories of content. We argue
that impossible worlds accounts can deliver a fully compositional
theory of content.
Chapter 9 is about information, which we conceptualize semanti-
cally, in terms of ruling out scenarios.We argue that Frege’s puzzle of
informative identities, and the informativeness of logical inferences,
can be accounted for hyperintensionally, using impossible worlds. In
our favourite analysis, it may be indeterminate whether a given logical
inference is informative. We also sketch an analysis of informative
content in terms of what is said by a speaker making an utterance.
Chapter 10 deals with epistemic and doxastic contents. Here
we focus on how to model a realistic cognitive agent, striking a
balance between the implausible extremes of logical omniscience
and complete logical ignorance. This is the problem of bounded
rationality, flagged in Chapter 5. The belief states of such an agent
seem to be closed under ‘easy’, trivial logical consequence, but not
under full logical consequence. Yet the former seems to imply the
latter. Our solution is that, while some trivial closure principle must
fail in a belief state, it is indeterminate just where any such failure
occurs. We give formal models of belief states so structured. These
entail that nobody genuinely believes an outright contradiction.We
close the chapter discussing the issue of people who claim they do.
Chapter 11, written with Chris Badura, applies impossible worlds
to the analysis of truth in fiction and the metaphysics of fictional
objects.We show that inconsistent fictions are naturally handled via a
space of worlds including impossible worlds, and that truth in fiction
can be understood as a kind of simulated belief revision over such
a space, triggered by the fiction’s explicit content. We then discuss
fictionalist, realist, and Meinongian accounts of fictional characters,
their problems, and their relative merits. We show how impossible
worlds can help to improve on some of these accounts.
Chapter 12, written with Rohan French, Graham Priest, and Dave
Ripley, is about counterfactuality. The starting point here is the
intuitive view that counterpossibles – counterfactual conditionals
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with impossible antecedents – are not all vacuously true, indepen-
dently of the truth value of the consequent. We discuss objections
to the effect that this intuition should be explained away, and
find them unconvincing.We then offer a non-vacuist semantics for
counterpossibles that resorts to impossible worlds. This triggers a
discussion of the so-called ‘Strangeness of Impossibility Condition’
(SIC). This relates to the idea that some pairs of worlds are closer
to one another than others, and that we evaluate counterfactuals
by considering the closest worlds. The (SIC), then, holds that, for
any given possible world, any impossible world is further away from
it than any possible world is. In the semantics, the substitutivity of
rigidly coreferential terms fails in counterfactual contexts. This is
arguably a problem.Another objection revolves around making sense
of arguments by reductio ad absurdum in mathematical practice. We
argue that both objections can be met.
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Part I
Impossibilities

1From Possible to Impossible
Worlds
1.1 Worlds as Ways
Things might have been otherwise. David Bowie may still have been
with us, the sun may have been shining on Nottingham, and the Axis
powers may have won the Second World War. Such alternative ways
we call possible worlds. Each possible world is a way things could
have been. (This initial characterization says nothing of what possible
worlds are, metaphysically speaking. That’s the topic of Chapters
2 and 3.) The actual world is the most general and comprehensive
way in which things in fact are. In the actual world, the Nazis lost
the Second World War, the sky one of us sees from his office in
Nottingham is cloudy, and David Bowie died at the beginning of
2016.
Ways things could have been can resemble the way things actually
are. A world where the Axis powers won the Second World War is
still a world where there was a war in which the Nazis fought, though
with a different outcome from the actual world. Some possible worlds
involve only small changes from ours: think of a world exactly like
the actual one, except that you are one inch taller. Others are very
different: think of one where the laws of biology and physics are
turned upside down, so that you can be born twice, or travel faster
than the speed of light. As we will see, the idea that it makes sense to
speak of relations of similarity between possible worlds is important
for some applications.
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Possible worlds have a vast array of applications. According to
some, this is the main reason for accepting them: ‘it may be that the
best philosophical defence that one can give for possible worlds is to
use them in the development of substantive theory’ (Stalnaker 1991,
141). Since the late twentieth century rejection of the Quinean and
Davidsonian idea that only extensional concepts should be allowed
in serious philosophical inquiry, the notion of possible world has
become ubiquitous in contemporary philosophy. It plays a key role
in most branches of the discipline, ranging from logic to metaphysics
and ontology, the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of information,
moral and political philosophy, and aesthetics. But it has been used
also outside of philosophy, in fields that range from the semantics of
natural language to game theory, artificial intelligence, and cognitive
science.We start with an overview of these applications. (Parts of the
following section draw on Berto and Plebani 2015, chapter 11.)
1.2 Possible Worlds at Work
Possibility and Necessity
Perhaps the most typical application of possible worlds is in modal
logic. This is, first of all, the logic of expressions like ‘necessarily’,
‘possibly’, ‘contingently’. Such expressions are used in two different
ways. A first use consists in qualifying the truth of a sentence, or of
the proposition expressed by the sentence:
(1.1) It is necessary that 7 + 5 = 12.
(1.2) It is possible that Scotland leaves the UK.
(1.3) Possibly, Anna wins the music contest.
(1.4) Necessarily, Valeria is human.
Modalities of this kind are called de dicto. Expressions like ‘necessar-
ily’ or ‘it is possible that’, or the concepts they express, are attached
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to dicta, that is, to pieces of language, or language-like entities, such
as sentences or propositions. They express the way that sentence, or
proposition, bears its truth value. Thus, according to (1.1), that seven
plus five is twelve is necessarily true, and according to (1.3), that
Anna wins the music contest is possibly true.
Modal expressions can also be used to qualify the features of
objects:
(1.1a) Seven is necessarily an odd number.
(1.2a) Scotland is such that it could leave the UK.
(1.3a) Anna is a possible winner of the music contest.
(1.4a) Valeria is necessarily human.
Modalities of this kind are called de re, for the modals are used here
to express the way in which a thing, a res, has some feature. Thus,
according to (1.1a) and (1.4a), seven has the property of being odd,
and Valeria that of being human, in a necessary way.
Contemporary logicians and philosophers follow Leibniz’s insight
that the necessary is what holds no matter what, in any way things
could have been: that is, in all possible worlds.What is possible, on the
other hand, is what holds at some possible world.What is contingent
is what holds at some, but not all, possible worlds. Necessity and
possibility are thus interpreted as quantifications over possible worlds.
Using ‘◻’ for ‘necessarily’, ‘◇’ for ‘possibly’, ‘iff’ for ‘if and only if’,
and lettingW be the total set of possible worlds, we get:
‘◻A’ is true at world w iff A is true at all worlds w1 ∈W
‘◇A’ is true at world w iff A is true at some world w1 ∈W
(The notation ‘w1 ∈ W’ here means that w1 is a member of the set
W. It’s a way of expressing that w1 is a possible world.)
The two notions◻ and◇ are duals of one other, just as the universal
and particular quantifiers, ∀x and ∃x, are of one another. Each modal
can be defined via the other and negation. That it is necessarily the
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case that A means that it is not possible that ¬A (‘not-A’). And that
it is possible that A means that it is not necessary that ¬A.
Necessity and possibility are highly ambiguous notions. (For a
taxonomy, see chapter 1 of Divers 2002.) Although there is no
universal consensus on this, many philosophers adopt three kinds of
absolute necessity, holding in all possible worlds unrestrictedly:
Logical necessity fixed by the laws of logic broadly conceived
(e.g., that if A, then either A or B);
Mathematical necessity fixed by mathematical truths (e.g., that
7 + 5 = 12); and
Metaphysical necessity fixed by the identity and nature of things
(e.g., that water is H2O; that Valeria is a human being).
We will not get into the issue of whether one of these is reducible to
another (e.g., the mathematical to the logical, as claimed by logicists
in the philosophy of mathematics, including Dedekind (1901), Frege
(1879), Peano (1889), and Russell (1903)).
We also talk of things being necessary, or impossible, only in a
relative sense, or from a certain viewpoint. We are stuck in a traffic
jam in Paris at 2 pm; our flight is leaving from De Gaulle airport
at 2:10 pm. We moan: ‘There’s no way that we can make it to the
airport in time’. What we mean is that, given the timing, the means
of transport available, and the laws of physics of our world, it is
impossible for us to reach the airport in time. It is not unrestrictedly,
absolutely impossible: if we had Star Trek’s transporter, we could
make it. But a Star Trek world in which one can be instantaneously
disassembled into atoms and reassembled exactly with the same
atomic structure in a different place is a world quite different from
ours. One may doubt that such a world is even physically possible,
that is, compatible with our laws of physics.
Other modal notions, thus, are naturally understood as restricted
forms of necessity or possibility. Something can count as R-necessary,
for some relativized modal notion R, even if it fails to hold at some
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possible world or other. Accordingly, the corresponding modals
are understood as restricted quantifiers over possible worlds. Thus
nomological necessity, compliance with the laws of nature of the
actual world or of the world under consideration, is often (no
universal consensus here either) taken to be a relative or restricted
necessity. It is biologically impossible but not absolutely impossible
for a human being to jump one mile up in the air; it is physically
impossible (if Einstein was right) but not absolutely impossible for a
body to travel faster than the speed of light.
Propositions
Possible worlds are extremely important for theories of representa-
tion, both in language and thought, and have been used to analyse key
notions from the philosophy of language. Many of these approaches
build on Wittgenstein’s insight that understanding the meaning of a
sentence is grasping its truth conditions: ‘to understand a proposition
means to know what is the case if it is true’ (Wittgenstein 1921/1922,
§4.024). Montague (1970) and Stalnaker (1976a) have claimed that
propositions, the meanings or contents expressed by sentences and
the primary bearers of truth values, should be understood as sets of
possible worlds. The proposition expressed in English by ‘raccoons
like to somersault’ is, on that view, the set of possible worlds where
raccoons like to somersault, precisely the same set of possible worlds
making for the proposition expressed in Italian by ‘ai procioni piace
fare le capriole’.
Knowledge and Belief
Another notion analysed via possible worlds is knowledge. Following
Hintikka (1962), knowledge has been characterized in terms of what
is true throughout all the ways things could be, for all the agent in
question knows. On this approach, the possible worlds accessible to
an agent represent her epistemic possibilities. Knowledge can then
be treated as another restricted quantifier over possible worlds. If
K stands for a given agent’s state of knowledge, and R is a binary
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accessibility relation on the space of worlds W, the Hintikka-style
characterization goes thus:
(H) KA is true at w iff A is true at all w1 such that Rww1
This thought is at the core of contemporary epistemic logic (see,
e.g., Blackburn et al. 2002, Fagin et al. 1995, Van Benthem 2003).
But several research programs in mainstream epistemology also rely
on a similar viewpoint. Dretske’s relevant alternatives approach takes
knowledge as ‘an evidential state in which all relevant alternatives (to
what is known) are eliminated’ (Dretske 1981, 367). Lewis (1996)
discusses a similar approach. Alternatives here work similarly to
possible worlds, and the uneliminated relevant alternatives work
similarly to accessible worlds.
Necessity (whether logical, mathematical, metaphysical, or nomo-
logical) and knowledge share the feature of being factive: what is
necessary, and what is known, is true. Factivity can be expressed by
claiming that the actual world must always be one of the (accessible)
possible ones, with respect to the relevant kind of possibility. Unlike
other factive modalities, though, knowledge is an intentional state:
a state of the mind directed towards a certain content. There are
also non-factive intentional states, including belief, desire, fear, hope,
and imagination. These have also been understood using restricted
quantifiers over possible worlds, where the accessible worlds are the
ones where things are as the agent believes (imagines, etc.) them to be.
(Fagin et al. 1995 is a comprehensive guide through epistemic and
doxastic logics. Niiniluoto (1985) and Wansing (2017) each discuss
the application to imagination; Berto (2018) gives a semantics for
imagination using an enriched possible worlds approach.)
Knowing (or believing, imagining, etc.) that A is often taken to be a
mental state whose content is the proposition expressed by A. As well
as being the primary bearers of truth values, thus, propositions have
been understood as the content of (de dicto) intentional states: they
are what is known, believed, feared, or imagined when one knows,
believes, fears, or imagines something (de dicto). Just as different
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sentences like ‘raccoons like to somersault’ and ‘ai procioni piace
fare le capriole’ can share the same content, so can different people’s
mental states share the same content: John believes, and Mary fears,
that Marine will win the elections. There is some doubt that one
and the same kind of entity can cover both the role of primary truth
bearers and the role of targets of de dicto intentional states (Jago
2018b, Lewis 1986b). Nevertheless, possible worlds stake a good
claim at giving a unified account of a broad range of linguistic and
mental contents.
Information
Information is connected to knowledge, or potential knowledge. If a
sentence or proposition is informative, then one can come to know
that information (say, by hearing the sentence uttered truthfully by
a trusted speaker). Something may be informative even if no one
yet knows it, however. We might think of information as embodying
potential knowledge for some suitable cognitive agent in the right
circumstances. If we analyse knowledge in terms of possible worlds,
we should expect a similar approach to information to be available.
According to the Bar-Hillel-Carnap theory of information (Bar-
Hillel and Carnap 1953, Bar-Hillel 1964), the informative job of a
sentence A consists in partitioning the totality of possible worlds into
those where A is true and those where it is false. We may identify
the information with the partitioning function, which in effect says
‘yes’ to some possible worlds and ‘no’ to all the others. Or we might
identify the information with the set of ‘yes’ worlds. (Mathematically
speaking, the former is the characteristic function of the latter set.
The two approaches are, in a straightforward mathematical sense,
equivalent.)
You might notice the similarity to the possible worlds account
of propositions: both are treated as sets of possible worlds. That’s
no coincidence. On this approach, the information contained in a
sentence (in a context) is precisely the proposition expressed by an
utterance of it (in that context).
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This gives us a static notion of information, as something that’s
possessed by a sentence or proposition.The possible worlds approach
also allows us to account for a dynamic notion of information, of
becoming informed of such-and-such.When a cognitive agent gains
the information (and, let’s suppose, thereby learns) that raccoons like
to somersault, we can model this in terms of ruling out the worlds
where it is not the case that raccoons like to somersault. (Perhaps
the raccoons of those worlds have different tastes; perhaps there are
no raccoons there at all.) By ‘rule out’, we don’t mean that the agent
thereby treats those worlds as impossibilities. Rather, she rules them
out as contenders for actuality: the ways things are, for all she knows.
Indicative Conditionals
Conditionality may also be dealt with using possible worlds. Many
philosophers and logicians are unsatisfied with the material condi-
tional, ‘⊃’, taken as the operator given by the usual (two-valued) truth
table: ‘A ⊃ B’ is false when A is true and B false, true otherwise. This
delivers two inferences which have sometimes be called ‘paradoxes
of the material conditional’ (Anderson and Belnap 1975, MacColl
1908, Routley et al. 1982):
(1.5) If ¬A, then A ⊃ B
(1.6) If B, then A ⊃ B
If we try to understand the English indicative conditional ‘if …
then’ in terms of ⊃, many seemingly false conditionals will come out
true, just because their antecedent is false, or their consequent true:
(1.7) If Obama is Canadian, then the Moon is made of green cheese.
(1.8) If Strasbourg is in Germany, then Obama is American.
One reason to reject these is that there is no relevant connection
between their antecedent and consequent: what’s Obama’s nationality
got to do with the constitution of the moon, or the location of
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European cities? Another reason to reject (1.7) and (1.8) is that
any connection between their antecedent and consequent seems far
too contingent. Even if Obama were Canadian, the moon would not
be a giant cheeseball.
This suggests an alternative conception of the conditional on which,
for ‘if A, then B’ to be true, it cannot be the case that A is true while
B is false. This analysis gives us the strict conditional, ‘J’. ‘A J B’
is true just in case there is no possible world in which A is true but
B is not. The strict conditional is the necessitation of the material
conditional: A J B is understood as ◻(A ⊃ B). It’s easy to see that
(1.5) and (1.6) are invalid when we replace ‘⊃’ with ‘J’. (Whether
this move really avoids the worries is something we’ll come back to
below, in §1.3 and Chapter 6).
Counterfactual Conditionals
Possible worlds have also been used to give a semantics for counter-
factual conditionals. These are conditionals of the form ‘if it were
(or, had been) the case that A, then it would be (or, have been)
the case that B’, symbolized as ‘A ◻→ B’. Counterfactuals are so-
called because, in a typical use, they have a false antecedent, contra
factum. In explaining why kangaroos have tails, for example, we
might say ‘well, if kangaroos had no tails, they would topple over’
(Lewis 1973b).
(Many philosophers use ‘counterfactual’ for any conditional of the
form, ‘if it were …, then it would be …’, even if the antecedent is
true (Bennett 2003, Lewis 1973b, Williamson 2007). Others prefer
to talk of ‘subjunctive conditionals’. We’ll will stick to the standard
‘counterfactuals’ terminology for all such conditionals.)
Counterfactuals are extremely important in our cognitive lives.
We conceive counterfactual alternatives to reality in order to explore
what would or would not happen, were those alternatives realized.
Would John not have been injured, had he avoided crossing the road?
They are also important in understanding history (Nolan 2016b):
what if Hitler had had the A-bomb in 1944? They may help us to
understand the concept of causation better (Lewis 1973a, Paul 2004;
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see Paul 2009, Paul and Hall 2013 for in-depth discussion). So it’s
important to give a semantic analysis of counterfactuals.
How? That counterfactuals must be modal conditionals can
be argued by comparing them to the corresponding indicative
conditionals:
(1.9) If Kate Bush didn’t write ‘The Kick Inside’, someone else did.
(1.10) If Kate Bush hadn’t written ‘The Kick Inside’, someone else
would have.
These have the same antecedent and consequent (in different moods),
but different truth values. (1.9) seems true.We know that someone
wrote ‘The Kick Inside’, so if it wasn’t Kate Bush, it must have been
someone else. By contrast, (1.10) seems false: ‘The Kick Inside’ might
never have been written, if it hadn’t been for Kate Bush. So even if one
insists that (1.9) be taken as a material conditional, (1.10) seems to be
of a different kind. The difference in mood between (1.9) and (1.10)
has been understood as getting us to evaluate (1.10) by looking at
alternative ways things could have been, that is, at alternative possible
worlds.
Which worlds? The mainstream treatment of counterfactuals, due
to Stalnaker (1968) and Lewis (1973b), says that we should evaluate
‘if kangaroos had no tails, they would topple over’ by looking to the
closest possible worlds where kangaroos have no tails. We then see
whether kangaroos topple over there. Closeness between worlds is
understood as involving (contextually determined) similarity in the
relevant respects. So evaluating a counterfactual will typically involve
theminimal change (with respect to the world of evaluation) required
to verify the antecedent. We disregard worlds where kangaroos have
no tails but help themselves with crutches, or have evolved wings.
Overall: ‘A ◻→ B’ is true (at world w) iff the closest(-to-w) possible
A-worlds are B-worlds.
(What if several possible worlds tie for closeness? Do we require
all closest A-worlds to be B-worlds? Or some? Or most? What if the
A-worlds get forever closer and closer to ours, with none being the
the problem(s) of hyperintensionality 21
closest? These are tricky questions: Kratzer (1981), Lewis (1973b,
1981), and Nute (1975) discuss them in detail. We won’t get into
them here.)
Possible worlds have also been used in the analyses of essence and
de re modality (Lewis 1986b), and of metaphysical dependence and
supervenience (Bennett 2004, Davidson 1970). Many physicalist
philosophers of mind, including Horgan (1982, 1993), Kim (1982,
1993), and Lewis (1983), express their commitment to physicalism
about mental states in terms of supervenience, cashed out in terms
of possible worlds. But, for reasons we won’t go into here, we don’t
think a worlds-based approach is the best way to capture notions
of essence or dependence. (We’re largely persuaded by Fine’s (1994)
arguments.) So we won’t discuss these applications any further.
Possible worlds are a success story of philosophical theorizing.
Still, most of the accounts using them, which we have just sketched,
face issues. The umbrella under which many of these can be gathered
is the concept of hyperintensionality, to which we now turn.
1.3 The Problem(s) of Hyperintensionality
Hyperintensionality can be characterized as a feature of concepts. A
concept is hyperintensional when it draws a distinction between
necessarily equivalent contents, where the relevant necessity is
unrestricted: logical, mathematical, or metaphysical, if we stick to
the threefold distinction mentioned above. If the relevant concept
is expressed by an operator ℋ, then ℋ is hyperintensional when
ℋA and ℋB can differ in truth value, in the face of A and B’s being
necessarily (logically, mathematically, or metaphysically) equivalent.
(Cresswell (1975) originally defined ‘hyperintensional’ to pick out a
position in a sentence in which logical equivalents cannot be replaced
salva veritate. But, as Nolan (2014, 151) notes, it is now common to
use the term more broadly, with ‘necessary equivalence’ in place of
‘logical equivalence’.)
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This characterization of hyperintensionality is a contrastive one.
It tells us that a concept or operator is hyperintensional when it is
more fine-grained than intensional or (normal) modal concepts or
operators, marking a distinction invisible to the latter. It does not yet
provide us with a full-fledged characterization of hyperintensionality,
and it says nothing about ‘just “how hyper” hyperintensions are’
(Jespersen and Duzi 2015, 527). Different hyperintensional notions
may display different degrees of fine-grainedness. We discuss this key
issue in Chapter 8.
The problems we are about to examine affect the possible worlds
accounts introduced in §1.2. The problems emerged over the last
few decades in piecemeal fashion. But a single issue underlies them
all: they are hyperintensional notions, making distinctions more fine-
grained than the standard possible worlds approach can easily model.
Propositions: Triviality
If we take propositions, the meanings or content of sentences, as
sets of possible worlds, then necessarily equivalent propositions are
one and the same proposition: possible worlds never disagree on
necessarily equivalent sentences. Assuming again that mathematical
and logical necessity are unrestricted, ‘if Obama is human, then
Obama is human’ and ‘7 + 5 = 12’ are true in the same possible
worlds: all of them. So they express the same proposition, viz., the
total set of worlds.
This seems wrong: the sentences should have different meanings.
They speak of different things: only one is about Obama.We have a
dual problem with sentences that cannot be true, like ‘Obama is both
human and not human’ and ‘7+5 = 13’. These would also express the
same possible-worlds proposition: the empty set of possible worlds.
This seems just as bad a result as the first: the two sentences have
different meanings and are about very different things: the first is
about Obama, the second is not.
This problem is particularly evident when we turn to the kinds
of propositions typically expressed when we do metaphysics. Many
metaphysical claims are such that, if they are true, or false, they are
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necessarily so. This includes claims of modal metaphysics, such as
statements about the very nature of possible worlds. If we say that
possible worlds have such-and-such natures, then we seem committed
to that claim being necessarily true. After all, if it were possibly false,
then it would be false at some possible world, which seems to make
little sense. (Just how powerful this argument is depends on how we
take worlds to represent a particular state of affairs: we’ll discuss this
issue in chapters 2 and 3.)
Many other metaphysical claims seem to be necessary (if true at all):
Hegel’s doctrine of the Absolute Geist, Plato’s view of ideas as purely
intelligible forms, and Armstrong’s claim that there are immanent
multiply instantiated universals, do not seem to be contingent claims.
Defenders and objectors of these views alike agree that these are
distinct viewpoints, expressed by distinct propositions. If that’s right,
then each view corresponds either to the set of all worlds (if true),
or to the empty set (if false). But since these are three distinct views,
expressed through three distinct propositions, those propositions are
not plain sets of possible worlds.
Here’s a further puzzle to bring out the problem. Suppose Anna
and Valeria are debating the nature of properties. Anna says (P) that
they’re transcendent Platonic universals, whereas Valeria says (I) that
they’re immanent universals. Each view corresponds either to the set
of all worlds (if true), or to the empty set (if false). Suppose further
than both Anna and Valeria believe that propositions are sets of
possible world. Then Anna must accept that her claim is identical
to the claim that P ∨ I (since she believes P is necessarily true, I is
necessarily false, and hence that P and P ∨ I each correspond to the
set of all worlds).
Similarly, Valeria must accept that her claim is identical to the
claim that P ∨ I (since she believes that P is necessarily false, that
I is necessarily true, and hence that I and P ∨ I each correspond
to the set of all worlds). But if each accepts that their claim is
identical to the claim that P ∨ I, they must accept that their claims
are identical, which neither will accept. If they are to have a serious
debate about the nature of properties, therefore, they should reject
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their beliefs that propositions are sets of possible worlds. Genuine,
rational metaphysical debate is possible only on the assumption that
propositions are not sets of possible worlds.
Knowledge and Belief: Logical Omniscience
Historically, one of the first manifestations of the hyperintensionality
issue came from the modal treatment of epistemic and doxastic
concepts. Here, the issue is logical omniscience: a cluster of closure
conditions on knowledge and belief, which come as a spin-off of
Hintikka’s (1962) possible-worlds approach (§1.2). Perhaps the most
important closure effects of Hintikka’s clause (H) above are:
(C1) If KA and A entails B, then KB
(C2) If A is valid, then KA
(C3) It is not the case that: KA and K¬A
and similarly for belief. (We will find a more comprehensive list of
closure conditions in §5.1.)
(C1), often dubbed Closure under entailment or Full omniscience,
says that one knows all the entailments or logical consequences of
what one knows. The principle also applies to the possible-worlds
semantics for belief: one believes all the logical consequences of what
one believes. (C2), Knowledge of all valid formulas, says that one
knows all the logical truth (and similarly for beliefs).When we define
validity as entailment by the null set of premises, (C2) is a special case
of (C1). (C3) guarantees Consistency of knowledge: one can never
have inconsistent knowledge, and the corresponding principle says
one can never have inconsistent beliefs.
These conditions follow directly from interpreting the relevant
epistemic notions as restricted quantifiers over possible worlds. For
instance, (C1) holds once we understand A’s entailing B as the claim
that B is true at all possible worlds (of all models of the epistemic
logic at issue) where A is true. Then, if A is known (believed), it holds
at all the epistemically accessible possible worlds. But if A entails B,
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then B holds at all those worlds too, and so B is known (believed) as
well. (C2) holds when we understand the logical validity of A as its
holding in all possible worlds (of all models, etc.). Then, in particular,
a valid A holds at all the epistemically accessible worlds, and so is
automatically known (believed).
For applications in computer science, such principles are often
taken as harmless (Fagin et al. 1995, chapter 9). However, it is
generally admitted that they deliver implausibly idealized notions
of knowledge and belief, having little to do with human cognition.
Against (C1), for instance: we know basic arithmetic truths like
Peano’s postulates, and these entail (let us suppose) Goldbach’s
Conjecture; but we don’t know whether Goldbach’s Conjecture is
true. Against (C2): Excluded Middle is (let us suppose) valid, but
intuitionist logicians do not believe it, and so do not know it either.
As for (C3): there cannot be inconsistent knowledge, given that
knowledge is factive and assuming there are no true contradictions.
But real, finite, and fallible cognitive agents may well have inconsistent
beliefs. They may even believe the relevant inconsistencies explicitly,
and take themselves as justified in doing so (e.g., dialetheists believe
that the Liar sentence is both true and false (Priest 1987)).
An answer one sometimes hears is that K in (H) expresses not
knowledge or belief, but rather some derivative attitude, characterized
in terms of knowledge or belief: what an agent is logically committed
to, given what else she knows or believes. This leaves us in want of a
logical account of knowledge and belief for real agents, as opposed to
some conditional commitment. One may also question this account
of epistemic or doxastic commitment. Is an intuitionistic logician
really committed to Excluded Middle (given classical logic)? Are
those of us with inconsistent beliefs – all of us! – really committed to
everything being true, given that a contradiction classically implies
every sentence?
Information: Triviality and Overload
The possible worlds Bar-Hillel-Carnap analysis of information has
similar issues to the account of knowledge and belief. ‘If Obama is
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human, then Obama is human’ and ‘xn + yn = zn has no integer
solutions for n > 2’ are both necessarily true. So there is no possible
world ruled out by learning either. On the Bar-Hillel-Carnap analysis,
neither are genuinely informative, and so neither are learnable. But
while the former is easily deemed true by competent speakers of
English, the truth of the latter is non-trivial in the extreme. For the
latter is Fermat’s Last Theorem, a proof of which took centuries to
find. The first, by AndrewWiles, was 130-something pages long.
The problem generalizes.A possible worlds analysis of information
entails that no logical, mathematical, or metaphysical truth can be
informative. It denies, in particular, the informativeness of any logical
deduction or mathematical proof, and thus the epistemic value of
devoting one’s time to the study of mathematics or logic. But some
deductions and proofs are obviously informative. This can depend on
the fact that the conclusion has high syntactic or semantic complexity,
but it need not be so. Fermat’s Last Theorem is expressed by a sentence
anyone with high school maths can understand. But recognition of
its truth, via proof, is extremely complicated.
Even simple proofs, like short truth table calculations, can be
informative. Students who have just mastered the truth table for the
material conditional may be surprised to find out that Frege’s Law,
(A ⊃ (B ⊃ C)) ⊃ ((A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃ C)), is a tautology, or that for
all A and B, either A ⊃ B or B ⊃ A. It is part of the explanation of
why they are surprised, that they acquire new information. It seems,
then, that there is a legitimate notion of information whereby one
can learn, or become informed of, a tautology.
Indicative Conditionals: Irrelevance
The possible worlds treatment of conditionality is not free from
problems either. We have seen that the strict conditional ‘A J B’ is
free from the paradoxes of the material conditional. But it has its
own so-called ‘paradoxes of the strict conditional’:
(1.11) If ¬◇A, then A J B
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(1.12) If ◻B, then A J B
If B is true in all possible worlds, or A in none, then there is no
possible world where A is true and B is false, so ‘A J B’ is true too.
Interpreting the ‘if …, then …’ of English as the strict conditional,
this makes many seemingly false conditionals true, just because their
antecedent is impossible, or their consequent is necessary:
(1.13) If 5 + 7 = 13, then Obama is Canadian.
(1.14) If Obama is American, then 5 + 7 = 12.
These look bad because of the irrelevance phenomenon. There
seems to be no connection between the antecedent and consequent:
they are about wholly distinct things. Given the necessity of logical
truth and the impossibility of logical falsity, we also get true strict
conditionals whose consequent is a truth of logic, or whose antecedent
is a falsity of logic, e.g., of the following form:
(1.15) A J (B J B)
(1.16) A J (B ∨ ¬B)
(1.17) (A ∧ ¬A) J B
These also look bad due to irrelevance: what A is about may have
nothing to do with what B is about. Take an instance of (1.16), ‘if the
Moon is made of green cheese, then either Nottingham is in Scotland,
or not’. Does that sound correct? (We will come back to this kind of
irrelevance phenomenon in Chapter 6.)
Counterfactual Conditionals: Counterpossibles
Counterfactuals with impossible antecedents are called counterpos-
sibles. The Lewis-Stalnaker treatment of counterfactuals delivers
vacuism: the view that all counterpossibles are vacuously true. If
‘A ◻→ B’ is true when all the closest A-worlds are B-worlds, and
there are no A-worlds, then it comes out automatically true. (Just as
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‘all hobbits in this room are tiny’ is true, trivially, given that there are
no hobbits in the room.) So a counterfactual ‘A ◻→ B’ will be trivially
true whenever its antecedent is impossible. To add insult to injury,
the conditional with the same antecedent and negated consequent,
‘A ◻→ ¬B’, will also be trivially true.
Some philosophers believe that, appearances to the contrary
notwithstanding, this is all right (we discuss this kind of view in
Chapter 12). However, many – including Nolan (1997), Brogaard
and Salerno (2013), Priest (2008), Krakauer (2012), Bjerring (2014),
and Bernstein (2016) – think these results to be problematic. Nolan
(1997) gives a nice example:
(1.18) If Hobbes had (secretly) squared the circle, sick children in
the mountains of South America at the time would have cared.
(1.19) If Hobbes had (secretly) squared the circle, sick children in
the mountains of South America at the time would not have
cared.
Hobbes’ squaring the circle would have made absolutely no difference
to the suffering of those sick children. So (1.19) should come out
true true for this reason, and not merely because there are no worlds
verifying the antecedent. Similarly, (1.18) should come out false. Some
counterpossibles are false; and where they are true, typically, they are
not trivially so.
The problem connects in an obvious way to the triviality problem
for possible worlds propositions. We often reason counterfactually
in matters of mathematics, logic, and metaphysics. Vacuism about
counterpossibles can hardly account for this.We make counterfactual
suppositions in all of these areas, perhaps with the purpose of
criticizing a theory by drawing unpalatable consequences. Such a
practice is trivialized if counterpossibles are all true. Imagine Hilbert
arguing against Brouwer that, if intuitionism were true, then much
of standard mathematics would be lost, for we could not then resort
to impredicative definitions. Vacuism makes any such claim devoid
of dialectical content. For given vacuism (and classical logic), we
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can also truthfully assert that, if intuitionism were true, nothing of
standard mathematics is lost. Indeed, this claim would be equivalent
to Hilbert’s; yet it is what Hilbert wanted to deny.
Taken together, these problems provide a strong case against the
possible worlds approach. It might even be that they provide reason
to abandon all attempts to analyse these notions in terms of worlds
(Fine 1975a, 2012a, 2019).
However, we needn’t abandon a worlds-based analysis of these
concepts. The problems we’ve just sketched show that we can’t give
good enough analyses using only possible worlds. We have to be
more open minded.We can give good worlds-based analyses of these
concepts, so long as the worlds in question include possible and
impossible worlds. Using impossible worlds, we can solve a number
of problems faced by possible worlds accounts of knowledge, belief,
meaning, information, and conditionality.
1.4 Impossible Worlds
This book is concerned with worlds that are not possible, with
‘possible’ understood in an unrestricted sense. You might worry that
impossible worlds are metaphysically weird, logically disreputable,
or not really useful for this or that purpose; or that they lose some
crucial benefit of possible worlds accounts. We’ll argue that it ain’t
so. In Chapters 2 and 3, we’ll show that impossible worlds can
be metaphysically acceptable even if, as we’ll discuss there, some
attempts to make themmetaphysically reputable fail. In Chapters 4–7,
we’ll show how impossible worlds have useful logical applications,
and that they may, but need not, involve a departure from classical
logic. We’ll discuss philosophical applications of impossible worlds
in Chapters 8–12. As we go, we’ll address some of the objections that
have been raised against impossible worlds, including, for example,
that they don’t allow for a compositional account of meaning
(Chapter 8).
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The possible worlds framework seems still to be a dominant
conceptual framework of our time for philosophical theorizing.
We’ll argue that the impossible worlds framework constitutes a
net theoretical gain. The late twentieth century saw an intensional
revolution centred on the notion of possible world. The early twenty-
first century is seeing what Nolan (2014) called a hyperintensional
revolution. Impossible worlds are at home in this revolution.
They aren’t the only theoretical tool that’s been suggested for
analysing hyperintensionality. An alternative is the structured propo-
sitions approach of King (1995, 1996, 2007), Soames (1985, 1987),
and others. Another one comes from Pavel Tichy’s transparent
intensional logic (Duzi et al. 2010). Other recent approaches include
Fine’s truthmaker semantics (Fine 2012a, 2014, 2019) and Yablo
(2014)’s work on aboutness, which enriches possible worlds semantics
with divisions of the space of worlds itself. We shan’t discuss these
here in any detail. We’ve discussed structured propositions elsewhere
Jago (2014a, 2015, 2017).Whatever its merits in accounts of content,
it cannot claim to be a general account of hyperintensional logical
or philosophical notions. Ripley (2012) compares the impossible
worlds and structured propositions approaches to hyperintensionality,
coming down forcefully on the side of the former.
(Truthmaker semantics is an exciting recent development. As a
general philosophical approach to hyperintensionality, it is at present
underdeveloped, but has great potential. We don’t think it can be
a general approach to hyperintensional notions. It seems that any
truthmaker involving James Newell Osterberg is thereby a truthmaker
involving Iggy Pop, since Osterberg is Iggy Pop. But one can believe
that Iggy Pop co-wrote David Bowie’s ‘China Girl’ without believing
that Osterberg did. So we don’t see how epistemic or doxastic contents
could be modelled using truthmaker semantics.)
Our aim is to investigate, develop, and defend the way of impossible
worlds. Of the other ways, we won’t say much. (For an assessment of
the relative merits of the structured propositions approach, aboutness
à la Yablo, truthmaking à la Fine, and impossible worlds, in the
treatment of hyperintensionality, see Gioulatou (2016).) So let us turn
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to the obvious question: what’s an impossible world? (The following
material draws on Berto and Jago 2018.)
A look at the literature on impossible worlds (which is rapidly
growing: see Nolan 2013 for a survey) presents us with a number
of different definitions. These can be reduced to four main ways of
treating impossible worlds, ordered from the more to the less general:
Impossible ways: Just as possible worlds are characterized as ways
things could have been, so are impossible worlds often characterized
as ways things could not have been. The initial insight is that not
everything is possible. Some things just (absolutely) cannot happen.
Anything that just can’t happen must be an absolute impossibility;
and these ways the world just couldn’t be are impossible worlds.
Beall and van Fraassen (2003), Restall (1997),Salmon (1984), and
Yagisawa (1988) think of impossible worlds in this way.
Logic violators: Another definition has it that impossible worlds
are worlds where the laws of logic fail. This approach depends on
what we take the laws of logic to be.Given some logicL, an impossible
world with respect to the L-laws is one in which some of those
laws fail to hold (Priest 2008, chapter 9). An impossible world in
this second sense will also be impossible in the first sense, so long
as the logic L in question is no stronger than the logic governing
logical possibility. But for dialethists or intuitionists, a world violating
containing contradictions, or failing excluded middle, won’t count
as a way the world couldn’t be, and so won’t count as an impossible
world in the first sense.Whichever logic is operative, there are worlds
which count as impossible in the first but not in this second sense.
If the Continuum Hypothesis of set theory is true (and, logicists are
wrong!), some world where the Continuum Hypothesis fails may
well be impossible in the first sense without thereby violating any law
of the chosen logic.
Classical logic violators: Another definition has it that impos-
sible worlds are worlds where the laws of classical logic fail (Priest
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1997a). This definition gives the same results as the previous one if
we take the laws of logic to be the classical ones, but not otherwise.
A world complying with intuitionistic logic, but where instances of
Excluded Middle fail, will be impossible in this third sense.
Contradiction-realizers: A still narrower definition has it that
an impossible world is one where sentences of the form A and ¬A
hold, against the Law of Non-Contradiction (Lycan 1994). Impossible
worlds of the fourth kind will be impossible in the third sense, since
they thereby violate classical logic. But not vice versa: an intuitionistic
world will have the Law of Non-Contradiction hold unrestrictedly,
and so will be impossible in the third, but not the fourth, sense.
Talk of impossible worlds as ways things could (absolutely) not have
been might suggest that these worlds are, themselves, impossible
objects. An impossible object is an object which could not possibly
exist and so does not in fact exist. Yet defenders of impossible worlds
claim that they do in fact exist. (Or rather, most of their defenders
do. Those who don’t have a different view of what existence is. We
will discuss the issue of the existence of impossible worlds in §2.3.)
This isn’t an issue for impossible worlds only. By the same
reasoning, we could say: possible worlds (other than the actual world)
are merely possible objects and so not actually existing objects. And
yet their defenders say that they do in fact actually exist. (Or rather,
most of their defenders do. Those who don’t have a different view
of what actuality is. We will discuss the genuine realist approach, on
which possible worlds exist but may not actually exist, in §2.2.)
For now, it will suffice to stick to an analogy. Assume that some
Escher drawings represent impossible situations. This does not make
them impossible. They are not merely possible entities either: they
really, actually exist. So actual entities can represent impossible
situations.A core part of our investigation into impossible worlds will
concern how they manage to represent the situations they represent.
(Don’t take the Escher drawing analogy too far: we don’t want to
claim that worlds represent pictorially, in the way pictures do.)
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The question of how worlds (possible and impossible) represent
what they represent is tied up with the question of what they are,
metaphysically speaking. This question will occupy Chapters 2 and 3.
We’ll investigate the issue by first looking at what possible worlds are,
metaphysically speaking. Of each of the plausible options, we then
ask whether it may be extended to account for impossible worlds.
Some readers may discern no serious issue here. Some modal
logicians take the instrumentalist line, on which the set of worlds
W may be any old bunch of objects with some relations between
them. Anything that does the job will do. This seems philosophically
unsatisfactory, just as it seems unsatisfactory to talk of moral
properties, or abstract universals, or truth, and yet to refuse to
consider their nature. If it is good to understand various concepts
in terms of worlds, possible or impossible, then we want to know
why this is so. It is difficult to answer the question without saying
something about what kind of things worlds are. (Of course, it’s often
fine to work with worlds without considering their nature, if one
is merely postponing, rather than forever refusing to answer, that
question.)
Before we get to the logical and philosophical applications of
impossible worlds (Parts II and III), therefore, we will investigate
the metaphysics of worlds. But, before we get to the metaphysics
of worlds and the issue of how worlds represent impossibilities, we
should ask whether we can represent impossibilities. For if we can’t,
there is less work to do for impossible worlds in logic and philosophy.
1.5 Conceivability and Possibility
Hyperintensionality is typically thought to involve representational
contexts. Impossible worlds have a role to play, first of all, in
modelling representational mental states, or thoughts, whose hy-
perintensional nature is tied to the fact that their content involves
absolute impossibilities in some way or other.
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But can we actually think about the impossible? Can we have
mental representations – intentional states of the mind – directed to
impossible contents? A venerable philosophical tradition denies this.
Hume is the most quoted authority:
’Tis an establish’d maxim in metaphysics, that whatever the
mind clearly conceives includes the idea of possible existence, or
in other words, that nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible.
(Hume 1739/1978, I, ii, 2)
We think that Hume’s maxim is wrong (as do Byrne (2007),
Fiocco (2007), Kung (2010), and Priest (2016a), among others).
Arguing for this requires us to say something about conceivability
and imagination. These are highly ambiguous notions. One way to
clarify them consists in asking how mental representations in general
represent, and looking at answers provided by cognitive psychologists.
(We now follow Berto and Schoonen 2018.) The literature presents
two main candidate codings for mental representations: the linguistic
and the pictorial, the difference between the two consisting in the
degree of arbitrariness of the representation relation (Paivio 1986).
Pictorial mental representations are gathered under the rubric
of ‘mental imagery’, and characterized by reference to sensory
perception. They are ‘quasi-perceptual experiences’ (Thomas 2014,
Introduction), for they resemble perceptual representation, but can
occur in the absence of the actual stimuli. Studies on neuroimaging,
such as Ganis et al. 2004, seem to show that visual mental imagery
(the most studied kind of imagery) activates about 90% of the
same cerebral areas activated by visual perception, though the
interpretation of such results is somewhat controversial.
Visual mental imagery is often claimed to have spatial or quasi-
spatial features.When we entertain imagery of this kind, we represent
objects and situations typically in three-dimensional egocentric space.
These representations are available for ‘parallel processing’ because
they have some kind of mereological structure (Paivio 1986, 198).You
can represent to yourself in this way the arrangement of your living
room and describe its contents from different viewpoints, mentally
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scanning the objects included there from top to bottom or from left
to right; you can mentally zoom into a corner, and so on. Of course,
psychologists who work on mental images do not claim that they
are real pictures, hence the frequent use of the ‘quasi-’ prefix. The
claim that the parts of a pictorial mental representation correspond
to the parts of the represented scenario, with the relative distances
respected, comes with the proviso that ‘part’ and ‘distance’ should be
understood functionally rather than spatially (see e.g. Kosslyn and
Pomerantz 1977).
Linguistic mental representation, by contrast, is arbitrary in the
same way that the connection between words and what they mean
is arbitrary. Such representations are called ‘amodal’ to stress that
they are disconnected from sensory modalities in a way pictorial
representations are not. According to Paivio (1986, 198), linguistic
mental representations are processed serially, the way we process the
meanings of sentences through their subsentential components.This is
taken as evidence that linguistic representations lack the mereological
and quasi-spatial features of (visual) pictorial ones.
Paivio’s dual coding theory has it that there are precisely two codes
for mental representations: the linguistic and the pictorial. Cognition
works with two functionally independent (though interacting) sys-
tems handling representations of the two kinds. The usefulness of
having two systems, according to some, lies in the different contents
the two are apt to represent: pictorial imagery is more suitable for
concrete situations which are proximal in space and time, whereas
linguistic representation works better for abstract scenarios involving
non-perceptual features (Amit et al. 2009).
(Some psychologists, including Pylyshyn (1973, 2002), think that
there is really just one kind of mental representation. They attempt to
reduce the pictorial to the linguistic.This involves the ‘imagery debate’
or ‘analog/propositional debate’, to which we return in Chapter 7.)
We argued in Berto and Schoonen (2018) that, if mental representa-
tions involved in conceivability represent linguistically, then Hume’s
maxim cannot even get off the ground. If we make the plausible
assumption that linguistic mental representations have at least the
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same representational power as the expressions of natural languages
like English, then of course we can conceive, by linguistically mentally
representing it, the impossible. Logically impossible sentences of
ordinary English can be perfectly meaningful.
Quine (1948) argues that contradictions can be meaningful. He
makes the point as a response to his fictional philosopher Wyman,
sometimes taken as representing Meinong’s view (to which we will
come back in §2.3) that some things do not exist. Wyman believes
that things like Pegasus ought to be admitted in our ontological
catalogue, as possibilia, for otherwise it would make no sense to say
that Pegasus is not. By parity of reasoning, says Quine, we ought to
admit the round square cupola on Berkeley College; otherwise, it
would make no sense to even say that it is not. But accepting this
brings inconsistency. Wyman reacts by declaring that inconsistent
conditions are meaningless. We find Quine’s reply spotless:
Certainly the doctrine [that contradictions are meaningless]
has no intrinsic appeal; and it has led its devotees to such
quixotic extremes as that of challenging the method of proof by
reductio ad absurdum – a challenge in which I sense a reductio
ad absurdum of the doctrine itself.
Moreover, the doctrine of meaninglessness of contradictions has
the severe methodological drawback that it makes it impossible,
in principle, ever to devise an effective test of what is meaningful
and what is not. It would be forever impossible for us to devise
systematic ways of deciding whether a string of signs made
sense – even to us individually, let alone other people – or not.
For it follows from a discovery in mathematical logic, due to
Church (1936), that there can be no generally applicable test of
contradictoriness. (Quine 1948, 34–5)
Graham Priest, a friend of true contradictions, agrees (for once!) with
Quine:
If contradictions had no content, there would be nothing to
disagree with when someone uttered one, which there (usually)
is. Contradictions do, after all, have meaning. If they did
not, we could not even understand someone who asserted a
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contradiction, and so evaluate what they say as false (or maybe
true). We might not understand what could have brought a
person to assert such a thing, but that is a different matter and
the same is equally true of someone who, in broad daylight,
asserts the clearly meaningful ‘It is night’. (Priest 1998, 417)
Now suppose that, instead, there are irreducibly pictorial mental
representations. Then the question for supporters of Hume’s maxim
is: does pictorial imagination work purely pictorially, or not? Does
the relevant mental imagery represent a situation without any
language-like arbitrary assignment of meaning, but just via the
phenomenological similarity of the imagery to the worldly situation?
It is controversial whether mental representation can ever work
purely pictorially. Fodor (1975) argues that pictorial mental repre-
sentation has a role in cognition only insofar as it works as ‘imagery
under description’, that is, insofar as the imagery comes endowed
with linguistic labels: linguistic mental representations pinning down
what the image is about. If so, then the arbitrariness of the relevant
linguistic labels allows us to imagine the impossible.
Kung (2010) argues that this stipulative labelling component
gives pictorial imagination its power to represent the impossible: for
example, by stipulating the identity of the imagined objects. Imagine
Tim kissing John. The phenomenology of the mental imagery can
be such that the represented figures are relevantly similar to Tim
and John: hair colour, eyes, bodies. But what makes the imagining
count as a representation of a scenario in which Tim kisses John
is that one takes one figure as representing Tim and the other as
representing John. And just as one can imagine Tim kissing John (a
possible scenario), so can one imagine Tim as a cleverly disguised
robot. One labels the imagined person-lookalike, which turns out to
be filled with circuits and transistors, as Tim. But Tim (suppose) is
essentially human, so this scenario is metaphysically impossible.
What if we do have pictorial mental imagery that represents purely
pictorially? Then it may be that scenarios imagined in this way must
be possible. But mental imagery of this kind would be quite limited in
scope (Berto and Schoonen 2018). Some labelling seems to be needed
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whenever perceptual experience has a content that goes beyond
mere shapes and colours (Siegel 2006, Siewert 1998). You see a
face and a nose, rather than merely face-like and nose-like shapes.
Your experience comes labelled: the nose-like shape as a nose and
the face-like shape as a face.
Purely pictorial mental imagery on its own would be limited, in
particular, as a tool of modal epistemology. Philosophers discuss
whether the imaginability of intrinsic universals, time travel, or a
supreme being having all perfections to the highest degree entails
their absolute possibility. (Van Inwagen (1998) doubts that we can
imagine these things; see Hawke 2011 for a discussion.) Imagination
here cannot be purely pictorial, for it involves abstract objects and
properties far removed from sensory perception. In these debates,
‘imagination’ seems to be understood more broadly than the purely
pictorial characterization allows.
If, finally, mental representations are taken to be neither linguistic
nor pictorial, this leaves the supporters of Hume’s maxim with a
heavy burden of proof. They seem forced to invoke a peculiar ‘third
code’ of representation, with no counterpart in general theories of
representation. It’s then up to Humeans to provide a plausible theory
of how that notion works. Absent a workable theory, the approach
is relying on representational magic. In short, we have good reason
to hold that we can mentally represent absolute impossibilities.
Chapter Summary
Possible worlds are ways things might have been (§1.1). They find
applications in analysing possibility and necessity; propositions;
knowledge and belief; information; and indicative and counterfactual
conditionals (§1.2). But possible worlds semantics faces the issue of
hyperintensionality, generated by concepts that require distinctions
between logical or necessary equivalents. The problems of distin-
guishing equivalent propositions, of logical omniscience, of infor-
mation overload, of irrelevant conditionals, and of counterpossible
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conditionals, are all instances of the general issue (§1.3). Adding
impossible worlds promises to help with these puzzles (§1.4). But
can we genuinely think about the impossible? We argued that we can
(§1.5).

2Metaphysics
2.1 Ways of Thinking about Worlds
We now investigate the metaphysics of possible and impossible
worlds. What are such worlds like? And how do they manage
to represent whatever it is they represent? (A difficult question
concerning the granularity with which impossible worlds represent
what they represent will appear in §8.4.) Our general approach will be
to begin with a theory of possible worlds, and to ask whether it may
be extended to accommodate impossible worlds.We will structure
our discussion around four central questions:
(Realism) Should we be realist or anti-realist about non-actual
worlds?
(Existence) Do non-actual worlds exist, or are they non-existent
entities?
(Genuineness) Are non-actual worlds genuine worlds or ersatz
entities?
(Parity) Should we give the same answer to the three questions
above for both possible and impossible worlds?
While the first three questions require answers from any possible
worlds theorist, the fourth one is specifically addressed to impossible
worlds theorists like ourselves.
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The first two questions – realism and existence – sound similar,
but they might differ in an important way. Realism asks whether
we should talk about non-actual worlds when we’re being most
metaphysically serious: should we quantify over non-actual worlds
at all, using our most serious metaphysical quantifiers, and therefore
(following Quine (1948)) accept commitment to such things in our
metaphysics? If we answer yes to realism, then existence asks,
should we say those worlds exist, or should we instead say they are
non-existent entities? Now according to Quine himself, and many
others (e.g. Van Inwagen (2008)), one who answers yes to the first
question is automatically committed to the existence of the relevant
objects, for existence is captured by the quantifier. But, as we will see
in 2.3, others disagree on this reduction of existence to quantification.
Let’s probe the question of realism a little further. People draw
the realism/anti-realism contrast in different ways. Sometimes, anti-
realism about X simply means the view that the X’s aren’t objects
of genuine, ontologically committing quantification. Other times, it
means that the X’s are mind-dependent parts of reality. (This is what
‘anti-realism’ often means in logic and mathematics. The view that
numbers exist, but are constructions of the human mind, is often
called anti-realist.) Here, we’ll use ‘anti-realism’ about worlds in the
former sense.
All participants in our discussion agree that we get to indulge in
worlds-talk. Realists interpret that talk literally: we’re talking about
parts of reality, which we can refer to and quantify over when we’re
being at our most metaphysically serious. Anti-realists, by contrast,
think that we get to indulge in worlds-talk but without ontological
commitment to non-actual worlds.
Let’s now turn to the remaining two questions, genuineness and
parity. Genuineness asks: should we understand the non-actual
worlds as being on a par, metaphysically speaking, with our own
world? Or should we accord them some other metaphysical status?
Exactly what this means is a delicate matter. We’ll discuss it in §2.2,
where we also explain the terminology of ‘ersatz’ and ‘genuine’ worlds.
Parity is a more straightforward question: should we treat impossible
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worlds as being metaphysically on a par with the merely possible
ones, so that the answers to the first three questions are the same for
both kinds of worlds? Or do impossible worlds require their own
special metaphysical treatment?
We won’t consider all 16 combinations of answers to these
questions. Some combinations do not make much sense, and some
haven’t been discussed at all in the literature. (Aside to potential PhD
students: there are unexplored possibilities here!)We’ll focus on those
combinations which have received the most attention.
2.2 Genuine Realism
Genuine realism says that there exist non-actual worlds very much
like our own. The view usually covers just the possible worlds;
applying it also to impossible worlds gives extended genuine realism.
We’ll first explain what the ‘genuine’ bit in ‘genuine realism’ is
supposed to mean.After that, we’ll take a look at some of the theories
falling into this camp.
The (unextended) view is often put by saying that these worlds
are concrete entities. This won’t quite do for the extended version,
but it nevertheless provides a good conceptual entry point to the
idea. On this approach, it’s possible that there’s a talking wombat
because there exists a possible world which has a talking wombat as
a part. That wombat is a real, flesh-and-blood living creature, just
like our wombats. It’s located in space and time, and is part of the
causal order of that world. That’s the sense in which that wombat is
a concrete entity, and that’s also the sense in which worlds made up
of such entities are concrete worlds.
(This is a good time to Google-image-search ‘wombat’, if you
haven’t done so already.We’ll meet you back here in a bit.)
However, it would be a mistake to identify the genuine worlds
with those made up of concrete entities. When we turn to impossible
worlds, we will need to make room for worlds which differ on
mathematical and logical facts. Such facts, and the entities they
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concern, are typically viewed by philosophers as being non-causal and
located outside time and space.We might, for example, have cause
to consider the impossibility that 3,456 is the largest natural number.
The genuine realist won’t analyse this impossibility in terms of a
concrete world which has the number 3,456 as a concrete part. The
intuition is: even if 3,456 were the largest natural number, it would
still be an abstract mathematical entity. So we shouldn’t identify the
genuine worlds as those that are concrete. (Note that this problem
doesn’t arise with the unextended view. Possible worlds never differ
over logical or mathematical facts, and so, on the unextended view,
mathematical and logical entities don’t need to be treated as parts of
worlds at all.)
For a better analysis of ‘genuine’, let’s return to our talking wombat
world. It’s genuine just in case it contains a real talking wombat.
It represents the existence of a talking wombat by having a real
talking wombat as a part. Similarly, a genuine world represents that
3,456 is the largest natural number by having 3,456, but no larger
natural number, as a part. Genuineness is a matter of how a world
represents, not of whether it is a concrete or an abstract entity.Worlds
that do not represent genuinely are ersatz worlds. The key distinction
between genuine and ersatz (non-genuine) worlds concerns how those
worlds represent. Genuine worlds represent (de dicto) possibilities
and impossibilities directly, by having them as parts. Non-genuine
ersatz worlds represent them in some other way.
Now let’s take a look at some of the theories falling under
the banner of genuine realism. We’ll begin with unextended views
covering just the possible worlds, and then see whether they can be
extended to cover impossible worlds.
Lewisian Realism
Lewis (1986b) views possible worlds as wholes, each unconnected in
space and time from the others, whose parts are themselves concrete
entities located in space and time. Take any spatiotemporal entity,
and take all those entities related to it in space and time. All of those
taken together make for a possible world. So for each world, every
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part of it is spatiotemporally related to every other part of it, but not
to any part of any other world.
The answer to our genuineness question, on this view, is that non-
actual worlds differ from the actual one only in terms of what goes
on at them, not in kind. Indeed, the actual world has no ontological
privilege in this modal metaphysics. According to Lewis, ‘actual’
works like an indexical expression. Just like ‘here’ and ‘now’ refer
to the place and time of utterance, so does ‘actual’ refer to the
world of utterance. The possibility of there being talking wombats is
represented by some non-actual world including talking wombats as
parts. From our own viewpoint, those chatty wombats are non-actual
possibilia: things that lack actual existence. But from their viewpoint,
they are the actual folks, and we are non-actual possibilia.
This approach gives Lewis a reductive definition of possible world.
According to him, one main advantage of genuine modal realism is in
providing an extensional, non-modal account of modal notions. Take
a (non-world-indexed) definition of absolute (de dicto) possibility as
unrestricted quantification over possible worlds:
(P) ◇A is true iff A is true at some world w
Whether this equivalence provides a reduction of possibility to
non-modal concepts depends on whether the notion of world,
involved in the quantification on the right hand side, is itself modal.
Lewisian possible worlds – maximal mereological sums of concrete,
spatiotemporally connected entities – are wholly extensional. And if
certain Lewisian criticisms of ersatzism from his (1986b) are right,
then each ersatz account of worlds on the market may have to resort
to primitive intensional entities (such as propositions) and to primitive
modal notions.We will return to this issue in Chapter 3, where we
investigate ersatz theories in detail.
It is controversial whether Lewisian modal realism can indeed
provide an accurate, reductive, non-modal account of modal notions
(Divers and Melia 2002). Even if it can, this advantage is put at stake
by adding genuine impossible worlds. Once such worlds enter the
stage, (P) becomes false from right to left, insofar as the quantifier
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on the right ranges over all worlds. One then needs a principled
way to restrict that quantifier to possible worlds. Achieving this
without resorting to primitive modal notions can be a tricky issue.
The Lewisian reductive definition of possible world won’t work for
impossible worlds, because (as discussed above) these need to include
non-spatiotemporal entities, such as mathematical entities. So, in
extending the account to include impossible worlds, one may have
to give up on this reductive ambition. The view would then say that
worlds are wholes, with both spatiotemporal and non-spatiotemporal
entities as parts.
It’s not even clear that we can assume that the spatiotemporal
portion of a world will include any entity spatiotemporally connected
to any other part of that world. Such worlds are spatiotemporally
maximal. It seems impossible for reality not to be spatiotemporally
maximal. But then, there will be genuine impossible worlds which
aren’t spatiotemporally maximal.
There is an even more serious worry for the extended Lewisian
approach, however. Lewisian worlds (possible or impossible) obey:
(Exportation) If world w represents something as being F, then
something is F (simpliciter).
To see why this is so, suppose Lewisian worldw represents something
as being F. Then, by definition, w contains an F as a part. Asw is part
of reality, by the (fairly uncontroversial) transitivity of parthood, that
F too is part of reality. It exists, full stop, in just the same sense that
the city of Nottingham exists. Because Lewisian worlds are genuine
worlds, representing possibilities directly by having them as parts,
the represented objects are really out there.
The exportation principle is problematic for any account of
impossible worlds, as Lewis remarks in a famous footnote (Lewis
1986b, 7, fn 3). Exporting merely possible entities or states of
affairs from genuine possible worlds lumbers us with a large and
counterintuitive, but still consistent ontology. (Let’s bracket any
inconsistency worries raised by the specifics of Lewis’s theory. See
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Jago 2016 for discussion.) Exporting impossible entities or states of
affairs from genuine impossible worlds, by contrast, drags us into
contradiction. There is an impossible world at which there is a round
square. If that world is genuine and we can export from genuine
worlds, then there really is an entity which is both round and square.
But it is a necessary truth that no square is round (that’s why the
round square was impossible to begin with!), and so our exported
round entity is also not round. Consequently, it both is and is not
round: contradiction.
Generalizing on this point, ‘at world w’ will distribute across
conjunction and negation when w is a genuine world. That’s because
a genuine world w represents something as being F∧G by containing
a part that’s both F and G; and it represents something as being F
iff it has a part that’s F. So, in particular, to represent something as
being such that Fx ∧ ¬Fx, w must contain a part that both is and is
not F. World w represents that thing as being F. But since that thing
is also not F, it’s false that world w represents it as being F. That’s a
straightforward contradiction: ‘atw, Fx∧¬(atw, Fx)’. Lewis presents
this argument as part of his reason for having no use for genuine
impossible worlds in the first place. It will not help to claim that
one can speak truly by contradicting oneself (only) when the subject
matter is an impossibility (Yagisawa 1988): we are still committed to
there being true contradictions, which is an unwelcome conclusion
to anyone who is not a dialetheist, à la Priest (1987).
Yagisawaian Realism
Yagisawa (2010) gives an alternative to the Lewisian view of worlds.
His account is particularly interesting for our purposes, because he
focuses explicitly on impossible worlds. Yagisawa treats modality
much as four-dimensionalists treat temporal matters. On the latter
view, entities exist and have properties at a time t by having temporal
stages at time t which have those properties. Lenny is Schnauzer-
shaped this Monday in virtue of having a Schnauzer-shaped this-
Monday-stage; he was once a puppy in virtue of having a past
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puppy-stage; and he is always adorable in virtue of all his temporal
stages being adorable.
Similarly, says Yagisawa, entities exist and have properties at
a world w by having modal stages at world w which have those
properties. Lenny is actually Schnauzer-shaped in virtue of having a
Schnauzer-shaped actual-stage; he could have been portly in virtue of
having a (merely) possible portly world-stage; and he is necessarily
canine because all of his world-stages are canine.
We’re unsure whether this approach avoids the exportation worry.
(The following draws on Jago 2013a.) In the temporal case, some
temporally extended entity such as Lenny has properties-at-time-t
in virtue of having t-stages with those properties. This reduces
Lenny’s properties-at-a-time to properties had by his temporal stages.
His Monday-stage is Schnauzer-shaped, simpliciter; that stage is
intrinsically Schnauzer-shaped.
Similarly, in the modal case, Lenny has properties-at-world-w in
virtue of having w-stages with those properties. His w-stage is portly,
simpliciter; that stage is intrinsically portly, even though Lenny (the
collection of all his stages) is not. So the possibility of Lenny’s being a
portly Schnauzer entails that there is a portly Schnauzer stage, perhaps
not actually, but out there somewhere in modal space. That stage
is intrinsically portly and not merely portly-at-w (for some world
w or other). But by the same token, the impossibility of Lenny’s
being a portly-and-slim Schnauzer entails that there is an intrinsically
portly-and-slim Schnauzer stage, certainly not actually, but out there
somewhere in modal space.We can truly say that that stage of Lenny
is both portly and not portly: we have not avoided contradiction.
Yagisawa (2015) responds to this objection on the grounds that
It is integral to [extended genuine realism] that predications in
modal metaphysics be made with careful attention to … modal
tense … on verbs in discourse concerning goings-on at worlds
and goings-on in modal space at large. (Yagisawa 2015, 319)
He describes four modal tenses: ‘actuality tense,mere-possibility tense,
(metaphysical) impossibility tense, and a modal tense specifically
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for predications concerning modal space at large’ (Yagisawa 2015,
319). The idea is that facts about Lenny’s contradictory impossible-
world stage are expressed using the impossibility tense, from which
(according to Yagisawa) we cannot infer contradictions simpliciter.
This is a complex proposal, and we shan’t evaluate it in detail.
We’ll merely note that whether Yagisawa’s approach really does avoid
the worry depends on what we are allowed to express in the ‘modal
space at large’ tense (which Yagisawa marks with an ‘m’ subscript).
This is the tense in which we express what modal space at large looks
like: it contains possible and impossible worlds, with modal stages of
individuals at those worlds. Such facts are expressed in the m-tense.
Since we express the existence of those worlds and the modal stages
at them in the m-tense, it is natural also to express facts about those
worlds and states in that tense.
If so, we’ll be able to express the existence of the Lenny-stage that
both is and is not portly in that tense. But then,Yagisawa’s story about
modal space is itself contradictory, which is precisely what he wants
to avoid. If, however, facts about Lenny’s impossible world-stages
may be expressed only in the impossibility-tense, then this argument
will not go through. It is clearly no objection to the account that
impossible words are contradictory!
McDanielian Realism
One way to avoid exportation is to deny that entities like Lenny
have this or that property simpliciter. Rather, on this approach,
they will have some properties relative to one world, but different
properties relative to other worlds. So, rather than asking what Lenny
is like in and of himself, we will need to ask what he is like at this or
that specific world. So we can say that Lenny is portly relative to world
w, but not portly relative to w1. He then has the relational properties,
being portly-at-w and being not-portly-at-w1.These properties are not
in conflict with one another (since w ≠ w1), and so no contradiction
arises. McDaniel (2004) defends a view along these lines, sometimes
called modal realism with overlap. (Transposed to the temporal case,
this is similar to the three-dimensionalist view.)
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Although McDaniel focuses only on possible worlds, the view is
interesting from an impossible worlds perspective, because it blocks
exportation. If Lenny is both portly and not portly at an impossible
world w, then he has the property of being both portly and not portly
at world w. But we can’t infer from this that Lenny is and is not some
specific way. It does not follow, for example, that he both possesses
and does not possess being portly-at-w. World w is an impossible
world, remember, and so there is no guarantee that being not-F-at-w
amounts to lacking the property being F-at-w. So the argument to
contradiction we discussed above is blocked, on this view.
There is a problem, however, in attempting to extend McDaniel’s
view to incorporate impossible worlds. (Here we draw on Jago
2014a.) It cannot be the case that Iggy Pop is a singer but James
Newell Osterberg isn’t (since Osterberg is Iggy Pop).That’s impossible.
So there is an impossible world w according to which Iggy Pop but
not Osterberg is a singer.
On the current analysis, that is to say that Iggy Pop, but not
Osterberg, bears the being a singer relation to worldw.Then Iggy Pop
bears a relation to w which Osterberg does not bear to w and hence,
by Leibniz’s law, Iggy Pop and Osterberg are not identical, simpliciter.
(Note that our use of Leibniz’s Law here is in an extensional context,
in which we consider relations between an individual and a world.)
But this is absurd, for Osterberg is Iggy Pop! On that basis, it seems
difficult to extend McDaniel’s account to include impossible worlds.
Lewisian, Yagisawaian, and McDanielian realism all have trouble
with impossible worlds, although the problems for Yagisawa’s view
may not be insoluble. Perhaps this suggests that we should treat
possible and impossible worlds differently. We consider that option
in §2.5. Before that, we’ll consider alternative answers to existence
and genuineness.
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2.3 Non-existent Worlds
In this section we use material from Berto and Plebani 2015, chapter 7.
As we claimed above, the question of realism may or may not be
distinct from the question of existence, depending on one’s view of
what existence is (or of how existence claims are best expressed). If
one takes the notion of existence to be best expressed by quantified
statements, as Quine (1948) did, then genuine uses of quantification
over non-actual worlds will involve commitment to the existence of
non-actual worlds.
One could, however, subscribe to a different notion of existence.
One could take existence to be a real property in the Kantian sense:
a genuine feature that some things have, but others lack. If some
things do not exist, then existence will not be captured by the
quantifier. In this way, one can be a realist about non-actual worlds
without automatically committing to their existence. In this setting,
the questions of realism and existence come apart.
The view that some things do not exist is nowadays often labelled
as ‘Meinongianism’, after Meinong (1904). (See Jacquette 1996,
Parsons 1980, Routley 1980, Zalta 1983) Meinongians distinguish
the Sein of objects – their existential status – from their Sosein –
their having features or properties. Things can bear properties even
when their existential status is none, when they lack the feature of
existing. The view is sometimes interpreted as making a distinction
between being and existence. In this interpretation, it is granted that
whatever is quantified over in literally true sentences must have some
being (after all, it is claimed that there are things which are such-and-
such), though it may lack that more accomplished way of being we
ordinarily call existence.
However, several Meinongians, including Berto (2012) and Priest
(2016b), deny any such distinction between being and existing: they
claim that some things have no being-or-existence whatsoever (and
if there are different ways of being or of existing, some things have
none of them). As for the verb ‘to be’ showing up in ‘there are’, they
claim that it is accidental to quantification: its appearing in some of
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the quantificational expressions we use in ordinary language lends
thin linguistic support to the thick ontological view that whatever
we quantify over must have being.
English also uses ‘some’, where the verb ‘to be’ does not appear.
German often uses es gibt, but we would hardly infer that Germans
ascribe giving, or being given, to what they quantify over. French
often uses il y a, which includes the other auxiliary verb, ‘to have’,
but we would hardly infer that the French ascribe having to what
they quantify over. Besides, we use ‘there is’ in locative constructions
where ‘exists’ make no sense, which casts doubts on their synonymy.
Compare, ‘there was a girl in the office this morning; while she was
there, she was looking for you’ with ‘a girl existed in the office this
morning; while she was existing there, she was looking for you’.
What kinds of things can lack existence? The most straightforward
candidates have traditionally been fictional objects: things described
in tales, stories, fantasy novels, like Sherlock Holmes, Heathcliff,
Gandalf, and Phlebas the Phoenician (we will come back to them
in Chapter 11). Other candidates come from temporal and modal
considerations: past existents like Heraclitus (he does not currently
exist, though he does still bear features, like being Heraclitus, or
being admired, or being obscure and often misinterpreted); future
existents like the first newborn of the twenty-second century; or
merely possible objects lacking actual existence, like Wittgenstein’s
daughter (Wittgenstein died childless, but he could have had a
daughter), or the eight-legged dog statue that could have been made
from the marble out of which Michelangelo actually sculpted David.
Parsons (1980) and Priest (2005) propose that worlds be under-
stood as nonexistent objects.Of all the worlds, just one, these physical
surroundings of ours, has the feature of existing. All the others lack
it. One way to mark the difference between what is actual and what
is not, while leaving room for the non-actual, is to identify the actual
with the existent. One can then claim that existence (and so actuality)
is not all there is. Non-actual worlds are nonexistent objects which
are, in some sense, maximal. Priest’s (2005) Meinongian account
comes endowed with both possible and impossible worlds.
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Some worry that nonexistents (including nonexistent worlds) have
no clear identity conditions, and that we cannot know about such
entities as they are devoid of spacetime location and causal powers.
But these difficulties also apply to other realist accounts of worlds.
Usually ersatz accounts (§2.4 and Chapter 3) have it that worlds
are abstract objects. If they are constructions out of propositions
or maximal property-like entities, then a rigid Quinean may ask for
plausible identity criteria for things of these kinds before accepting
ersatz worlds. (For an extended discussion of identity criteria for
nonexistent objects, see Berto 2012, part II and chapter 8.) Abstract
objects are also devoid of causal powers and spatial location. On the
other hand, Lewisian genuine possible worlds are concrete, but by
definition causally and spatiotemporally isolated from one another
and from us. So epistemic access to worlds is problematic whether
they are Lewisian, abstract, or nonexistent. Overall, it is not clear
that a Meinongian view of worlds as nonexistents is worse off than
other realist accounts.
Priest argues that modal facts can be known, on the Meinongian
view of worlds, largely by stipulation and imaginative exercise. This,
he claims, is similar to how we know things about nonexistent
fictional characters. Conan Doyle was free to stipulate that Holmes
lived in Baker Street, rather than Oxford Street (Priest 2008, 31).
Similarly, we can stipulate worlds that are particular ways: for
instance, such that Trump lost the US presidential election. Just
as we can stipulate that Holmes lived in Baker Street, so can we
stipulate that Hobbes squared the circle. But a world where one can
square the circle with ruler and compass is not a possible world. So
stipulation can give us nonexistent worlds that represent possibilities
and impossibilities. How do we know which is which? That is
a difficult question of modal epistemology, but it might be that
answering it is no more problematic than for other views.
What is harder for the Meinongian view, we submit, is to give a
precise explanation of how worlds represent (or realize) possibilities
and impossibilities. The Meinongian view complicates the issues
surrounding genuineness. In a sense, there is a metaphysical (or,
54 metaphysics
ontological) difference between the actual world,which exists, and the
rest, which do not. But given how Meinongians understand existence,
this does not tell us anything about how nonexistent worlds represent
what they represent.
It is difficult to defend the view that nonexistent worlds can
represent as genuine worlds, that is, by realizing the relevant
possibility or impossibility as a part. Some problems for this view look
similar to the ones examined above for genuine realism, having to do
with the exportation principle. A genuine nonexistent impossible
world would represent there being round squares by having real
round squares as parts. Those round squares are nonexistent, but
they really are both round and square. So the Meinongian who takes
this stance is committed to move from asserting ‘world w represents
something as being round and square’ to asserting ‘something is both
round and square’. In other words, she is committed to exportation,
just as Lewisians are, and so it stuck with true contradictions. (This
may be no problem for dialetheists such as Priest (1987), but it is for
anyone who aims for a consistent metaphysics of worlds.)
One may ask what it means for a nonexistent entity to have parts.
The idea of parthood is most intuitive when it involves concrete
existents, such as this table having its legs as parts. One could gesture
to an answer by claiming that parthood relations make sense for
abstract objects (as in, ‘the antecedent is part of the conditional’),
which also lack spatial features. But it is an open issue to what extent
this is more than a metaphor. (What does ‘part’ really mean when we
say that writing accurate reviews is part of being a good referee?)
Another worry is that we want worlds to represent things as
existing. For a genuine world to represent something as existing –
Wittgenstein’s sister, say – is to have a sister of Wittgenstein’s as
an existing part. But how can a wholly nonexistent world have
a part which exists? Moreover, given exportation for genuine
Meinongian worlds, that sister of Wittgenstein exists, simpliciter.
But this undermines talk of taking mere possibilia to be nonexistent
entities. One may think that we should not infer from the existence of
the parts to existence of the whole. In general, it’s fallacious to infer a
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property F of the whole from its parts being Fs. (Thanks to Graham
Priest for suggesting this move.) However, a whole with an existent
part is surely something that in part exists, whereas a Meinongian
should say that her worlds are wholly nonexistent entities.
Given these worries, one may think that nonexistent worlds had
better represent as ersatz worlds, without realizing the relevant
possibilities or impossibilities. (We’ll discuss ersatz approaches in
§2.4 and then again in Chapter 3.) Nonexistents are often invoked
as representational targets: we seem to be able to speak about
them, quantify over them, and also to intend them in our thoughts
(Crane 2013). Nonexistents are introduced as what is represented,
rather than as what does the representing. An associated account of
representation is lacking. This is not a refutation of such Meinongian
approaches to worlds as nonexistents, but a challenge to be addressed.
2.4 Ersatz Modal Realism
On our understanding of what it takes for a world to be genuine, it
must represent the existence of an F by having an F as a part. Such
worlds represent the existence of a talking wombat by having a real
talking wombat as a part. Ersatz worlds, by contrast, represent the
existence of an F in some other way. We are using ‘ersatz world’
as a catch-all term, to cover worlds which represent such-and-such,
not in the way genuine worlds do. To get a sense of how this might
go, consider how a story represents some event. It does so by being
composed of sentences of some language, whose meaning conveys
that such-and-such happened. It’s clear that the story can exist even
if the things and events it describes do not, and never have: that’s
what it is to be a fiction.We have no ontological trouble with stories
of hobbits, insofar as we can make sense of them without thereby
committing ourselves to the existence of hobbits.
We can think of worlds on that model. They exist, and they
represent such-and-such as existing and as being certain ways. But
they don’t represent those things being those ways by having those
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things being those ways as parts. So we should feel no urge to infer
from the existence of those representations, of hobbits, say, to the
existence of hobbits.
In general, when the relevant world w is ersatz, exportation
will not hold. This helps especially with impossible worlds: w
can consistently represent inconsistencies, such as that x is both
F and not-F, without implying the reality of any such x. This
approach, ersatz modal realism, is thus compatible with actualism in
metaphysics: the view that nothing exists but what actually exists. In
particular, ersatzists say that their worlds, and all their constituents,
actually exist and are part of the actual reality surrounding us. (Again,
compare the situation with stories. Their constituents are the words
that make them up, all of which actually exist.)
How can our world include a plurality of worlds within itself?
There seems to be insufficient room in actuality for that! The standard
ersatzist reply (Divers 2002, chapter 10) consists in distinguishing
between (a) actuality, this reality surrounding us and which, for
actualists, is everything there is; and (b) what is actualized. Of the
various representations of how things could have been, one stands
out as representing actuality precisely as it is, and this is the one
which is actualized.
Ersatz modal realism can then analyse possibility and necessity
in the standard way, as existential and universal quantification over
possible worlds, respectively (§1.2). Ersatzists typically take their
worlds to be abstract entities: maximal properties, or sets of sentences
or propositions. (We will get to the details in Chapter 3.) In this
way, ersatzists typically have the resources to include impossible as
well as possible worlds in their ontological toolkit, for example, as
sets of ‘worldmaking’ sentences which include both A and ¬A. This
encourages a positive reply to the parity question. Once one has the
relevant abstract objects at one’s disposal, one can put them to work
in the representation of impossibilites as well as possibilities, at no
extra ontological cost. (Just as one can put a storytelling language to
work to compose stories that speak of impossible as well as possible
happenings.)
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Now go back to the project of giving a reduction of modal notions
to purely extensional ones. Taking again our clause for unrestricted
possibility:
(P) ◇A is true iff A is true at some world w
How should we delimit the quantification on the right-hand side, so
that it ranges only over ersatz possible worlds? This seems hard to
achieve if worlds are constructions out of abstract entities such as
properties, propositions, or sentences. A widespread answer among
ersatzists consists in biting the bullet (Vander Laan 1997). This
approach accepts that no complete and accurate reduction of modal
notions to non-modal ones is feasible. Nevertheless, say the defenders
of this approach, conceptual elucidation may come from an analysis
given in other, allegedly better understood, notions – even if they
are modal concepts. This answer can be paired with a tu quoque
argument, showing that genuine realism too cannot achieve a fully
extensional modal reduction (Divers and Melia 2002).
The big question for ersatzists is: how do ersatz worlds represent
such-and-such as being the case? Different answers give us different
versions of ersatz modal realism. Here are some ways to represent
that A:
(State) By using a state of affairs of a certain kind.
(Property) By using a property reality would have, were things such
that A;
(Combinatorial) By taking objects and properties which, if recom-
bined in a given way, would make it the case that A;
(Map) By using a map, picture, or image which depicts things being
such that A;
(Propositional) By using the proposition or some other content-
carrying entity that A;
(Linguistic) By using bits of language, whose meaning is that A;
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(Primitive) By taking the relevant representation to be a basic,
unanalysable feature.
Each of these ways of representing that A gives us a form of ersatz
modal realism: we’ll call them property ersatzism, combinatorial
ersatzism, map ersatzism, and so on. Ersatz modal realism, in
its various guises, provides a rich resource for theorizing about
possibilities and impossibilities. Because of the range of options
available, we’re going to postpone discussion of the various ersatz
accounts until Chapter 3,which will be wholly dedicated to evaluating
the approaches in detail.
We’re unsure whether the final option just mentioned, primitive
ersatzism, should be counted as a form of ersatz modal realism at
all. To be sure, it’s a realist view without genuine worlds: in that
sense, it’s a form of ersatzism. The source of our hesitation is that it
refuses to answer the central question for ersatzists, ‘how do worlds
represent?’We’ll treat this option as a separate account, in §2.7 below.
Before that, we’ll quickly examine a metaphysics of worlds which is
intermediate between the genuine and ersatz approaches.
2.5 The Hybrid View
Hybrid modal realism endorses a hybrid view of what possible and
impossible worlds are and of how they represent. It gives a negative
answer to our fourth metaphysical question, parity, and denies what
Priest (1997b) and Rescher and Brandom (1980) call the Parity Thesis.
Possible and impossible worlds are not on a par metaphysically: the
answer to at least one of our previous three questions is different,
depending on whether we’re talking about possible or impossible
worlds. The view is defended in Berto 2010, following suggestions
from Divers (2002, Chapter 5) and Kiourti (2010, Chapter 3).
According to hybrid modal realism, both possible and impossible
worlds are real and both exist. (That answers realism and exis-
tence.) However, they represent in different ways (genuineness).
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Possible worlds are taken as concrete, genuine Lewisian worlds
with their real inhabitants, the Lewisian possibilia. Impossibilities
are represented by set-theoretic constructions from genuine worlds.
Genuine worlds represent possibilities by realizing them, whereas
impossible worlds are ersatz set-theoretic constructions. They rep-
resent impossibilities without realizing them. All possibilities really
exist out there in some disconnected spacetime. But there are no
real impossibilities, only set-theoretic constructions which merely
represent ways things could not have been.
Berto (2010) shows that the hybrid account can distinguish
between certain impossible propositions, such as that swans are black
and not black and that John is a married bachelor. The former is
a partition on possible worlds, into those where swans are black
and those where swans are not black. The latter is a partition on
possible worlds, into those where John is a bachelor and those where
he is married. Since these are distinct partitions, we have distinct
propositions.
The hybrid account also avoids resorting to primitive modality
(at least to the extent that Lewisian modal realism does). It is a
fully extensional ontology of genuine Lewisian worlds and sets.
In our clause for possibility (P), ◇A is true iff A is true at some
world w, we take the quantification on the right-hand side to range
over the genuine Lewisian worlds only. Since these are characterized
extensionally (as maximal mereological sums of spatiotemporally
related concreta), this restriction of the quantifier doesn’t resort to
any primitive modal notions.
Like other accounts which use ersatz impossible worlds, hybrid
modal realism has no problem with the exportation principle.
Inconsistencies and impossibilities at impossible worlds do not
spill over into the actual world, nor into any genuine possible
world. Impossible worlds are world-stories: abstract set-theoretic
constructions. ‘At impossible world w, A’ means ‘according to ersatz-
world-story w, A’. From the fact that, according to ersatz world w,
A and not-A, it does not follow that: according to w, A and it is not
the case that according to w, A.
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Hybrid modal realism has other problems, though. One is that
it asks us to buy the Lewisian ontology of infinitely many concrete
disconnected spacetimes and possibilia inhabiting them. Few have
accepted such an ontology. Perhaps the most resilient attitude towards
Lewisian modal realism is what Lewis himself called ‘the incredulous
stare’. In spite of Lewis’s (1986b) rebuttal of several objections,
philosophers remain unconvinced.
Another problem is the extent to which the account can be
developed, in order to make all the hyperintensional distinctions
we may want to make. (Here we draw on Jago 2014a, 110–12.)
In its current form, hybrid modal realism can discriminate between
absolute impossibilities on the basis of logical propositional structure.
But what about non-logical impossibilities? Hybrid modal realism
cannot distinguish between the propositions that Hesperus is the
second planet from the Sun and that Phosphorus is the second planet
from the Sun. Since (necessarily) Hesperus is Phosphorus, there is
but one planet from which to construct ersatz impossible worlds. So
no impossible world contains Hesperus but not Phosphorus, and no
impossible world says that Hesperus is not Phosphorus. Yet we want
impossible worlds which do distinguish Hesperus from Phosphorus.
After all, people believed they were distinct. One may believe herself
to be looking at Hesperus but not Phosphorus (or perhaps, she has
no particular attitude towards Phosphorus at all).
These worries apply to the specific version of hybrid modal realism
presented in Berto 2010. But the idea behind the approach is much
more general (see Reinert 2018 for an insightful discussion): start with
Lewisian possible worlds, and from them construct ersatz impossible
worlds. Different ways of achieving the construction give different
versions of hybrid modal realism. If any actualist ersatz approach
can be made to work, then hybrid modal realism can too, since it has
all the actualist’s ontological resources (and then some).
Perhaps what’s really at stake in the debate over hybrid modal
realism is the issue of modal reduction. This is the hybrid modal
realist’s key advantage over actualist ersatz accounts. If it turns
out that actualist ersatz accounts can define ‘possible world’ using
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only non-modal concepts, or if it turns out that so doing isn’t that
important, then hybrid modal realism loses its trump card. But
otherwise, the view is appealing.
2.6 Encoding Worlds
We’ve discussed both genuine and ersatz accounts of worlds, distin-
guished by asking whether worlds represent, say, the existence of a
talking wombat by containing a talking wombat. Genuine worlds
that represent (de dicto) that A are such that A; whereas ersatz worlds
may represent that A without being such that A.
In Zalta’s powerful abstract object theory (Zalta 1983, 1997),
however, ‘being such that’ is ambiguous. More generally, saying that
some object o is F is ambiguous. This approach is interesting for our
purposes, for it offers a conception of possible and impossible worlds
which promises to capture some of the advantages of genuine worlds,
but without the pitfalls we discuss in §2.2. (Berto and Plebani (2015,
chapter 7) give an introduction to Zalta’s view.)
Zalta’s central claim is that ‘o is F’ is ambiguous, between (i) o’s
exemplifying (or possessing, or instantiating) property F; and (ii)
o’s encoding F. Encoding is a primitive notion, and applies only
to abstract (non-spatiotemporal and non-mental) objects. For an
abstract object to encode a property means, roughly, that that object
is partly defined in terms of, or determined by, that property. Abstract
objects both exemplify and encode properties, and may encode
properties they do not exemplify and vice versa.
Within this theory, situations are defined as abstract objects that
encode states of affairs, taken in their turn as 0-ary properties, of the
form being such that —. Worlds are maximal situations (encoding,
for each A, either the state of affairs that A or that ¬A). Those that
could obtain are the possible worlds, and those that remain are the
impossible worlds.
This characterization of worlds bears some similarity to (our
version of) Plantinga’s approach, which we’ll discuss in §3.2. On
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Plantinga’s approach, worlds are identified maximal states of affairs,
whereas on Zalta’s, worlds are abstract entities which maximally
encode states of affairs. So much of what we’ll say about the features
of Plantinga’s approach in §3.2 applies to Zalta’s approach as well.
Zalta (1997) is keen to emphasize that his is not an ersatz
conception of worlds (even though they are abstract entities). A given
state of affairs, that A, obtains at world w (possible, or not) when
w encodes the property being such that A. And something is such
that A (at w) just in case the state of affairs that A obtains (at w).
In the encoding sense of ‘is’, a world w which encodes being such
that A is indeed such that A. So, on the ‘encoding’ disambiguation of
‘is’, Zalta’s worlds are genuine worlds. But on the ‘exemplification’
disambiguation of ‘is’, they are not.
To illustrate the point: all possible worlds exemplify being abstract,
but may encode being concrete. None exemplify being such that there
is a talking wombat, else we could infer the existence of that clever
marsupial. But some encode this property, for there could have been
a talking wombat.
With the notion of encoding, Zalta’s theory has a unique take
on how worlds represent possibilities and impossibilities. Unlike
the genuine worlds discussed above, Zalta’s talking-wombat-world
does not have a talking wombat as a part. Abstract objects do not
have concrete things as parts. And, unlike many of the ersatz worlds
we’ll discuss in Chapter 3, Zalta’s worlds are not constructed by
representational entities.
Zalta’s object theory is designed to deliver a wide range of benefits,
including a theory of mathematical entities. The account of worlds is
something of a by-product of the overall theory. To evaluate the
approach properly, we’d need to assess its benefits across those
areas. In particular, we’d need to assess whether those benefits justify
treating ‘is’ as ambiguous. But that’s well beyond the scope of our
discussion here.We’ll merely note that positing an ambiguity, with
little or no linguistic evidence, is always hard to justify.
To highlight the worry, consider some reasoning involving ‘is’:
Lenny is barking; therefore, something is barking. That seems a priori
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valid. But if it is, then the ‘is’ here cannot have the ‘encoding’ reading,
for that reading would not support the inference. (Recall that some
worlds encode being such that there is a talking wombat, but we
cannot infer that something is such that there is a talking wombat.)
And if an ordinary use of ‘is’ like this one cannot have the ‘encoding’
reading, then positing a general ambiguity looks a doubtful move.
Another way to bring out the worry is by noting that encoding
is entirely unconstrained. An object can encode, say, being maroon
without thereby encoding being red. Absent this flexibility, the theory
could not deliver impossible worlds. But this is further evidence that
encoding F is not a viable reading of ‘is F’. For if something is maroon,
there’s no escaping that it’s red.
There are also worries about the notion of encoding itself. Byrd
(1986, 247) argues that Zalta’s ‘dual predication view must face the
task of giving a satisfactory account of the notion of encoding’. He
questions whether a ‘non-pictorial understanding can be articulated
of the conditions under which ‘o encodes F’ is true’ (1986, 247). But
that seems unfair to Zalta. Encoding is a primitive of his theory,
so one can hardly ask for a definition. The choice of primitives is
vindicated if the theory’s successful applications reach far enough,
and Zalta’s approach certainly has wide scope (Zalta 1983, 1988).
A more pressing concern is that the facts about what properties an
object encodes seem entirely ungrounded.When an object encodes,
say, being red, there is no reason why it does so. It just does. We
cannot say that it encodes being red because it encodes being maroon,
or being scarlet, or some other determinate of red. It may encode no
determinate of red at all. It is a primitive, unanalysable fact that that
object encodes being red.
Similarly, when a world encodes that A, there is no reason why it
does so. It’s a metaphysically basic fact about a world that it encodes
what it does. It’s not even that a Zalta world encodes that A ∧ B in
virtue of encoding both that A and that B, since some (impossible)
worlds encode that A ∧ B but neither that A nor that B.
Zalta’s approach to worlds seems to be a form of primitivism
(which we’ll discuss in §2.7). On such accounts, there’s no story to
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be told about why they represent (or encode) what they represent
(or encode). They just do, and that’s all we can say on the matter.
We’ll offer objections to that approach in §2.7. Zalta’s approach
adds a further worry, in that it’s more theoretically complex that
straightforward primitivism. It involves postulating the notion of
encoding, as well as a claim about ‘is’ being ambiguous. But if this
approach to worlds is at bottom a primitivist one, what would be
lost, specifically in the theory of worlds, by simply stipulating that
some worlds exist, which primitively represent that such-and-such?
2.7 Primitivism about Worlds
Primitivism about worlds says that there’s no informative answer to
the question, ‘how do worlds represent?’ Rather, worlds represent
what they represent, and that’s all we can say on the matter. There
is no further theory to give of how or why a given world represents
what it represents. Facts such as that world w represents that A are
primitive facts: they are ‘metaphysical bedrock’.
Primitivism about worldly representation is a natural match for
primitivism about themetaphysical structure, or nature, of worlds.On
this view, worlds have no analysable structure. They don’t have parts,
or constituents. We might think of them as dimensionless ‘points’
in modal space. This is the view Lewis (1986b, §3.4) calls ‘magical
ersatzism’. (See also Lewis 1986a and Nolan 2005 for discussion.)
One might go for primitivism about worlds because one thinks
questions about their nature (and about how and why they represent
what they do) are bad questions. But we don’t think this line is
very plausible, given willingness to analyse metaphysical notions of
possibility and necessity.We can offer all kinds of explanations about
how, for example, natural languages, paintings, photographs and
the like represent what they do. In general, the question, ‘how (or
why) does X represent that A?’ is meaningful. Why should the case
of worlds be any different?
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One might find motivation for primitivism about worlds from
quietism about certain metaphysical questions. Quietists about a
certain topic or question, such as moral truth or the ultimate nature
of reality, don’t look to provide a positive characterization of their
subject matter. They deny that any such positive characterization is
called for.That view naturally aligns with certain kinds of pragmatism
(Macarthur 2008), although its supporters often find their inspiration
in Wittgenstein (1953).
We don’t think committed quietists should be primitivists about
worlds. We’re interested in the metaphysics of worlds because we’re
attempting to give a constructive analysis of metaphysical notions,
including possibility and necessity, and perhaps of various notions of
content, too. Neither pragmatist nor Wittgensteinian quietists will be
attracted to this kind of constructive theorizing about those notions.
Having gone in for constructive metaphysical theorizing, it’s no good
to then claim ‘quietism!’ whenever a tricky question arises.
A better motivation for primitivism, in our view, comes from the
problems encountered in trying to answer the question, ‘how does
a world represent?’ If none of the accounts surveyed above manage
to give a satisfactory, informative answer, then primitivism becomes
more attractive. On this approach, the question makes good sense,
but has no informative answer.
Merricks (2015) offers an approach along these lines, but for
propositions, not worlds. His view is that propositions are primitive,
unanalysable entities, whose nature is to represent states of affairs,
but for which there’s no informative theory to be given of why they
represent what they do. That’s just what the primitivist about worlds
says about worlds. Merricks’s argumentative strategy is to consider
each informative proposal (about propositions) in turn, arguing that
all have irreparable problems. Primitivism then emerges that the last
theory standing.
This comparison with Merricks’s primitivism about propositions
throws up an unexpected issue for the primitivist about worlds.Many
of the issues we’ve encountered in our discussion of worlds have
parallels in the literature on propositions. In particular, questions
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about their constituents or structure, about how they represent what
they do, and how these two facets interrelate, are central when
discussing both worlds and propositions. Merricks’s arguments in
favour of primitivism about propositions, if they work at all, would
seem to work just as well for primitivism about worlds.
So should one be a primitivist just about worlds, or just about
propositions, or about both? Given primitivism about propositions
(including facts about their modal and entailment properties), we
have all we need to understand worlds in terms of propositions.
But equally, given primitivism about worlds, we have all we need to
understand propositions in terms of worlds.Why prefer one approach
over the other? And yet being a primitivist about both worlds and
propositions begins to look like a phobia against giving informative
answers.
Our main issue with primitivism about worlds emerges from the
following considerations. Take a complex representation, that A ∧
B. Primitivism, taken literally, denies any links between a world’s
representing that A ∧ B, representing that A, and representing that
B. But that seems absurd. In order to theorize at all, we need to
establish some link between conjunctions and their conjuncts. After
all, conjunctions entail their conjuncts. That is a modal fact, and so
needs to be accounted for in our theory of worlds.
A natural reply is that a world represents that A ∧ B because it
represents both that A and that B individually. But this forgets about
impossible worlds. It is impossible for a conjunction, but not its
conjuncts, to obtain. So we might infer that there’s an impossible
world representing that A ∧ B but not that A. How so? The question
is hard indeed, and it calls out for an answer.
To give a feel of what an answer might look like, we might
claim that worlds somehow contain propositions, and so represent
that A when they contain that very proposition. An impossible
world representing that A ∧ B but not that A would then be one
which contains the conjunctive proposition but not its conjuncts.
We mention this not because we think it best answers the question,
but because it shows what an answer may look like. Our point is
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that, faced with the question of complex representations, we may
begin to doubt the very coherence of impossible worlds. We require
a theory of how they can represent (e.g.) conjunctions but not the
conjuncts. Replying ‘they do so primitively’ clearly will not assuage
those worries.
Before moving on, we should note that, in a sense, the primitivist
approach to worlds may be the implicit default in formal worlds-
based semantics as practiced by many logicians, linguists, and
computer scientists. They often endorse a practical instrumentalism,
of the kind we hinted at at the end of §1.4, about what worlds are
and how they represent. Worlds are treated as primitive points; a
model is built by assigning atomic sentences randomly to worlds; and
that’s it. That’s all fine, in a context where the aim is to investigate
the logical properties of classes of such models.We shouldn’t have to
answer all the metaphysical questions before doing any semantics:
that would be hugely impractical. However, we should not confuse
this attitude with an argument for metaphysical primitivism. The
semantic approach will work (just about) whatever the metaphysics
says about worlds, and so neither requires nor implies metaphysical
primitivism.
2.8 Fictionalism
We’ll close this chapter with an anti-realist take on worlds, rep-
resented here by fictionalism about worlds. Fictionalism gives a
negative answer to our initial question on realism. Recall (§2.1)
that we’re using ‘realism’ to mean the view that we can talk about,
refer to, and quantify over worlds, even when we’re being at our
most metaphysically serious.We’re using ‘anti-realism’ for the view
that we may use world-talk, but without ontological commitment to
non-actual worlds.
Fictionalist strategies in ontology and metaphysics have gained
popularity in recent years. (Berto and Plebani (2015, chapter 6)
survey different approaches.) According to such strategies, claims
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that seem to commit us to entities that may be, for whatever reason,
controversial – abstract objects, mathematical entities, propositions,
properties (or properties of a certain kind) – can be, as the fictionalist
motto goes, ‘good without being true’ (Field 1989). Numbers, for
instance, are useful for counting objects. If there are n things of a
certain kind F, it is useful to speak as if there is a number, n, that
counts them. Such talk can help us as a representational aid, or to
shorten and facilitate communication and inference, although what
it appears to be about is really no part of the furniture of the world.
To see how this might be possible in general, let’s switch the topic
to moral properties as an example. Anti-realists in this area will
typically say something like the following:
There are moral truths, such as it is wrong to cause unnecessary
harm intentionally. However, literally speaking, there are no
moral properties: it is literally false that there is such a thing
as the property of being morally wrong. But we can engage in
a moral fiction, according to which there are such properties.
While it is literally true that causing unnecessary harm is morally
wrong, it is only true in the fiction that the property of moral
wrongness is possessed by such acts.
On this way of thinking, the moral anti-realist pretends (‘in the
fiction’) that reality is as the moral realist says it is. When the fiction
delivers a moral verdict, say that such-and-such is wrong, she treats
those actions as being wrong. But all the prima facie ontologically
committing claims (such as ‘there is a property of moral wrongness’)
are true only within the fiction. Since being true within the fiction
is not factive (it does not export to being true simpliciter), the anti-
realist doesn’t feel any pressure to commit to such properties.
The anti-realist may then align ‘everyday’ moral talk with her ‘in
the fiction’ talk, and reserve her ‘out of the fiction’ talk for the kind
of debate we typically engage in when doing metaphysics. (Note that
this fictionalist isn’t an error theorist about morality, in Mackie’s
(1977) sense. For, unlike Mackie, she allows for moral truth.)
This kind of move is appealing when the realist’s metaphysics seems
to deliver good results, but you can’t quite bring yourself to accept
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her ontological claims. So, for example, if you agree with Mackie
that moral properties would be ‘a very strange sort, utterly different
from anything else in the universe’ (1977, 38), then it’s tempting to
be a fictionalist about moral properties.
Similarly, you can engage in modal fictionalism (Rosen 1990). The
name is a bit misleading: modal fictionalists are not fictionalists about
modality, but rather about worlds. According to fictionalists, talk of
(and quantification over) worlds should be understood as literally
false: it is only true within a ‘worlds fiction’, which we make-believe
because it gives useful results in the analysis of modal notions. (For a
survey, see Nolan 2016a.)
To understand how the fiction might work, take the following
passage:
There are countless other worlds … The worlds are something
like remote planets; except that most of them are much bigger
than mere planets, and they are not remote. Neither are they
nearby. They are not at any spatial distance whatever from here.
They are not far in the past or future, nor for that matter near;
they are not at any temporal distance whatever from now. They
are isolated: there are no spatiotemporal relations at all between
things that belong to different worlds. Nor does anything that
happens at one world cause anything to happen at another.
Nor do they overlap; they have no parts in common. … The
worlds are many and varied.There are enough of them to afford
worlds where (roughly speaking) I finish on schedule, or I write
on behalf of impossibilia, or I do not exist, or there are no
people at all, or the physical constants do not permit life, or
totally different laws govern the doings of alien particles with
alien properties. There are so many other worlds, in fact, that
absolutely every way that a world could possibly be is a way
that some world is. (Lewis 1986b, 1)
You might be attracted to this ‘philosophers’ paradise’ of genuine
Lewisian worlds, while being unable to bring yourself to believe in
the real existence of talking wombats and other non-actual entities.
Then it’s tempting to be a fictionalist about worlds, interpreting these
Lewisian claims as true only within a worlds fiction.
70 metaphysics
Modal fictionalism, as presented in Rosen (1990), has been
understood as fictionalism about possible worlds. If it works, it seems
that its extension to impossible worlds should be straightforward.
After all, if modal fictionalism is right about possible worlds, there
really are no such things (other than the actual one). One may add
that it’s also true in the fiction that there are impossible worlds – but
no worries, for in reality there are no such things. Similarly, it would
have done no harm to The Lord of the Rings if Tolkien had added
winged goblins to the population of Middle Earth, had the addition
been useful to the overall plot.
How should we choose the right modal fiction? This is an issue
raised by Sainsbury (2010, chapter 8). In the case of other forms
of fictionalism, such as the one embedded in Field’s nominalistic
reconstruction of mathematical discourse (Field 1980, 1989), there
is one standard story, namely standard mathematics. In this case, we
have a conservativeness constraint with respect to such story: only a
fiction which is conservative with respect to the results of standard
mathematics will be acceptable. In this case, established mathematical
results provide the relevant constraints.
In the modal case, however, there is no standard worlds-story to tell.
Fictionalism about worlds is probably most attractive when it takes
a genuine realist account as its fiction. Rosen (1990), for example,
formulates his modal fictionalism by taking Lewis’s On the Plurality
of Worlds (1986b) as the relevant fiction. But what is the standard
fiction for impossible worlds? Perhaps it is Yagisawa’s 2010; perhaps
Priest’s 2016b. (The latter would be a somewhat strange choice for
modal fictionalists, resulting in a fiction according to which some
entities don’t exist!)
The point we wish to stress is that fictionalism, in and of itself,
doesn’t propose any solution to the issues genuine realism faces with
impossible worlds (§2.2). If those problems render genuine realism
problematic, or even inconsistent, then we can’t base the fiction of
worlds on genuine realism (Jago 2016, §8). An adequate account
requires the fictionalist first to solve the genuine realist’s problems
with impossible worlds. That is no easy task.
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Fictionalists aim to get the advantages of realism about worlds,
but without the ontological costs. Yet it is sometimes hard to tell just
what the fictionalist’s ontological beliefs are. She analyses modal talk
based on what is true in the fiction. But within the fiction, worlds
exist (in the most literal sense). So how is she to avoid saying that
worlds exist, simpliciter? It might be that she uses her ‘in the fiction’
operator only for claims beginning ‘it is possible that …’ or ‘it is
necessary that …’. But ‘it is necessary that there exist worlds’ is true
in the fiction and hence, she is forced to say, true simpliciter. But this
entails that worlds exist! Fictionalists have to work hard to avoid
this issue.
Another issue with fictionalism about worlds is that, if the
worlds do not literally exist, then neither do constructions out of
worlds. World-based theories often analyse propositions, meanings,
subject matters, and other notions of semantic content, in terms of
constructions from worlds. The fictionalist can do this too, in her
fiction, but must say that, literally speaking, there are no such entities
as propositions, meanings, or subject matters.
This may be a worrying conclusion to draw. If truth is a property
which attaches to propositions, as many philosophers hold, but there
are no propositions, then there are no truths. That can’t be right.
Similarly, some sentences have the same meaning: ‘raccoons like to
somersault’ and ‘procioni piace capriola’ have the same meaning.
But if they have the same meaning, then they have a meaning. Some
thing is their meaning, shared between the two of them. This puts
fictionalism about worlds in an awkward position. Either they deny
that there are propositions, meanings, and so on, or else they accept
that they exist and analyse them in some other way, without using
worlds. But this undercuts much of the motivation for talking about
worlds in the first place (§1.2).
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Chapter Summary
The metaphysics of possible and impossible worlds revolves around
a number of questions (§2.1). Should we treat worlds as genuine
entities, which represent something as being F by having an F as a
part? This is a hard position to maintain in the case of impossible
worlds (§2.2). Should we treat (non-actual) worlds as non-existent
beings (§2.3)? Or should we think of them as abstract entities and,
if so, what kind of abstract entity (2.4)? Should we give the same
answer to these questions for possible and impossible worlds (§2.5)?
Yet a further option is to distinguish two senses of ‘is’ – encoding
vs exemplifying some property – and claim that impossible worlds
encode without exemplifying impossibilities (§2.6).
We argued that all of these approaches face difficulties. If one
thinks these difficulties are insuperable, one can always adopt the
approach that worlds are primitive entities (§2.7).We argued that this
is a difficult line to maintain. Another fallback position is fictionalism
about world, on which truths about worlds are always given ‘in the
fiction’ (§2.8).
Of all the views considered, the most promising seems to be the one
which takes impossible worlds (and perhaps the non-actual possible
worlds too) to be ersatz entities. There are many competing ways to
understand this suggestion (§2.4).We’ll devote the next chapter to
discussing which, if any, of these approaches is the most promising.
3Ersatz Modal Realism
3.1 Classifying Ersatz Theories
We are using ‘ersatz world’ in contrast to ‘genuine world’. In §2.2,
we understood a genuine world as one which represents the existence
of an F by having a real F as a part. So ersatz worlds are those that
represent the existence of an F some other way.
That way of drawing the distinction between genuine and ersatz
worlds cuts across the distinction between concrete and abstract
worlds.Genuine possible worlds may line up with the concrete worlds,
and ersatz possible worlds with the abstract ones. But when we want
to talk about impossible worlds as well as possible worlds, these
distinctions come apart (§2.2).
Our notion of an ersatz world is essentially a negative one: these
are worlds which do not represent in the way genuine worlds do.
So how do they represent? Different answers give us different ersatz
theories. In §2.4, we introduced a number of ways (in general) to
represent that A:
(State) By using a state of affairs of a certain kind.
(Property) By using a property reality would have, were things such
that A;
(Combinatorial) By taking objects and properties which, if recom-
bined in a given way, would make it the case that A;
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(Map) By using a map, picture, or image which depicts things being
such that A;
(Propositional) By using the proposition or some other content-
carrying entity that A;
(Linguistic) By using bits of language, whose meaning is that A;
(Primitive) By taking the relevant representation to be a basic,
unanalysable feature.
We’ve already discussed primitive (in §2.7), which we treated as
a theory separate from ersatzism. In the rest of this chapter, we’ll
discuss the remaining options.We’ll explore how the various views
work in the case of possible worlds, before investigating whether they
can also accommodate impossible worlds. In several cases, we’ll have
to go beyond what the defenders of these views say, since they often
don’t explicitly discuss impossible worlds. We’ll then indicate how
we think the views in question may or should be extended to include
impossible worlds.
Throughout our discussion, we’ll talk of worlds, by which we’ll
normally mean worlds other than the reality around us. As explained
in §2.4, ersatz theorists normally include an actualized ersatz world,
which represents things being as they in fact are. This move allows
them to analyse modal notions purely in terms of ersatz worlds.
(Without an ersatz actual world, they’ll need to say that A is possible
iff there’s an ersatz-or-genuine world such that A, which is a bit
clunky. But nothing really hangs on this.)
3.2 Maximal States of Affairs
Plantinga (1970, 1974, 1976) develops a view on which possible
worlds are maximal possible states of affairs. A state of affairs is
maximal when it either includes or precludes every other state of
affairs. Here, both inclusion and preclusion are understood modally: s
includes t when, necessarily, if s obtains then so does t; and s precludes
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t when, necessarily, if s obtains then t does not. Intuitively, a maximal
state of affairs could not have any states of affairs added to it, without
becoming impossible.
This approach, then, makes no attempt at a reductive definition
of possibility or necessity. To understand ‘maximal state of affairs’,
we first need to understand which states of affairs can obtain with
which, and which they cannot obtain without. Modality is taken as a
primitive concept.
A key idea is that a state of affairs can exist without obtaining. The
merely possible worlds are those maximal states of affairs that exist,
but do not obtain. Our world – the reality around us – determines
the unique obtaining maximal state of affairs. Non-obtaining states
of affairs are ‘ontologically inert’, in the sense that, if the state of
affairs that Fa does not obtain, then it is not the case that a is F.We’ll
discuss just what this might mean at the end of this section.
As a consequence, the approach is actualist: all the states of affairs
it posits actually exist. When we say ‘non-actual world’, we mean a
state of affairs which exists, but does not obtain. Non-actual worlds
represent an F by including a state of affairs that a is F, for some a or
other. Such an a is represented as being F by that state of affairs, and
hence by that world. But if that state of affairs does not obtain, a is not
F. That’s why we’re classifying this view as an ersatz (non-genuine)
account of worlds.
Can this approach accommodate impossible worlds? As far as we
know, there is little discussion on this in the literature, one exception
being Vander Laan 1997. To investigate the issue, we need first to
amend the initial approach. Recall that maximality is defined in
terms of either including or precluding every other state, with both
notions defined modally. Now suppose we add a contradictory state
of affairs, s, which represents that A∧¬A. As s cannot possibly obtain,
by definition it precludes all states of affairs (including itself), and
includes no state of affairs (not even itself). It is maximal, but certainly
should not be counted as a possible world.
We do better by thinking of states of affairs structurally, rather
than (just) modally. Let us suppose we have some kind of grouping
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operation on states of affairs, which makes a plurality into a unity.
Think of this as a conjunction operation: if states s1,… , sn are grouped
as an entity s, then s is the conjunctive state of affairs whose conjuncts
are s1 to sn. We might, but need not, treat s as a sort of mereological
sum or fusion, s1 ⊔ ⋯ ⊔ sn.
This operation would give the notion of inclusion we need: the
conjunctive state includes its conjuncts, but no more.Next, take a pair
of states s1, s2 to be incompatible when it is not possible for them to
obtain together. A maximal state is one which, for every incompatible
pair of possible states s1, s2, includes either s1 or s2. (Alternatively, we
could work with both negative and positive of states of affairs, as
Barker and Jago (2012) do, and take a maximal state to be one which
includes one state of each pair, that A, that ¬A.) We then identify the
possible worlds with the maximal possible states of affairs, and the
impossible worlds with all other states of affairs.
There are thus two ways in which a state of affairs may count
as an impossible world. It may be a state that could not possibly
obtain (an impossible state), or it may be a non-maximal state. (It
may be both.) The former are (metaphysically) inconsistent worlds,
the latter (metaphysically) incomplete worlds. We should flag that,
on these definitions, an incomplete world may obtain, as part of a
larger possible world.The state of affairs that Charlie’s tail is wagging
obtains, as part of the actual world, and hence is possible. But we
nevertheless identify that state with an incomplete world, because it
could not possibly be all there is to reality.
(We could alter our definitions so that only non-obtaining non-
maximal states count as incomplete impossible worlds.Then, it would
be a contingent matter whether some state s counts as a world. That
seems strange to us. But since the matter is largely definitional, nothing
much hangs on it.)
What does it mean to say a state of affairs exists, but does
not obtain? We can’t make much sense of the idea. The primary
metaphysical role for states of affairs is in accounting for the
ontology of predication. States of affairs provide an answer to the
question, ‘what is it for particular a to possess property F?’ We might
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understand the state of affairs that a is F as being (in some way)
composed of a and F (Armstrong 1997, 2004).When property and
particular are composed in that way, a is F. That’s precisely what it is
for a to possess F. But then, the state of affairs that a is F cannot exist
without a being F. So, on Armstrong’s approach, a state of affairs
obtains just in case it exists.
That argument relies on Armstrong’s specific theory of states of
affairs. But in general, it is hard to see how some other approach
would avoid this problem. If one determines the identity and existence
of that a is F, but allows that a is not F, then one undermines the
main argument for believing in states of affairs.
There is an independent argument against allowing states of affairs
to exist without obtaining (Jago 2018b, §6.2). Those who believe
in states of affairs usually take them to be truthmakers for the
corresponding propositions. The truthmaker for the proposition ⟨a
is F⟩ is the state of affairs that a is F. Usually, this is understood as
the claim that the existence of the state of affairs that a is F is what
makes ⟨a is F⟩ true. But we cannot say that if states of affairs may
exist without obtaining. If that a is F exists but does not obtain, then
a is not F, so ⟨a is F⟩ is not true and hence has no truthmaker.
Instead, the defender of non-obtaining states of affairs will say that
a state of affairs makes a proposition true only when it obtains. But
this move is problematic. Take a statement of the view in question,
(3.1) There exist states of affairs which do not obtain.
As an existential claim, this is made true (if it is true) by the very
things it claims to exist. (Just about everyone agrees with this, even
if they do not subscribe to truthmaker theory in general.) The only
candidate truthmakers for (3.1) are states of affairs which do not
obtain. But this conflicts with the principle above, on which non-
obtaining states of affairs do no act as truthmakers. So, we do not
think existent but non-obtaining states of affairs are coherent.
Overall, we don’t see much hope for overcoming these issues. The
notion of non-obtaining states of affairs is absolutely central to the
78 ersatz modal realism
approach. So if it can’t be put on a good metaphysical footing – and
we don’t see how it can – then the approach is doomed. However,
there are other approaches in the vicinity, the propositional and
linguistic approaches, which seem to capture the advantages of the
states of affairs approach.We’ll discuss these in §3.6 below.
3.3 Property Ersatzism
Possible worlds are ways that things could be or have been. Ways
are properties. Thus, possible worlds are properties. So says property
ersatzism. (This view is sometimes called Stalnakerian realism or
Stalnakerian ersatzism, after Stalnaker (1976a); see also Forrest 1986
and Bigelow and Pargetter 1990.) A (non-actual) possible world is
identified with the property that would be instantiated, were that
world actualized. Such properties must entail a specific pattern of
property-instantiations. That is, instantiating a world-property must
entail all the specific matters of fact associated with the world in
question. As Divers (2002, 177) notes, the approach hasn’t been
developed greatly, even in the case of possible worlds. So some of
what we present in this section is our take on the most promising
way to develop the approach.
Wemight think of a world-property as a big distributional property.
Suppose we think of reality in the Humean way, as a pattern of matter,
or point-sized particles, scattered over spacetime (Lewis 1986b).
Then, a world-property would be a property which specifies a total
distribution of matter (or point-sized particles) over spacetime.
This approach to world-properties is rather limited, however. It
makes the assumption (usually called Humean supervenience: see
Lewis 1994) that, given the facts about how matter is distributed
locally, all the other facts follow. That’s questionable, even assuming
classical physics, and probably wrong given what we know about
quantum physics. (Ladyman and Ross (2007) argue at length against
the compatibility of Humean supervenience with quantum physics.)
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We mention the idea merely to illustrate what a world-property might
look like.
An alternative, and more flexible, approach is to take world-
properties to be big conjunctive properties. We can make sense of
the idea in terms of an operation on properties, forming a unified
property from a plurality. (In §3.1, we mentioned a similar operation
on states of affairs. As in that case, the operation on properties may,
but need not, be identified with mereological sum or fusion. If we
make that identification, then conjunctive properties are fusions of
their conjuncts.)
On this approach, the conjoined properties are instantiated by
whatever instantiates their conjunction: something possesses being
both F and G when that very same thing is F and also G. World-
properties are instantiated by reality as a whole, when they are
instantiated at all. So, on this view, each conjunct of the conjunctive
world-property must be a property possibly possessed by reality as a
whole.These will be properties like being such that Charlie is wagging
her tail. If instantiated, the corresponding state of affairs, that reality
is such that Charlie is wagging her tail, straightforwardly entails the
state of affairs that Charlie is wagging her tail.
The details of this approach will be much as they were for the
maximal states of affairs account (§3.1).The difference here is that we
identify non-actual worlds with uninstantiated properties, rather than
non-obtaining states of affairs. On this approach, worlds are actual
when they are instantiated (rather than when they obtain). A key
advantage of this approach is that it is easier to make metaphysical
sense of uninstantiated properties than it is of non-obtaining states
of affairs.
When we turn to impossible worlds, the moves we made in §3.1 are
attractive options here too. A property F is maximal when, for each
incompatible pair F1,F2 of properties possibly possessed by reality,
F includes either F1 or F2 as a conjunct. (Alternatively, we might
work with negative properties, taking F2 to be the negation of F1.)
We then identify possible worlds with maximal possible properties of
reality. Impossible worlds are identified with all other properties of
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reality: those that are non-maximal, plus those that reality could not
possibly instantiate. (The approach is thus reductive about worlds,
but non-reductive about which worlds are possible.)
Understood this way, property ersatzism can be viewed a form of
linguistic ersatzism (§3.6). Specific properties of reality, being such
that A, can be thought of as sentence-like or proposition-like entities,
carrying the content that A. They can be conjoined, and perhaps
negated too. So we will defer further discussion of this approach until
§3.6, where we will discuss the issues faced by linguistic ersatzism.
3.4 Combinatorial Ersatzism
Combinatorial ersatzism comes in various shapes, but all of its
variants agree that possible worlds should be understood in terms
of recombinations of bits of actual reality. These can be actual
individuals and actually instantiated properties, or obtaining simple
states of affairs. Examples of the strategy are found in Quine 1969
and Cresswell 1972. We will focus on Armstrong’s (1989, 1997)
exemplary version, which he develops in terms of recombinations
of actual particulars and universals (properties and relations). Key
to this idea is Armstrong’s notion of sparse universals: fundamental
properties like charge, spin, and mass, as opposed to derivative ones
like being a penguin and being anX Factor contestant.We can’t freely
recombine any property with any particular. Electrons can’t possibly
be red, and you can’t possibly have spin 1/2. But, says Armstrong, we
can freely recombine the sparse properties with the simple individuals.
Armstrong’s aim is to give a reductive account of modality. He
spells out which (actual) particulars and universals may be freely
recombined, and spells out what it is to recombine them. All of
this is done without bringing in modal notions. Possible worlds are
then identified with recombinations of the selected particulars and
universals, and modality is analysed in the usual way in terms of
possible worlds.
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On this picture, each possible world consists of a rearrangement of
fundamental bits of reality. But possible worlds represent more than
that: they also represent facts about penguins, X-Factor contestants,
and the like. On Armstrong’s view, all the non-fundamental facts
represented by a world come for free, given facts about what’s
fundamental (according to that world). What a possible world is,
according to Armstrong, is a rearrangement of fundamental stuff. But
what it represents is whatever follows, metaphysically, from those
facts, rearranged thus-and-so.
There are a number of issues with the approach, which we’ll
mention only briefly here. First, it’s clear that not every fundamental
bit of reality exists necessarily. This or that quark (or whatever) need
not have existed. So merely rearranging actual, fundamental stuff
won’t give the right results. Instead, we have to think in terms of
rearrangements which potentially leave some bits out.
By the same token, it seems that there could have been (funda-
mental) things which don’t in fact exist. There could have been more
quarks (or whatever) than in fact there are. No rearrangement of
actual stuff produces those non-actual entities. So we have to think
in terms of rearrangements which potentially include extra stuff (as
well as potentially leaving some bits out). Those extra bits are alien
entities: entities which are possible, but which don’t actually exist.
They’re a real problem for this approach (very likely, for any actualist
approach). After all, what are we supposed to be arranging? If it’s
actual stuff, plus some extra bits, then we seem to have quantified over
non-actual entities, and the actualist endeavour is over. Moreover, if
we are allowed to quantify over non-actual entities, why not instead
go for genuine modal realism (§2.2)? This is a serious problem, but
it’s a problem any ersatz account must face.We’ll set it aside for now,
and return to it in §3.7.
The issue we want to investigate here is: just what are recombina-
tions, metaphysically speaking? We’ll argue that the recombination
approach is destined to collapse into one of the other approaches
we’ve discussed. Suppose rearrangements are (or consist of) states of
affairs. Do the non-actual states of affairs obtain or not? If we say
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they don’t obtain, then we have the states of affairs account from §3.1.
If they do obtain (perhaps on the grounds that, for states of affairs,
obtaining amounts to existing), then we have a form of genuine
realism. (Or we may have no theory at all. If possible worlds consist
of genuine states of affairs, then modal space as a whole will contain
contradictory states of affairs. It’s hard to see how this approach can
avoid outright triviality, wherein every sentence is treated as being
true simpliciter (Jago 2018b).)
Rearrangements might be treated not as states of affairs, but rather
as ersatz replacements for them.These might be propositions, or some
other kind of property-and-particular-containing representational
entity. That approach will be a form of propositional or linguistic
ersatzism (to be discussed in §3.6). Armstrong’s view is that the
rearrangements do not in fact exist; but it is nevertheless convenient
and acceptable to speak as if they do (Armstrong 1989, 49–51). As
Sider (2005) argues, this is a form of fictionalism (§2.8). Possible-
worlds talk should be understood as talk about a fictional ontology
of recombinations. So, however we understand the ontology of
recombinations, we don’t have a genuinely distinct account of what
possible worlds are.
It’s also worth flagging a specific difficulty for Armstrong’s fictional
recombinations. If the fiction talks of all the recombinations at once,
then it’s at serious risk of inconsistency. In that fiction, there will
exist pairs of logically incompatible states of affairs. Their existence
renders that fiction logically inconsistent, and this in turn renders the
entire account inconsistent (Jago 2016). The problem is avoided if
there’s a separate fiction for each recombination. But then, there’s
no way to analyse iterated modality, as when we say, it’s possibly
necessary that such-and-such.
Combinatorialism isn’t best viewed as a theory of what possible
worlds are. Rather, it’s a theory of the extent of the space of
possible worlds. How do things change when we include impossible
worlds? We are not aware of any proposals in the literature, and
so what follows are our own suggestions. It seems clear that, if
all the rearrangements correspond to possible worlds, then we
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can’t make sense of impossible worlds in terms of those same
rearrangements. One option is to make space in the theory for
rearrangements which aren’t licensed by Armstrong’s restriction to
sparse universals. We allow the derivative properties to ‘float free’ of
their fundamental grounds. So, rather than rearranging facts about
tables bymanipulating fundamental facts about (say) the arrangement
of matter in spacetime,we could think in terms of the property being a
table itself.We may rearrange properties to arrive at a (representation
of a) massless table, for example.
This approach will generate (representations of) impossibilities. We
can recover the possible worlds as those that conform to acceptable
recombinations of Armstrong’s sparse universals. To do that, we’ll
need enough bridge principles, from fundamental to derivative facts.
These ‘vertical’ principles tell us how the derivative facts are grounded
in the fundamental facts. They should tell us, for example, that
there’s no fundamental recombination to support our massless table,
and hence that that recombination gives us an impossible world. In
general, when one of these grounding principles is broken, we have
an impossible world.
This notion of grounding – a form of metaphysical dependence, of
the kind we briefly discussed in §1.3 – is a much-debated concept in
contemporary metaphysics (Fine 2001, 2012b,c, Schaffer 2009). If
sense can be made of the notion using non-modal vocabulary, then the
approach suggested here may offer a reductive and actualist-friendly
analysis of modality.
3.5 Map Ersatzism
Map erstzism takes worlds to represent in much the same way as
a realistic painting, a map, or architect’s scale model does (Lewis
1986b, chapter 3). Consider how a map works. It has a limited
vocabulary of symbols, arranged spatially, in a way that mimics the
spatial arrangement of the bits of reality thereby represented. Maps
typically use above and below (on the map) to represent north of
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and south of (in reality), so that a tree-symbol above a lake-symbol
represents a situation in which there are trees to the north of a lake.
The distance between the symbols on the map, together with the
map’s scale, represents the distance in reality between trees and lake.
Map-based representations have some very useful representational
properties. Suppose, in our map with a tree-symbol above the lake-
symbol, there’s also a church-symbol under the lake-symbol. Then the
map represents the trees as being north of the church.And it represents
the church as being south of both the trees and the lake. It does this
for free. If we’d represented the tree-lake and lake-church relations
descriptively, using sentences, then we’d have to do some work to
infer that the trees are north of the church. And similarly, if we’d
represented those facts linguistically using ‘north’, then we’d have to
do some further work to infer that the church is south of the trees.
Map-based representations build this inferential work automatically
into the way they represent.
This feature makes map-based representations great candidates
where what is represented is closed under (some amount of) logical
consequence. Block (1983), for example, argues that cognitive data
suggests that (at least some) mental representations are image-like,
rather than linguistic. (See also Kosslyn and Pomerantz 1977, Paivio
1986, and Pinker 1980.)
But by the same token, this feature makes it hard for map-based
representations to represent certain impossibilities. Just take the
impossible situation where the trees are north of the lake, but the
lake isn’t south of the trees. How could a map represent that?
Escher was ingenious in finding ways to depict many impossible
situations pictorially, but the applicability of these or any other
pictorial techniques is fairly limited. How would a map or picture
depict an explicitly contradictory situation, say the one described by
Graham Priest in Sylvan’s Box (Priest 1997b), in which the narrator
discovers a box that is both empty and not empty? (We discuss
Sylvan’s Box in detail in §11.3.) How would we even begin to depict
the impossible situation in which Fermat’s Last Theorem turns out
false?
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There are options here, to be sure. A map may contain a special
not like this symbol, with maps featuring that symbol interpreted as
the global negation of what they would otherwise represent. We may
further introduce a conjunction operation on maps, with the resulting
map representing the conjunction of what each map individually
represents. Conjunction plus negation will allow us to represent
explicit impossibilities, for sure. But we get there using linguistic,
not pictorial, techniques. It seems likely that any form of map or
pictorial ersatzism will need to resort to non-pictorial, linguistic ways
of representing, if it aims to represent all the desired possibilities
and impossibilities. But then why not go for linguistic representation
across the board, and do away with any worries about how the
pictorial and linguistic elements are supposed to interact?
3.6 Propositional and Linguistic Ersatzism
Propositional ersatzism identifies worlds with sets of propositions.
Linguistic ersatzism is similar, except it builds worlds from sentences
of some chosen language, the worldmaking language, rather than
propositions. Linguistic forms of ersatzism go back to Carnap’s (1947)
theory of state descriptions, and both Adams (1974) and Jeffrey
(1965) talk ofworld-stories, understood as sets of propositions. (They
don’t have to be sets. They could be some other kind of construction
from propositions or sentences. All that matters is that we can take
all the propositions or sentences making for a world together, treating
them as a single entity. We’ll work with sets.)
One nice feature of such worlds is the definition of truth, relative
to a world. It is true that A, relative to world w, just in case the
proposition that A, or the worldmaking sentence which means that
A, is a member of world w. In this kind of definition, we have a
phrase ‘that A’ in both the definiens and the definiendum. But it isn’t
circular. We’re defining the truth of an English sentence, relative to a
world, either in terms of a proposition or of a sentence of some other
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language, the worldmaking language. In the latter case, this amounts
to a translation from the worldmaking language into English.
Just what properties worlds have depends on our theory of
propositions or our construction of the worldmaking language. Let’s
consider propositions first. One prominent theory of propositions
identifies them with sets of possible worlds (Lewis 1986b, Stalnaker
1984). But that approach is ruled out, if we first identify worlds
with sets of propositions. Indeed, that is one motivation for rejecting
propositional ersatzism altogether. Modal semantics often works
with sets of worlds, and it’s very natural to identify these sets with
propositions, as we saw in Chapter 1.
Whether propositions really are sets of worlds is moot (Jago 2015,
2018b, Merricks 2015). An alternative is the Russellian account,
after Russell (1904/1980), which identifies (atomic) propositions with
ordered sequences (or tuples) of particulars, properties, and relations.
King (1995, 1996, 2011), Salmon (1986, 2005), and Soames (1987,
2008) all defend a variant of this view. The proposition that Charlie
is wagging her tail is the sequence ⟨⟨wagging, Charlie, Charlie’s tail⟩⟩.
(We’ll use the notation ‘⟨⟨ ⟩⟩’ for sequences and the more familiar ‘⟨ ⟩’
for propositions.)
Logically complex propositions are treated as sequences which
include (the semantic values of) logical connectives.We might identify
these values with truth-functions, familiar from truth-table semantics
(although we don’t need to make this identification). Let neg,
conj, and disj be the truth-functions corresponding to negation,
conjunction, and disjunction, respectively. Then we can treat negated,
conjunctive, and disjunctive propositions as follows:
⟨¬A⟩ = ⟨⟨neg, ⟨A⟩⟩⟩
⟨A ∧ B⟩ = ⟨⟨conj, ⟨A⟩, ⟨B⟩⟩⟩
⟨A ∨ B⟩ = ⟨⟨disj, ⟨A⟩, ⟨B⟩⟩⟩
Since order matters to sequences, the structure of these propositions
is (relatively) fine-grained, and allows for distinct but logically
equivalent propositions. Even very closely related propositions, such
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as ⟨A ∧ B⟩ and ⟨B ∧ A⟩, will be treated as distinct entities, on this
approach.We’ll say more about the Russellian approach below.
Yet another approach is to take propositions to be metaphysically
primitive, unanalysable entities (Merricks 2015). We discussed the
corresponding primitivist view about worlds in §2.7. Many of the
same considerations raised there apply also to primitivism about
propositions, and so we won’t discuss the view any further.
Let’s turn to linguistic ersatzism. Linguistic ersatzism is similar to
propositional ersatzism, but with sentences in place of propositions.
Worlds can be taken as sets of sentences. A theory along these lines
must first specify the language to which those sentences belong. This
is what is called the worldmaking language. The choice of language
will be important. To see why, suppose we adopted English as our
worldmaking language. Then, a world w represents that A iff it
contains the English sentence ‘A’. And so, on this analysis, it is
possible that A iff there’s a possible world which contains the English
sentence ‘A’. To determine whether this is the case, we will need to
ask, which sets of English sentences are compossible (that is, possibly
true all together)? But answering this question will depend, in part,
on whether ‘A’ represents a possible situation. So we seem to have a
circular analysis of possibility.
To avoid circularity, the worldmaking language and the theorist’s
language (English, in this case) must differ. One option is to use a
Lagadonian language (Lewis 1986b, 145–6, following Carnap 1947),
in which each particular is a name for itself and each property and
relation is a predicate denoting itself. Infinitary logical connectives
allow for sentences of infinite length (Divers 2002, 180).
The approach achieves little (goes one objection) if it requires that
we first analyse which sets of sentences count as possible worlds. We
do not have a reductive account of modality, of the kind genuine
realists claim to have (§2.2). This is one of two objections Lewis
(1986b) raises against linguistic ersatzism. (We’ll discuss his second
objection in §3.7.) The approach applies equally to propositional
ersatzism, if the propositions in question are fine-grained as on the
Russellian account.
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In response, a defender of propositional or linguistic ersatzism
may say that she never intended her account to be fully reductive.
Its benefits lie elsewhere, she may claim. Sider (2002), for instance,
argues that
Unless modal consistency can be reduced in some way, linguistic-
ersatz worlds cannot be used in a reductive analysis of modality,
on pain of circularity. But the linguistic ersatzist can accept
this limitation. The reduction of worlds to language still has a
point, for it allows us to reduce all talk of worlds—which runs
far beyond that which can be said utilizing merely the modal
operators—to talk of possibility and necessity. As for these, they
may one day be reduced in some way that does not involve
worlds, or they may remain primitive. (Sider 2002, 282)
A reduction of talk of possibilia which employs primitive
possibility and necessity is nevertheless valuable since talk of
possibilia runs beyond what can be said in the language of
quantified modal logic. (Sider 2002, 306)
That’s a concessive response. A more ambitious propositional or
linguistic ersatzer might attempt to offer a fully reductive account of
modality, by saying, in non-modal terms, which sets of propositions
or sentences count as possible worlds. The difficulty here is that
non-modal notions appear to be either too narrow, or too broad,
to pick out metaphysical modality. To see why, consider those sets
of propositions or sentences that are both logically consistent and
closed under (classical) logical consequence. These are maximal
consistent sets, and correspond to (classical) logically possible worlds.
But not all of these represent (genuine,metaphysical, etc.) possibilities.
There will be worlds where this apple is both red all over and green
all over, or where there are married bachelors; these things aren’t
logically inconsistent. Lewis (1986b) argues, on these grounds, that
this purely syntactic way of delimiting possible worlds gets the modal
facts wrong, by delivering too broad a conception of what’s possible.
The ambitious, reductive approach is difficult. Nevertheless, here’s
an attempt, which builds on the approach sketched at the end of
§3.4. (We’ll focus now on linguistic ersatzism, but a propositional
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ersatzer could say similar things.) The metaphysically possible worlds
are those logically possible worlds (the maximal consistent sets of
sentences) which respect grounding relationships. Let’s unpack this.
Grounding is a metaphysical dependency relationship (§1.3) which
holds between facts or states of affairs (and perhaps between other
kinds of entity), where the grounded state of affairs obtains in virtue
of the ground.The fact that it’s now 20∘C in Nottingham grounds the
(more general) fact that it’s now hot in Nottingham. If physicalism
about the mind is true, then the fact that Anna’s brain is in such-and-
such state grounds the fact that she’s feeling hot. And that fact in turn
grounds the fact that the proposition ⟨Anna is feeling hot⟩ is true.
A set of sentences S respects grounding relationships as follows.
Suppose S contains sentences A1,… ,An, which represent states
of affairs s1,… , sn. Suppose also that s1,… , sn together ground a
further state of affairs s. Then any sentence A which represents s
must be a member of S, too. The idea is then that, when such sets
of worldmaking sentences are consistent and closed under logical
consequence, they (and only they) count as possible worlds.
This approach will work only if grounding is itself a non-modal
notion. As we saw in §1.3, Fine (2001, 2012b) argues persuasively
that grounding is irreducible to modal notions. Grounding has
modal consequences – if state s1 grounds s2, then it is necessary
that s2 obtains if s1 obtains – but it is not itself defined in modal
terms. Indeed, it might be that grounding is a primitive, undefinable
metaphysical notion. One of us attempts a reductive, non-modal
analysis of grounding in Jago 2018a. Whether this approach will
ultimately work out is beyond the scope of our discussion here. But if
it does, then a fully reductive account of possible world to non-modal
notions is on the cards for linguistic (and propositional) ersatzism.
3.7 Alien Entities
All versions of ersatz realism face a worry with alien entities: things
that do not (actually) exist, but could have. Franz could have had an
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older sister (but, in fact, doesn’t). How is his possible older sister to
be represented by an ersatz possible world? One way is by naming
her. Let’s call her ‘Franzista’. But how do we give that name meaning?
Not by associating it directly with an individual (as we do at a
naming ceremony, for example), since, by hypothesis, there actually
is no such person.We could instead give ‘Franzista’ its meaning by
associating it with the description, ‘Franz’s older sister’. But this gives
us strange results. Franz might not have existed. So we should expect
the following situation to be possible: Franzista exists, but Franz does
not. So, in that possible situation, Franzista is not Franz’s sister. But
this situation is contradictory if ‘Franzista’ means Franz’s sister.
A better approach is to forget about naming Franz’s merely possible
older sister, and instead describe our target possible world.We can
characterize that world as follows: there are distinct individuals
x1,x2,… , each distinct from all actual individuals, such that x1 is
such-and-such, x2 is such-and-such, …, xi is Franz’s older sister, ….
Here, we describe a possible situation in which there exists some
older sister of Franz’s. We can allow that that person may have had
no siblings herself in some other possible situation.
A problem remains. How are we to capture this further possible
situation, in which Franz’s (merely possible) older sister has no
siblings? Call the possible world just described, containing Franz
and a Franz-sister, w1. Let w2 be a Franz-less world, in which Franz’s
sister from w1 has no siblings.What guarantees that we are talking
about the same person, Franz’s possible sister, in both worlds? For all
we’ve said, nothing does. So we have no way to say, thinking about
Franz’s sister in w1, that she could have had no siblings.
One response to the problem is to use counterpart theory (Lewis
1968, 1971). This is a feature of Lewisian genuine modal realism,
though we did not get into it in §2.2. Counterparts capture de re
ways an entity could have been. If x and y are counterparts, then x
could have been like y, and vice versa. In our ersatz setting, we can
describe some xi in w1, and describe some xj in w2, and then say that
x1 in w1 and xj in w2 are counterparts. One problem here is that the
counterpart relation is, well, a relation, and relations relate entities.
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Unless one is a Meinongian, if it’s true that xi and xj are related, then
xi and xj exist. (Note that the theory doesn’t say that xi and xj are
counterparts according to worldw1 or any other world. It’s a claim of
the theory from the viewpoint of all modal space.) But, by hypothesis,
neither xi nor xj exist. So this can’t be the right approach.
The problem of aliens gets even tougher to solve when we turn
our attention to merely possible properties (Lewis 1986b, chapter 3).
Presumably, there are properties that could have been instantiated
but are not. Perhaps there are fundamental uninstantiated properties.
They pose a serious problem for any ersatz approach. At least we
have the means to describe Franz’s merely possible older sister.We
do so using the predicates ‘older than’ and ‘sister of’, which get their
meaning through being associated with the corresponding relations.
But in the case of alien fundamental properties, we don’t even have
the vocabulary to describe them.
Sider (2002) shows how to solve these problems. On his approach,
rather than describing each possible world one by one, we describe
all of them in one go. (For simplicity, we’ll consider the case of alien
individuals only.) We say: there are distinct individuals x1,x2,… ,
each distinct from all actual individuals, and worlds w1,w2,… , such
that, in w1, …, and in w2, …, and …. Here, we quantify over merely
possible individuals all in one go, and then describe how each is in
each of the worlds which represent that individual. This is the Ersatz
pluriverse sentence. It is false, of course, since (by actualist lights)
there are no merely possible individuals. Its function is to represent
a space of possibilities, just as (standard) linguistic ersatzism does.
The ersatz pluriverse sentence makes clear when distinct worlds wi
and wj are talking about the same possible particular. That is the
great advantage of Sider’s approach. Jago (2013c) raises a worry for
Sider’s approach, which we won’t discuss here. This said, we conclude
by saying that we take a form of linguistic ersatzism endowed with
grounding relations to be the most promising ersatz account. One
advantage of linguistic ersatzism is that it helps with an insidious
objection to impossible worlds: the compositionality objection, which
we discuss in §8.5.
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Chapter Summary
We can understand ersatz possible worlds as maximal states of
affairs; maximal properties; recombinations of actual bits of reality;
as maps; or as entities built from propositions or sentences (§3.1).
Our question was: can these approaches be extended to include
impossible worlds? The states of affairs approach can, with some
modification, accommodate impossible worlds; yet we found the
concept of a non-obtaining state of affairs hard to sustain (§3.2). The
property approach too can, with some modification, be extended to
impossible worlds.We then argued (§3.3) that the extended approach
is best viewed as a form of linguistic ersatzism.
The combinatorial faces the question: what are recombinations,
metaphysically speaking? We argued that, however the question is
answered, this approach collapses into one of the others (§3.4). Map
ersatzism does not seem general enough to accommodate all the
impossibilities our theories require of impossible worlds (§3.5). The
most promising approach seems to be propositional or linguistic
ersatzism, of which, we prefer the linguistic variant (§3.6). Finally,
we discussed an issue all ersatz accounts face: the problem of alien
entities (§3.7).
Part II
Logical Applications

4Modal Logics
4.1 Normal Modal Logics
We begin with a rehearsal of standard or normal modal logic. To
keep things simple, we limit ourselves to a propositional language ℒ,
including a set of atoms AT: p,q, r,p1,p2,… .We have negation ¬,
conjunction ∧, disjunction ∨, the material conditional ⊃, and the box◻ and diamond ◇ of necessity and possibility.We use A,B,C,… as
metavariables for formulas of ℒ. The well-formed formulas are the
atoms in AT and, if A and B are well-formed formulas, then so are:
¬A | (A ∧ B) | (A ∨ B) | (A ⊃ B) | ◻ B | ◇ B
Outermost brackets are normally omitted.
A normal possible worlds frame or Kripke frame ℱ for ℒ is a pair
⟨⟨W ,R⟩⟩, where W is a set of possible worlds and R ⊆ W ×W is a
binary accessibility relation between them. A frame becomes a model
ℳ = ⟨⟨W ,R, v⟩⟩, when endowed with a valuation function v. This
assigns to each atom either the value 1 (true) or the value 0 (false)
at a world. So we write ‘vw(p) = 1’ to mean that p is true at w, and
‘vw(p) = 0’ to mean that it is false there.
The valuation function v is extended to the whole language via
the following recursive clauses:
(S¬) vw(¬A) = 1 if vw(A) = 0, and 0 otherwise.
(S∧) vw(A ∧ B) = 1 if vw(A) = vw(B) = 1, and 0 otherwise.
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(S∨) vw(A ∨ B) = 1 if vw(A) = 1 or vw(B) = 1, and 0 otherwise.
(S⊃) vw(A ⊃ B) = 1 if vw(A) = 0 or vw(B) = 1, and 0 otherwise.
(S◻) vw(◻A) = 1 if for all w1 ∈W such that Rww1, vw1(A) = 1, and
0 otherwise.
(S◇) vw(◇A) = 1 if for some w1 ∈ W such that Rww1, vw1(A) = 1,
and 0 otherwise.
Logical consequence or entailment ‘⊨’, is defined as truth preserva-
tion at all worlds of all models (for any set of formulas Γ):
Γ ⊨ A iff for all models ℳ = ⟨⟨W ,R, v⟩⟩ and all w ∈ W: if
vw(A) = 1 for all B ∈ Γ, then vw(A) = 1.
For single-premise entailment,we will writeA ⊨ B instead of {A} ⊨ B.
Logical equivalence, A ⫤⊨ B, is two-way entailment between A and
B. Logical validity or logical truth, ⊨ A, defined as truth at all worlds
of all models, is a special case of entailment by the empty set, ∅ ⊨ A.
The semantics makes ◻A equivalent to ¬◇¬A and ◇A equivalent
to ¬◻¬A, as desired. It also validates the Distribution principle or
K-principle:
(K) ◻(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (◻A ⊃ ◻B)
The logic induced by the semantics (the set of valid sentences) is
called K, after Kripke. This is the weakest normal modal logic. In the
context of modal logic, ‘normal’ means that the logic includes all the
classical tautologies plus (K), and is closed under modus ponens and
the Necessitation rule:
(N) If ⊢ A, then ⊢ ◻A
(Be careful in how you read this rule. It doesn’t say that A implies◻A: that would trivialize modality by committing us to treating all
truths as necessary truths. Rather, it says that, if A is a theorem of
the logic/a logical truth, then so is ◻A.)
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K is the base normal modal logic, in that its semantics puts
no conditions on the accessibility relation R. If we impose some
conditions on R, we obtain stronger normal modal logics.The normal
modal logics obtained in this way contain all the K-theorems, plus
some extra ones too. (In semantic terms, we get more entailments by
putting further conditions on the accessibility relation R.) Table 4.1
shows the most well-known cases:
Axiom name Axiom scheme Frame condition
D ◻A ⊃ ◇A R is serial: ∀x∃yRxy
T ◻A ⊃ A R is reflexive: ∀xRxx
B A ⊃ ◻◇A R is symmetrical
∀x∀y(Rxy→ Ryx)
4 ◻A ⊃ ◻◻A R is transitive
∀x∀y∀z(Rxy ∧ Ryz → Rxz)
5 ◇A ⊃ ◻◇A R is euclidean
∀x∀y∀z(Rxy ∧ Rxz → Ryz)
Table 4.1: axiom-frame correspondence
The logic KTB adds the T and B axioms, for example, and so
corresponds to to the reflexive and symmetrical frame.Corresponding
to the serial and euclidean frame is the logic KD5. And so on.
Whether we accept these additional axioms depends on how we
understand the involved modalities. The D axiom says that what is
necessary is possible, and this seems plausible on most readings of
the notions of possibility and necessity. For D to hold, we need every
world inW to access some world (that’s Seriality). For if a world w
accesses no world, given (S◻), all formulas of the form ◻A are true
at w. And given (S◇), all formulas of the form ◇A are false at w, for
there is no accessible world where A is true. Thus, D fails. (The label
‘D’ comes from ‘deontic’, inspired by the reading of necessity as ‘it
ought to be the case that’ and of possibility as ‘it is permissible that’.)
If the relevant necessity is factive, then the T axiom must hold: if
A is necessary (at a given world w), then it should be true (at that
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world). This won’t hold in general without Reflexivity (every world
is possible relative to itself). For without Reflexivity, it could be that
A holds at all worlds accessible from w but not at w itself.
If the relevant necessity is unrestricted, then the 4 and 5 axioms
look very plausible. If A is unrestrictedly necessary (or possible) in
the relevant sense, this fact should not be contingent on anything and
so it should be necessary as well. This may not be so for factive but
restricted or relative necessities. Against 4, for instance, it might be
physically necessary (determined by the laws of physics) that bodies
do not accelerate through the speed of light; but its necessity may
not be determined by the laws of physics. The 4 and 5 axioms are
characteristic of two important normal modal logics, S4 (= KT4) and
S5 (= KT5), due to C.I. Lewis (Lewis and Langford 1932), a founding
father of modern modal logic.
If we read ‘◻’ as an epistemic operator expressing knowledge, it is
doubtful that either 4 or 5 holds. In epistemic logic, 4 is called the
Axiom of (Positive) Introspection, or KK-principle. It says that, if
one knows that A, then one knows that one knows that A. One has
perfect introspective access to what one knows. It seems, however,
that this has counterexamples. Think of yourself panicking the night
before the exam, but doing fine with your essay the day after. You
may truthfully say: ‘Yesterday I didn’t know I had learned so much by
studying, but today it turned out that I did’. You knew the answers,
but didn’t know that you knew them all.
The 5 axiom is even more suspect in an epistemic setting. It is
equivalent to ¬◻A ⊃ ◻¬◻A, which, in an epistemic setting, says: if
one doesn’t know that A, then one knows that one doesn’t know
that A. That doesn’t seem at all plausible. For one thing, we often
think we know things we don’t in fact know. In those cases, we don’t
believe, and so don’t know, that we don’t know them.
As we shall see in Chapter 5, it is indeed doubtful that any
normal modal logic can provide an adequate formal treatment of
epistemic notions like knowledge and belief. This is due to the logical
omniscience phenomena, which were introduced in Chapter 1, and
to which we shall return in §5.1.
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4.2 Non-Normal Modal Logics
This section expands on Berto and Jago 2018. Normal Kripke frames
are celebrated for having provided suitable interpretations of different
systems of modal logic, including S4 and S5. Before Kripke’s work, we
merely had lists of axioms or, at most, algebraic semantics many found
rather uninformative. Kripke also introduced non-normal worlds
(Kripke 1965), in order to provide world-based semantics for modal
logics weaker than the basic normal modal system K. These are non-
normal modal logics, including C.I. Lewis’s systems S2 and S3.
Non-normal modal systems do not include the Necessitation rule:
(N) If ⊢ A, then ⊢ ◻A
As we said in §4.1, (N) holds in the weakest normal modal logic K
and all its normal extensions. A semantic counterpart of (N) would
tell us that if A is a logical truth, then so is ◻A. This principle cannot
be avoided when ◻ is understood in line with (S◻). For if A is a logical
truth, then it is by definition true at all worlds of all models. So given
any world w, A is true at all worlds accessible from w, so also ◻A
is true at w. Since this applies to any world of any model, ◻A will
thereby be a logical truth, too.
Non-normal worlds enter the stage in order to make (N) fail. Take
the same language ℒ of §4.1 and give it the following semantics. A
non-normal worlds frame ℱ for ℒ is a triple ⟨⟨W ,N,R⟩⟩, withW the
set of worlds and N ⊆ W the subset of normal worlds, so that the
items inW −N are the non-normal worlds. R is as before. A frame
becomes a non-normal modelℳ = ⟨⟨W ,N,R, v⟩⟩ when endowed with
a valuation function v assigning truth values to formulas at worlds.
The truth conditions for the extensional logical vocabulary are
defined as in §4.1. But we now take the clauses (S◻) and (S◇) to
apply to normal worlds only. If w ∈W −N, the clauses are:
(NS◻) vw(◻A) = 0
(NS◇) vw(◇A) = 1
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At non-normal worlds, formulas of the form $A, with $ a modal
operator, are not evaluated depending on the truth value of A at
other (accessible) worlds, but get assigned their truth value directly.
Specifically, all ◻-formulas are false and all ◇-formulas are true. In
a sense, non-normal worlds of this kind are worlds where nothing
is necessary and anything is possible. These worlds are deviant only
in this respect: their behavior, as far as the extensional connectives
are concerned, is quite regular. Notice also that, as is easy to check,
(NS◻) and (NS◇) still deliver the equivalence of ◻A with ¬◇¬A and
of ◇A with ¬◻¬A.
Logical consequence or entailment is defined as truth preservation
at all normal worlds in all models:
Γ ⊨ B iff for all models ℳ = ⟨⟨W ,N,R, v⟩⟩ and all w ∈ N: if
vw(A) = 1 for all A ∈ Γ, then vw(B) = 1
Logical validity is truth at all normal worlds in all models.
Restricting logical consequence and validity to normal worlds in
this way is a common, though not universal, move in semantics that
include non-normal or impossible worlds. The insight behind this
comes from the second characterization of impossible worlds as ‘logic
violators’ from §1.4: worlds where logic is different, or where the
laws of logic fail. If this is the interpretation of the items inW −N,
then we should not refer to, or quantify over, such worlds when we
characterize logical consequence and validity. For these, we want to
look only at possible or normal worlds: worlds where logic is not
different.
This setting gives us a basic non-normal modal logic, which Priest
(2008) calls N. If one adds the condition that R be reflexive, one
gets C.I. Lewis’s modal system S2. If one takes R to be reflexive and
transitive, one gets S3 (Kripke 1965).
This kind of semantics makes (N) fail. Take any classical proposi-
tional tautology, say, of the form A ∨ ¬A. This holds at all worlds of
all interpretations. Therefore, ◻(A ∨ ¬A) holds at all normal worlds
of all interpretations, so ⊨ ◻(A ∨ ¬A). But by (NS◻), ◻(A ∨ ¬A) does
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not hold in any non-normal world. So ◻◻(A ∨ ¬A) is false at normal
worlds that have access, via R, to any non-normal world. As there
must be some such world in some model, we have ⊭ ◻◻(A ∨ ¬A).
Another welcome feature of this semantics is that it does not make
the ‘irrelevant’ conditional A J (B J B) valid. This is one of the
‘paradoxes’ of the strict conditional (§1.3). It fails in non-normal
models once one reads A J B as the necessitation of the horseshoe,◻(A ⊃ B). Then the paradox is ◻(A ⊃ ◻(B ⊃ B)). This is valid in
K, but not in N (and extensions): take a world w ∈ N accessing a
non-normal w1 where A holds but (since the world is non-normal)◻(B ⊃ B) fails.
Non-normal worlds semantics of this kind does not provide a
systematic framework for dealing with all cases of irrelevance (nor
was it intended to do so). Nevertheless, this way of handling one
paradox of the strict conditional hints at a general strategy: make
irrelevant conditionals fail by taking into account non-normal or
impossible worlds, understood as worlds where logical truths such
as B J B may fail. We’ll see more of this approach in Chapter 6.
The semantics for non-normal modal logics such as S2 and S3 is
based on a valuation function which assigns the same truth value to all◻-formulas (false) and all ◇-formulas (true) at non-normal worlds.
We also mention the modal system S0.5, due to Lemmon (1957).
This is a non-normal system whose semantics, initially provided by
Cresswell (1966), includes non-normal worlds at which formulas that
begin with a modal operator are assigned arbitrary truth values. The
valuation function v treats modal formulas as atomic. (Interpretations
for S2 or S3 are special cases of interpretations for S0.5: those cases
in which the valuation function uniformly treats ◻-formulas as false
and ◇-formulas as true at non-normal worlds.) This setting makes
the inter-definability of ◻ and ◇ via negation fail.
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4.3 Non-Uniform Truth Conditions
A key idea in impossible worlds semantics of various kinds is that
certain complex formulas are assigned arbitrary values at non-normal
worlds. They are, in effect, treated as atomic sentences. At worlds
that behave this way, the syntax of a formula can be partly or
wholly disregarded. As we shall see in Chapter 5 on epistemic logics,
this insight can be fruitful, and is at work in semantic frameworks
including non-normal or impossible worlds.
This approach requires the truth conditions of some operators not
to be spelled out in a uniform way across worlds. In particular, at
non-normal worlds complex formulas can have truth values assigned
in a non-recursive way. But this approach raises worries. Fine (2019)
claims that it is a ‘theoretical virtue in itself’ for a semantics to be
uniform:
we would like the compositional clauses for the logical connec-
tives to be ‘uniform’ or non-disjunctive. … without uniformity,
it is not even clear that we will have clauses for the logical
connectives themselves as opposed to some gerry-mandered
product of the theoretician’s mind. Fine (2019, 1)
A similar worry is pressed in Williamson (2017).
It is not clear, however, why disjunctiveness would be a problem.
The fact that a concept has a disjunctive characterization per se does
not make the concept itself gerrymandered or gruesome. The notion
Australian citizen, for instance, is obviously perfectly fine even though
it works just as follows: x is Australian citizen iff either x was born
in Australia or x has been naturalized. (The example is due to Priest
(2005, 237).)
A more serious worry is lack of compositionality. If truth-at-a-
world-conditions constitute meaning, and we want meanings to be
compositional for them to be graspable by finite minds, then the
truth-at-a-world-conditions of whole formulas should be given in
terms of those of their subformulas. If there are infinitely many non-
normal worlds in our setting, however, we may have no way finitely
to do this.
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We think this is a serious philosophical worry. We’ll offer a
philosophical response to it in §8.5, by showing how to get a
compositional account of content involving impossible (non-normal)
worlds. Here, our focus is on the logical applications of impossible
worlds.We want our impossible worlds models to give us a notion of
logical consequence that’s useful for certain applications, for example.
But that isn’t to demand that they are all compositional. A model can
be useful, even if it isn’t capable of underpinning a theory of meaning
for a language like English. So for pragmatic logical purposes, we’re
happy to dismiss the worry.
4.4 Non-Adjunctive and Non-Prime Worlds
This section draws on Berto and Jago 2018. Rescher and Brandom
(1980) introduce impossible worlds of a different kind to the ones we
just saw. (Their book’s subtitle is A Study in Non-Standard Possible-
Worlds Semantics and Ontology, but, as we shall now see, the worlds
making their semantics non-standard deserve the label of impossible
worlds.)
In their formal semantics, standard possible worlds are taken
as maximal consistent aggregates of states of affairs. Their non-
standard worlds are obtained combinatorially, by means of two
recursive operations having standard worlds as their base. These
are schematization (‘∩’) and superposition (‘∪’). Given w1 and w2, a
schematic world w1 ∩ w2 is one at which all and only the states of
affairs obtain which obtain both at w1 and at w2. A superposed (or
inconsistent) world w1 ∪w2 is one at which all and only the states
of affairs obtain which obtain either at w1 or at w2. With respect to
the definitions listed in §1.4, Rescher and Brandom’s inconsistent-
superposed worlds are impossible worlds of the fourth kind, that
is, contradiction-realizers: they can make both A and ¬A true. (Just
superpose a possible world, w1, at which you are 1.70m tall, and
another one, w2, at which you are not.)
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Unlike Kripke’s non-normal worlds, which require different truth
conditions only for the modal operators, Rescher and Brandom’s
non-standard worlds behave peculiarly with respect to extensional
operators. The standard clause for conjunction (S∧) from §4.1 has
to go for superposed worlds: A and B can each be true without
A∧B’s being true. These worlds still have a certain amount of logical
structure. They behave in quite a standard fashion with respect to
essentially single-premise inferences (Priest et al. 1989, 161). But they
are anarchic with respect to essentially multiple-premise inferences.
Dually, schematic worlds can be non-prime: it can happen that
A∨B is true at a world without either A or B being true at that world.
One application that can motivate non-prime worlds is the handling
of under-determined information: one may have the information
that Strasbourg is either in France or in Germany, without having
information as to which is the case.
Now ‘dualizing’ back, one may use inconsistent-superposed worlds
to model inconsistent databases. These may consist in sets of data
or information, supplied by different sources which are inconsistent
with each other, such as incompatible evidence presented by different
witnesses in a trial. The non-adjunctive features of superposed
worlds are useful here. Intuitively, one is allowed to draw the logical
consequences of the data or information fed in by a single source,
but one does not conjoin data from distinct sources which may be
inconsistent with each other. The database is ‘compartimentalized’:
occasional inconsistencies are placed in separate sectors, and not
conjunctively asserted. This is an example of a non-adjunctive system.
Hyde (1997), Lewis (1982), and Varzi (1997) each discuss different
uses of this kind of approach.We will come back to uses of impossible
worlds in information theory in more detail in Chapter 9.
Chapter Summary
After recapping standard normal modal logics and their frame
correspondeces (§4.1), we introduced non-normal modal logics,
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which invalidate the Necessitation rule (N).We showed how to model
these logics using non-normal or impossible worlds, thought of as
‘logic violators’ (§4.2). This approach gives comes with non-uniform
truth conditions: some operators are understood in one way at normal
worlds, in another way at non-normal worlds (§4.3).This may or may
not be a problem; we’ll come back to it in §8.5.We then discussed the
specific case of non-adjunctive and non-prime worlds (§4.4), where
conjunction and disjunction can behave in unusual ways.

5Epistemic Logics
5.1 Standard Epistemic Logic and Logical
Omniscience
In §1.2, we introduced the idea of understanding knowledge and
belief as restricted quantifiers over possible worlds, where the
accessible worlds are those that represent epistemic possibilities for
a cognitive agent. This can be modelled by taking the language ℒ
of §4.1 with its normal Kripke semantics, and interpreting ‘◻’ as an
operator representing knowledge or belief.We’ll rewrite ‘◻’ as ‘K’, for
‘one knows that’. (We’ll also talk about belief, and sometimes use ‘B’
in place of ‘K’. But most of what we say about modelling knowledge
goes for belief, and vice versa.) Its semantic clause is:
(SK) vw(KA) = 1 if for all w1 ∈W such that Rww1, vw1(A) = 1, and
0 otherwise.
One can then read the dual ‘◇’ as ‘it is compatible with what one
knows/believes that’.
The relation R in a Kripke model ⟨⟨W ,R, v⟩⟩ should now be read
in an epistemic way, as epistemic accessibility. Epistemic operators
are often indexed to a particular agent, with ‘KiA’ read as ‘agent
i knows that A’. Indexing allows a multi-modal logic representing
the cognitive states of a plurality of agents. For agents 1,… , n, each
gets its own knowledge operator K1,… ,Kn, with a corresponding
epistemic accessibility relation, R1,… ,Rn.
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It’s sometimes useful to rephrase accessibility in terms of a function
f which, given a world w as input, returns the set of worlds fw that
are epistemically accessible from w. This f is called the epistemic
projection function, and is defined by setting fw = {w1 ∣ Rww1}.
Then KA’s truth at w requires A’s truth at all worlds in fw. When
we have multiple epistemic accessibility relations R1,… ,Rn, we have
multiple epistemic projection functions, f1,… , fn, one for each agent.
Since the issues we’ll go on to discuss arise in both the single-agent
and multi-agent settings, we’ll focus for simplicity on single-agent
models, with a single modality ‘K’.
Our concern here will be with the various issues arising under the
heading of logical omniscience (§1.3). The issues are the result of our
semantics satisfying various closure conditions. These take the form:
if an agent knows —, she must also know —. Fagin et al. (1995,
335–6) and Van Ditmarsch et al. (2008, 23) discuss the following
(with ‘A ⫤⊨ B’ meaning that A ⊨ B and B ⊨ A):
(C1) If KA and A ⊨ B, then KB
(C2) If ⊨ A, then KA
(C3) ⊨ ¬(KA ∧ K¬A)
(C4) If KA, and A ⫤⊨ B, then KB
(C5) If KA and ⊨ A ⊃ B, then KB
(C6) If KA and K(A ⊃ B), then KB
(C7) If K(A ∧ B), then KA and KB
(C8) If KA, then K(A ∨ B)
(C1) is Closure under entailment or Full omniscience. (C2),
Knowledge of all valid formulas, is a special case of (C1). We met
both principles in §1.3. (C3),Consistency, says that one cannot know
contradictory things. (C4),Closure under logical equivalence, follows
from (C1) as logical equivalence is defined as two-way entailment.
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(C5),Closure under valid implication, is equivalent to (C1) in systems
in which ⊨ A ⊃ B if and only if A ⊨ B. (C6) is Closure under known
implication. (C7) and (C8) are often called Closure under conjunction
and Closure under disjunction, respectively. There are corresponding
closure principles for belief.
In §1.3, we discussed how (C1) and (C2) are implausible for the
case of real, finite, and fallible cognitive agents. The corresponding
principles for belief are just as implausible, as is (C3): we are all
inconsistent believers. The other principles look no more promising.
(C4) and (C5) obviously are in no better position than (C1). (C6) is
a hotly contested principle in epistemology, because of its relation to
external-world scepticism. You know that, if you have hands, then
you’re not a brain in a vat. But you don’t know that you’re not a
brain in a vat. (How could you?) Given (C6), it follows that you
don’t know that you have hands (and similarly for other simple bits
of external world knowledge). (Dretske (2005), Holliday (2015),
Nozick (1981), and Roush (2010) discuss the issue.) (C7) is perhaps
themost plausible principle in the list.As for (C8), it seems implausible
that, just because one knows that A, one automatically knows the
disjunction of it and any arbitrary B. One may lack the very concepts
involved in B.
All of these principles except (C3) hold in the weakest normal
modal logic K from §4.1, with no conditions on the accessibility
relation R. ((C2) is related to (N) and (C6) to the K-principle, for
example. (C3) requires Seriality to be valid.) This fact tells us that
tampering with the accessibility relation is not going to help us avoid
all of these principles. So if we want to understand knowledge and
belief in terms of modal logic, we should not work with a normal
modal logic.
Non-omniscience is often taken as evidence that knowledge and
belief are hyperintensional. There are a number of ways to draw
distinctions more fine-grained than those available in standard
possible worlds semantics, however. Not all of those options resort
to impossible worlds. We’ll briefly discuss some of them in §5.2.
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5.2 Dealing with Omniscience without
Impossible Worlds
One radical way to avoid Logical Omniscience is to adopt a syntactic
approach to modelling knowledge and belief. What an agent knows
(or believes) is captured as set of sentences, whose content reflects
what the agent knows (or believes). Alechina and Logan (2002),
des Rivieres and Levesque (1686), Eberle (1974), Konolige (1986),
Moore and Hendrix (1979), and Morreau and Kraus (1998) all take
an approach along these lines. Philosophical motivation for their
approach may be found in Quine, who sees propositional attitudes
as ‘involving something like quotation of one’s own imagined verbal
response to an imagined situation’ (Quine 1960, 219).
Syntactic models of knowledge include a database 𝒟 of formulas,
and takeKA to hold iffA ∈ 𝒟.𝒟 is logically unstructured. It is merely
a set of formulas, having no non-trivial logical closure features. As
a result, all closure conditions for K are destroyed as well. But the
solution seems cheap: knowledge or belief in syntactic structures have
few interesting features. As Fagin et al. (1995) say,
One gains very little intuition about knowledge from studying
syntactic structures … In these approaches knowledge is a
primitive construct. … Arguably, these approaches give us ways
of representing knowledge rather thanmodelling knowledge. In
contrast, the semantics given to knowledge in Kripke structures
explains knowledge as truth in all possible worlds. (Fagin et al.
1995, 345)
An alternative approach draws on Scott-Montague neighbourhood
semantics (Scott 1970), and represents what an agent knows or
believes as an unstructured set 𝒫 of propositions, rather than
formulas. Propositions here are understood as sets of possible worlds.
𝒫 is then an unstructured set of sets of worlds. This approach
invalidates various forms of logical omniscience.
One that remains valid is (C4), though: if A and B are equivalent
and KA holds, then KB holds as well. In a possible worlds setting,
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that 2 + 2 = 4 and that xn+ yn = zn has no solutions in integers for
n > 2 are the same proposition, namely the total set of worlds. Yet
one can know the former without knowing the latter.
Some proposals combine a syntactic and a possible worlds
approach. Awareness logic (Fagin and Halpern 1988) works with
three main notions. Awareness is syntactic: an agent is aware
of A when A belongs to a set of formulas, its ‘awareness set’.
Implicit knowledge gets the standard possible worlds definition,
whereas explicit knowledge is defined as the combination of implicit
knowledge and awareness. An agent explicitly knows that A when
she implicitly knows that A and A is in her awareness set. The
underlying idea is that lack of omniscience can come from lack of
awareness, understood as lack of conception (Schipper 2015). Because
explicit belief requires awareness, and awareness is represented
via membership of an arbitrary set of formulas, explicit belief can
invalidate any non-trivial logical closure condition.
Differentiating between explicit and implicit representational
mental states is as such cognitively plausible and independently
motivated. The distinction between explicit and implicit memory
and knowledge is frequently made in empirical psychology. Explicit
memory is often taken to be conscious, involving the deliberate recall
of previously acquired information. Implicit memory, by contrast, is
taken to involve a change in performance or in the execution of a task
in the light of previously acquired information without conscious
recall (Schacter 1986, Schacter and Tulving 1994).
Similarly, representational accounts of belief claim that one believes
A explicitly when one has a representation with content A actually
present in the mind, as a token of a sentence inscribed in a ‘belief
box’. One believes A implicitly if one believes A without having a
representation with that content present in one’s mind (Dennett 1978,
1987). Dennett proposes that, in order for one to believe something
implicitly, it is enough that ‘the relevant content be swiftly derivable
from something one explicitly believes’ (Schwitzgebel 2015, §2.2.1).
What does swift derivability mean here? In the Fagin-Halpern
approach, implicit belief is closed under classical logical consequence.
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But this is precisely what spells trouble in the light of logical
omniscience. In what sense does a finite cognitive agent have implicit
belief in the infinitely many logical consequences of what it believes?
This notion of implicit belief (or knowledge) seems more like the
implicit rational commitments of one’s beliefs (or knowledge). That’s
not the psychologically motivated notion of implicit belief just
discussed (for criticisms along these lines, see (Schipper 2015, 88)).
But now, without a satisfactory notion of implicit knowledge
or belief, the awareness approach fares little better than a purely
syntactic approach to knowledge and belief representation (Jago
2006, Konolige 1986). Konolige sums up the situation:
the logic of general awareness represents agents as perfect
reasoners, restricted to considering some syntactic class of
sentences. There don’t seem to be any clear intuitions that this
is the case for human or computer agents. (Konolige 1986, 248)
We now turn to approaches that resort to impossible worlds, with
the aim of seeing whether some of them can do better.
5.3 Impossible Worlds for Knowledge and
Belief
The idea of adopting impossible worlds in order to address the logical
omniscience problem goes back to Hintikka (1975). He proposed
that epistemically accessible worlds need not be genuinely logically
possible. Instead, he allows the epistemically accessible worlds to
be ‘options which only look possible but which contain hidden
contradictions’ (Hintikka 1975, 476).
Rantala (1982a) gives an example of this strategy. Recall how,
in Rescher and Brandom’s work (§4.4), there are worlds at which
conjunction and disjunction behave abnormally. In Rantala’s ap-
proach, the idea is extended to all logical operators. Take once again
the language ℒ from §4.1 and give it the following semantics. A
Rantala frameℱ forℒ is a triple ⟨⟨W ,N,R⟩⟩, withW the set of worlds,
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N ⊆W the subset of normal, possible worlds,W−N the non-normal
or impossible worlds. R is as before. A frame becomes a Rantala
modelℳ = ⟨⟨W ,N,R, v⟩⟩ when endowed with a valuation function
v assigning truth values to formulas at worlds. At possible worlds
in N, atomic formulas are directly assigned 1 or 0, and compound
formulas are evaluated recursively. At impossible worlds inW −N,
by contrast, all formulas are assigned a truth value by v directly, not
recursively. Logical consequence and validity are defined, again, as
truth preservation at all possible worlds in all models.
As a consequence, at impossible worlds, all formulas are treated
as if they are atomic. A ∨ B may turn out to be true even though
both A and B are false (impossible worlds may be non-prime), and
¬A may turn out to be true when A is (impossible worlds may be
inconsistent). This is the generalization of a strategy already met in
§4.2: taking impossible worlds as worlds where the logical syntax
of formulas can be disregarded when assigning them a truth value.
As a consequence, the impossible worlds in W −N are not closed
under any consequence relation other than identity, A ⊨ A. Because
of this, impossible worlds of this kind are called open worlds in Priest
(2005).
On this approach, none of of (C1)–(C8) hold. For instance, against
(C1) and (C8), consider the following model, with N = {w} and the
arrow representing accessibility:
w w1
p
At w, Kp is true (since p is true at w1) but K(p ∨ q) is not (since p ∨ q
is false at w1). So Kp ⊭ K(p ∨ q), even though p ⊨ p ∨ q. (Note that
this is no countermodel to p ⊨ p ∨ q. Since w1 ∈W −N, it does not
affect logical consequence.)
Rantala (1982b) extends this approach to quantified modal logics,
and Wansing (1990) develops it into a unified framework for
epistemic logics. Wansing shows that various logics for knowledge
and belief in Artificial Intelligence, including Fagin and Halpern’s
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awareness logic (mentioned in §5.2), have equivalent impossible
worlds models (that is, models which validate precisely the same
formulas). Sillari (2008) establishes further equivalence results in the
area.
A naive Rantalian approach, however, faces a serious problem.
As noted by Jago (2007, 2009b), the way in which Rantala models
manage to invalidate all forms of logical omniscience involves having
no restriction on the impossible worlds one can look at, via the
epistemic accessibility relation R of the models. The set of worldsW
in the frames can include worlds not closed under any non-trivial
consequence relation.Worlds, thus, can correspond to arbitrary sets
of formulas of ℒ.
Given world w where our epistemic agent is located, then, let
𝒮w = {w1 ∣ Rww1}, the set of worlds accessible from w. Let 𝒞 =
{A ∣ vw1(A) = 1 for all w1 ∈ 𝒮w}, the set of formulas true at all of
them. The agent’s epistemic or doxastic state can be reduced to a
merely syntactic structure: KA holds at w just in case A ∈ 𝒞, and 𝒞
can be a set of formulas lacking any (non-trivial) closure property.
The content of epistemic states, then, comes out as highly structured
as the syntax of the language. ‘Unconstrained’ impossible worlds
semantics makes no real progress with respect to a merely syntactic
approach. One can add constraints on the accessibility relation, or
on the logical behaviour of the accessible worlds, which will validate
some inferences. As we are about to see, though, how this should be
done is no trivial issue.
5.4 Closure under a Weaker Logic
We’ve seen that, by adding impossible worlds with no logical structure
whatsoever, the worlds approach seems no better than the syntactic
approach. A natural thought is that we should insist that impossible
worlds have some degree of logical structure, although not as much
as logically possible worlds. Cresswell (1973) and Levesque (1984)
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offer approaches along these lines. We’ll present a simple version in
this section.
Our language ℒ will include the operators ¬, ∧, ∨, and K, with
A ⊃ B being defined as ¬A∨B. As before, a frame ℱ is a pair ⟨⟨W ,R⟩⟩,
withW the set of worlds and R the epistemic accessibility relation. A
frame becomes an FDE model ℳ = ⟨⟨W ,R, 𝜌⟩⟩ when endowed with a
valuation relation 𝜌. (We’ll explain the name ‘FDE’ below.) Unlike the
usual valuation function, a valuation relation can connect a formula
to more than one truth value at a world: 𝜌 can relate the atomic
formulas of ℒ to truth (𝜌wp1), falsity, (𝜌wp0), both, or neither. We
thus get rid of the assumption, embedded in the semantics of classical
logic, that truth and falsity are exclusive and exhaustive.
We extend 𝜌 to the whole language via the following recursive
clauses. We now need to spell out truth and falsity conditions
separately for each operator, for now not being true (not being related
to 1) is distinct from being false (being related to 0):
(S1¬) 𝜌w(¬A)1 iff 𝜌wA0
(S2¬) 𝜌w(¬A)0 iff 𝜌wA1
(S1∧) 𝜌w(A ∧ B)1 iff 𝜌wA1 and 𝜌wA1
(S2∧) 𝜌w(A ∧ B)0 iff 𝜌wA0 or 𝜌wB0
(S1∨) 𝜌w(A ∨ B)1 iff 𝜌wA1 or 𝜌wB1
(S2∨) 𝜌w(A ∨ B)0 iff 𝜌wA0 and 𝜌wB0
(S1K) 𝜌w(KA)1 iff for all w1 ∈W such that Rww1, 𝜌w1A1
(S2K) 𝜌w(KA)0 iff it is not the case that 𝜌w(KA)1
Logical consequence is truth preservation at all worlds of all models:
Γ ⊨ A iff for all modelsℳ = ⟨⟨W ,R, 𝜌⟩⟩ and allw ∈W: if 𝜌wB1
for all B ∈ Γ, then 𝜌wA1
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(Note that we define logical consequence over all worlds in the model,
making no distinction between possible and impossible worlds here.)
ThisK operator corresponds to what Levesque (1984) calls explicit
belief. He also defines an implicit belief operator, which is closed
under classical logical consequence and hence delivers full logical
omniscience (for the notion of implicit belief). We’ll focus on the
explicit notion only here.
In this semantics, worlds can be inconsistent (making both A and
¬A true, for some A) and incomplete (making neither A nor ¬A true).
In the taxonomy of §1.4, they are impossible worlds of the third and
fourth kinds: violating classical logic and making contradictions true.
Yet they do have some logical structure. They are still adjunctive,
making A∧B true whenever they make both A and B true, and prime,
making either A or B true whenever they make A ∨ B true. They
also obey Disjunction Introduction (from A to A ∨ B) and Double
Negation Introduction and Elimination (from A to ¬¬A and back).
The resulting logic is paraconsistent, forA∧¬A ⊭ B: contradictions
do not entail arbitrary conclusions. It is also paracomplete, for A ⊭
B ∨ ¬B: arbitrary premises do not entail all instances of Excluded
Middle. The extensional fragment of this logic (the part lacking K-
sentences) is, in fact, one way of presenting First Degree Entailment,
FDE (Belnap 1977, Dunn 1976). This is a simple and well-known
paraconsistent and paracomplete logic, and is why we call these
structures FDE models.We’ll also refer to the worlds in those models
as FDE worlds.
FDE models avoid some problematic forms of logical omniscience.
The approach can be used to model agents that have contradictory
beliefs (against (C3)), but do not thereby believe everything. Consider
the model:
w w1
p 1
p 0
(We display all the atoms related to a truth-value by 𝜌.) ThenK(p∧¬p)
holds at w, but Kq does not.
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Closure under known (or believed) implication (C6) fails too. This
is because modus ponens fails in the semantics: A,A ⊃ B ⊭ B. In the
model above,modus ponens fails at w1: p ⊃ q holds there, for any q,
given that 𝜌w1p0 and that p ⊃ q is defined as ¬p ∨ q. For any world
that can access such worlds, it may be that KA and K(A ⊃ B) both
hold, and yet KB does not. So in general, KA,K(A ⊃ B) ⊭ KB.
Fagin and Halpern (1988) and Jago (2007) stress that logical omni-
science strikes back in unwelcome ways, however. Any epistemically
accessible FDE world will be adjunctive, closed under Disjunction
Introduction, and Double Negation Introduction and Elimination.
As a consequence, knowledge and belief come out closed under the
corresponding entailments. Conditions (C7) and (C8) still hold.
It is questionable whether this is a good way to model finite and
fallible epistemic agents. In particular, one may believe that Awithout
believing that A ∨ B for an arbitrary B, for one may lack the B-
involving concepts. Similarly, any FDE world making A true also
makes true the formula obtained by prefixing an even number of
negations to A. But it might be that an agent believes that A, without
believing that
1,000,000 times
¬¬⋯ ¬¬A
simply because she lacks the cognitive resources to record all the
iterations.
More generally, in this system knowledge and belief are closed
under weaker-than-classical first-degree entailment. If KA and B is
an FDE-consequence of A, then KB. But this seems wrong: finite
cognitive agents do not know or believe all remote consequences of
what they know or believe, even when the notion of entailment in
play is FDE. There are infinitely many such consequences and they
cannot all be computed by a finite mind.
We seem to face a dilemma: either cognitive states like knowledge
and belief for real agents are closed under some logical consequence,
or they’re not. If they are, then logical omniscience returns: we have
the implausible situation of an agent that is omniscient with respect
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to the target logic. For this not to happen, we seem to have to admit
that such states are completely anarchic: they violate any logical
closure principle (except for A entailing A). But then, how can we
have a logic of knowledge and belief at all? Some logicians and AI
researchers have conjectured that there is no solution to the dilemma
(Meyer and Van der Hoek 1995, 88).
5.5 Going Dynamic
We will now focus on a version of this dilemma, phrased directly in
terms of worlds, which we take from Bjerring (2010, 2012). (See also
Jago 2014a.) Take a setℛ of rules of inference.One may think of a set
of sequent calculi or natural deduction rules; but (bracketing issues
caused by the presence of rules that discharge temporary assumptions)
the point is independent from the specific logical set-up. Call an
inference from A1,… ,An to B immediate when it involves just a
single application of a single rule inℛ.
If what one believes is represented by a set of accessible worlds
and these are all closed under the rules inℛ, then one turns out to be
omniscient with respect toℛ. Suppose, instead, that some accessible
world w is not closed under some rule r ∈ ℛ. Then for some B
that follows immediately from some A1,… ,An, w makes true all of
A1,… ,An but not B. Then our agent is represented as missing some
immediate consequence of what she believes. She considers w as a
way things might be, even though it is, in an obvious way, not a way
things could be. This seems to be a poor approach to modelling our
agent’s rational states.
The difficulty we have in deciding which impossible worlds may
be accessible to our non-idealized agents is due to the fact that,
seemingly, there is no third option: either epistemically accessible
worlds are closed under full logical consequence, or they turn out to
be obviously impossible. That, in short, is what Jago (2014a) calls
Bjerring’s Problem (which we’ll discuss in more detail in §10.3).
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What seems especially difficult to do is to model epistemic agents
that are rationally competent, in spite of not being omniscient. Real
agents just cannot believe all that follows from what they believe. But
if ‘anything goes’, so that believing something does not entail believing
anything else in particular, then it seems that we are modelling agents
who are not even moderately rationally competent: they fail to believe
obvious consequences of what they believe.
One recent approach to the issue develops an idea for modelling
competent but non-omniscient agents dynamically, in terms of how
their beliefs will or may evolve over time due to epistemic actions
and events. As a response to the problem of modelling competent but
non-omniscient agents, the idea was originally put forward by Duc
(1995, 1997). Bjerring and Rasmussen (2018) and Rasmussen (2015)
update the approach, using the dynamic epistemic logics framework.
To evaluate their approach, we’ll need to understand a little about
dynamic epistemic logic.
Dynamic logics contain operators based on actions. If a is an action,
then ‘[a]’ is an operator, and ‘[a]A’ says that, after action a has been
carried out, A is the case. Semantics for these operators is given in
terms of transformations on the model. Typically, the semantics of
such logics uses pointed Kripke models, that is, modelsℳw with a
regular Kripke modelℳ and a ‘designated’ base world w, which is
itself inℳ and can be thought of as the world considered to be the
actual one. Then [a]A is true inℳw iff A is true in all pointed models
𝒩 w1 obtained by transforming ℳw according to the instructions
encoded in action a. Dynamic epistemic logic, developed by Baltag
et al. (1998), Segerberg (1995), Van Benthem (2011), Van Ditmarsch
(2005), and Van Ditmarsch et al. (2008), adds epistemic operators to
the dynamic semantics. Baltag and Renne (2016) give an introduction
to the approach.
Bjerring and Rasmussen (2018), following ideas in Rasmussen
2015, adapt this approach to model competent but non-omniscient
agents. In their models, agents count as competent insofar as they
unfold the consequences of their beliefs, up to a certain ‘depth’ of
reasoning. Their key dynamic operator is of the form ‘⟨n⟩A’, to be
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read as: ‘After n steps of logical reasoning, A may be the case’. These
steps of reasoning are n applications of rules from a chosen setℛ.The
approach also has an epistemic operator B, allowing for sentences of
the form ‘⟨n⟩BA’, saying that the agent can come to believe that A
after n steps of reasoning.
Models (adapted to our own notation in this book) are tuples
ℳ = ⟨⟨W ,N, f , v⟩⟩, whereW is the total set of worlds, N ⊆W is the
set of normal-possible worlds, f is an epistemic projection function
(see §5.1) mapping each world to the set of worlds epistemically
accessible from it, and v is a valuation function. Pointed models are
model-world pairs, writtenℳw, where w ∈ N.
Given a pointed modelℳw and a set of rulesℛ, we can define a set
of epistemic projection functions ℱ n for each integer n. Intuitively,
these functions capture all chains of reasoning of length n using
rules in ℛ, thus, all ways in which the agent can modify the set of
worlds initially seen as epistemically possible, by performing a chain
of reasoning steps of length n.We then define an equivalence relation
∼n for each n, relating pointed models that differ at most in their
projection functions f , which must be chosen from ℱ n. (We skip the
definitions here: see Bjerring and Rasmussen (2018) for the details.
We’ll present a related rule-based approach in detail in §10.5.)
We then extend each pointed modelℳw’s valuation function v to
all formulas. The clauses for connectives and B are as in standard
epistemic logic, and the clause for ⟨n⟩A is given as follows (at w ∈ N;
impossible worlds have complex formulas evaluated directly, non-
recursively):
(S⟨n⟩) vw(⟨n⟩A) = 1 iff there is some pointed model 𝒩
w with
extended valuation v′ such thatℳw ∼n 𝒩 w and v′wA = 1.
The Bjerring-Rasmussen framework is a plausible and promising
model of how non-omniscient agents can deductively unfold the
consequences of their beliefs, and update their belief states accordingly.
For, given a set of inference rules, we can align what the agent can
come to believe in n steps of reasoning with possible proofs containing
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no more than n steps. Bjerring and Rasmussen then prove that, if C
follows from A1,… ,Am in n steps of reasoning given rulesℛ, then
BA1,… ,BAm together entail ⟨n⟩BC (Bjerring and Rasmussen 2018,
17, Corollary 1).
Their overall aim, however, is to capture a non-omniscient agent’s
logical competence, for which they provide the following behavioural
test:
For any p and q such that q follows trivially from p, if an agent
believes p, then upon being asked whether q is the case does
she immediately answer ‘yes’? If she does, she passes the test
and counts as moderately logically competent. (Bjerring and
Rasmussen 2018, 3)
One might quibble with this test (after all, agents can be confused
about what they believe; they often speak insincerely; and often
require a moment’s reflection before asserting). But let’s accept it for
our evaluation of the approach.
Does Bjerring and Rasmussen’s approach pass the test they set?
This is formulated in terms of what an agent will do: she will answer
‘yes’ when asked whether q, a trivial consequence of her beliefs. But
the formal approach tells us about what an agent can come to believe,
within n steps of reasoning. The main result is that BA1,… ,BAm
together entail ⟨n⟩BC when C follows from the Ais within n steps.
⟨n⟩BC says that the agent can come to believe C within n steps: there
is some n-step chain of reasoning the agent can follow, via which she
will come to believe that C. This isn’t the same as telling us that our
agent will come to believe that C. For she might follow some other
chain of reasoning, and thereby come to believe something other than
C. So there’s no guarantee that the modelled agent will answer ‘yes’
when asked whether q. As such, that agent hasn’t been show to pass
the test for moderate logically competence.
If we’re interested only in agents which pass Bjerring and Ras-
mussen’s test, then we need to focus on what the modelled agent will
come to believe after n steps, however she reasons.We need to switch
from particular to universal quantification over pointed models, that
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is, to a box-like dynamic modality, ‘[n]’. [n]A is true on a pointed
model when A is true on all ∼n-related pointed models. (Then [n]A
is equivalent to ¬⟨n⟩¬A. But we can’t define [n]A directly in this way,
since [n]A and ¬⟨n⟩¬A may come apart at impossible worlds.)
It’s easy to see that, if the rules inℛ are sufficiently general, then
there’s nothing the modelled agent must believe after n steps (for any
finite n). Supposeℛ contains Disjunction Introduction and our agent
believes that p. Then one chain of reasoning goes: p, p ∨ p, p ∨ p ∨ p,
and so on. Another goes: p, p∨ q, p∨ q∨ q, and so on. The agent can
go for either chain of reasoning. So the only thing she is guaranteed
to believe after n steps of reasoning is p, which she believed to begin
with. In other words, [n]BA entails BA.
It also turns out that the move from one model to a ∼n-related one
is belief-monotonic, which means that an agent’s current beliefs are
preserved (with additions, but no subtractions) in the newmodel.This
guarantees that BA entails [n]BA, and hence that [n]BA is equivalent
to BA. So formulas of the form ‘[n]BA’ tell us nothing about logical
competence, over and above what formulas of the form ‘BA’ tell
us. But then, the modelled agent will fail the test for moderate
logical competence, since beliefs aren’t closed under any notion of
consequence. Neither dynamic modality, then, helps us capture the
target concept of moderate logical competence.
Bjerring and Rasmussen’s behavioural test is (rightly, in our
opinion) a normative one. It sets up a standard to be met, and so tells
us something about what’s expected of agents. Ordinary reasoners
can fail the test, of course. We all make mistakes in our reasoning
from time to time, and thereby, on those occasions, fail to live up to
rational standards. In a normative setting, the aim is not to model
what an agent can come to believe. Rather, it’s to model a normative
notion of belief, which builds in a certain amount of rationality,
without idealizing agents to the point of logical omniscience.
Much more needs to be said on the key ideas we’ve introduced in
this section. One is that of a trivial inference. We offer an analysis
in §9.5. Another is the idea that epistemically accessible worlds
cannot be obviously impossible. This leads to Bjerring’s Problem: that
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worlds are either closed under full logical consequence, or obviously
impossible, and neither should be epistemically accessible. We offer
a philosophical analysis of the problem, and attempt to draw a
distinction between obvious and subtle impossibilities within a formal
model, in §9.5. Finally, there is the normative, rational, but non-ideal
notion of belief we’ve just discussed. We propose a model of the
notion in §10.5, based on the idea of subtly impossible worlds from
§9.5.
Chapter Summary
Standard possible-worlds epistemic logic gives rise to the problem
of logical omniscience (§5.1). There are attempts to deal with the
problem without using impossible worlds. We discussed a number of
these approaches, and found them all wanting (§5.2). The impossible
worlds approach is immediately more successful, but faces a deep
problem: how should impossible worlds be constrained, so as to
give adequate models of knowledge and belief (§5.3)? One option
is to take impossible worlds to be closed under some weaker-than-
classical logic. But this approach does not genuinely solve the problem
of logical omniscience (§5.4).
A different approach is the dynamic one, whereby epistemic states
are not closed at any one time, but nevertheless evolve towards closure
in a dynamic way (§5.5). We found this approach promising, but we
will propose an alternative philosophical account of epistemic and
doxastic states in §10.5.

6Relevant Logics
6.1 Basic Relevant Logic
Relevant logic (or, as they call it in the US, relevance logic) aims
at developing a notion of conditionality free from the ‘fallacies of
relevance’: the ‘paradoxes’ of the material and strict conditional
(§1.3), including:
(6.1) A→ (B → B)
(6.2) A→ (B ∨ ¬B)
(6.3) (A ∧ ¬A) → B
Whether ‘→’ is understood as material or strict, such conditionals
come out logically valid in ordinary modal logic with possible
worlds semantics. However, in each case, there need be no real
connection between antecedent and consequent. ‘If Amsterdam is
in the Netherlands, then if snow is white, then snow is white’ is an
instance of (6.1), yet what has Amsterdam’s being in the Netherlands
to do with (trivial consequences of) snow’s being white?
We can debate whether (6.1)–(6.3) are really invalid. ‘Be relevant’
was one of Grice’s conversational maxims, theMaxim of Relation.
Perhaps what’s wrong with (6.1)–(6.3) is that they violate this
pragmatic rule. Perhaps that’s all that’s wrong with them. They might
be logically fine after all, but pragmatically difficult to assert. For
relevant logicians, however, relevance is not merely pragmatics: it is
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an integral feature of logic and formal semantics. They argue that
this approach is more plausible than starting with classical logic, and
then claiming that irrelevancies should not be asserted purely on the
basis of Gricean maxims.
Anderson and Belnap (1975) pioneered relevant logics with the
aim of avoiding irrelevance in logic. They held that a formula of the
form A→ B should be a theorem only if A and B shared a sentential
atom or parameter. This was called the Variable Sharing Property
(Dunn and Restall 2002, 27), and was meant to capture the idea of a
real connection between antecedent and consequent. They intended
the Variable Sharing Property to be necessary, but not sufficient, for
a conditional to count as being relevantly acceptable.
Anderson and Belnap initially proceeded proof-theoretically, writ-
ing down lists of axioms and rules of inference which gave to the
conditionals of their systems the required features. Soon, however,
the issue of providing a semantics for such systems came to the top
of the agenda:
Yea, every year or so Anderson & Belnap turned out a new
logic, and they did call it E, or R, or EI, or P −W, and they
beheld such logic, and they were called relevant.And these logics
were looked upon with favor by many, for they captureth the
intuitions, but by many they were scorned, in that they hadeth
no semantics. Word that Anderson & Belnap had made a logic
without semantics leaked out. Some thought it wondrous and
rejoiced, that the One True Logic should make its appearance
among us in the Form of Pure Syntax, unencumbered by all that
set-theoretical garbage. Others said that relevant logics were
Mere Syntax. (Routley and Meyer 1973, 194)
Anderson and Belnap (1975, §28.2) later found algebraic seman-
tics, with soundness and completeness proofs, for these logics, or
fragments of them. Usually, these made use of algebraic structures
called De Morgan lattices. But in such approaches, the syntax and
the semantics seem to copy each other. Lacking an independent
understanding of the latter, these results often leave philosophically
inclined logicians unsatisfied.
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In other words, Anderson and Belnap’s approach looks like
pure, rather than applied, semantics. (The terminology may be
due to Plantinga (1974), although Carnap (1948) and Dummett
(1973) make similar distinctions.) Pure formal semantics consists
in mathematical structures which interpret the language but which
have a merely mathematical meaning. In applied formal semantics, by
contrast, we have a clear understanding of the connection between the
mathematics and meaning. For Dummett, the former are of ‘purely
technical’ interest, whereas the latter ‘are taken to have a direct
relation to the use which is made of the sentences of a language’
(Dummett 1973, 6–7).
Relevant logicians sought to develop frame semantics for relevant
logics which promised to move beyond syntax or pure algebra. But
this seemed difficult. A logical truth is true everywhere; so how could
a conditional with it as a consequent fail to be true everywhere? This
requires a semantics that can, at the same time, (a) account for failures
of logical truths, but (b) not relinquish their status as logical truths.
The ‘Routley-Meyer semantics’ of Routley and Meyer 1973 was a
breakthrough. They distinguished two kinds of points, normal and
non-normal, and this allowed them to invalidate conditionals like
(6.1)–(6.3).Non-normal points are naturally interpreted as impossible
worlds (Priest 2008, 171–4).
Let us introduce a simple frame semantics of this kind. (We now
follow Restall 1993, a simplified version of the original Routley-
Meyer semantics presented also in Priest 2008, chapter 10.) ℒ is
as before but with a conditional →. A Routley-Meyer frame ℱ for
ℒ is a quadruple ⟨⟨W ,N,R, ∗⟩⟩, with W the set of worlds, N ⊆ W
the subset of normal worlds, and W − N the non-normal worlds.
R ⊆W×W×W is a ternary relation on worlds satisfying aNormality
Condition:
(NC) If w ∈ N, then Rww1w2 iff w1 = w2.
Finally, ∗ is the Routley Star: a period two operation onW (w∗∗ =
w for each w ∈ W). Given w, let us call w∗ the twin of w. We will
come to the issue of what R and ∗ may mean later on.
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A frame becomes a model ℳ = ⟨⟨W ,N,R, ∗, v⟩⟩ when endowed
with a valuation function v, assigning truth values to AT at worlds.
We extend v to the whole language as follows:
(S¬) vw(¬A) = 1 if vw∗(A) = 0, and 0 otherwise.
(S∧) vw(A ∧ B) = 1 if vw(A) = vw(B) = 1, and 0 otherwise.
(S∨) vw(A ∨ B) = 1 if vw(A) = 1 or vw(B) = 1, and 0 otherwise.
(S→) vw(A → B) = 1 if for all w1,w2 ∈ W such that Rww1w2, if
vw1(A) = 1 then vw2(B) = 1, and 0 otherwise.
Logical validity and consequence are truth/truth preservation at all
normal worlds in all models. The logic which is sound and complete
with respect to this semantics is called B, for Basic relevant logic.
(Don’t confuse this with the modal logic from §4.1, also called B.)
The effect of (NC) is that A → A holds at all normal worlds. For
A → A to hold at w, we require that, if Rww1w2 and A holds at w1,
then A holds at w2 also. But if w is a normal world, then w1 = w2,
and hence A holds at w2 by assumption. Since validity is defined as
truth at all normal worlds, it follows that A → A is valid in B. But it
does not follow that each instance of A→ A holds at all worlds. For
now suppose w1 is a non-normal world, and that Rw1w2w3, where
w2 ≠ w3 and q holds at w2 but not at w3. Then q → q does not hold
at w1.
Now let’s see how this allows us to deal with (6.1), A → (B → B).
We need a world at which A holds but B → B fails. We can use the
model from above, in which q → q fails at w1. Now add to the model
a normal world w such that Rww1w1, and add that p holds at w1.
Then by definition, p → (q → q) fails at w. Since w is a normal
world, what holds there determines what’s valid. Since an instance of
A→ (B → B) fails at w, it isn’t valid.
To understand how (6.2) and (6.3) are handled, we need to say
something about the Routley Star. The clause (S¬) has it that ¬A is
true at a world w if and only if A is false at its twin, w∗.Whenw and
w∗ are distinct, we cannot read the value of ¬A atw from the value of
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A at w (as we could if ¬ were classical negation). Relevant negation
is a modal operator: in order to evaluate negated formulas at w, one
has to look at the goings on of a world that may be distinct from w.
This negation is often called De Morgan negation in the literature,
for all of De Morgan’s Laws hold for it:
¬¬A ⫤⊨ A ¬(A ∧ B) ⫤⊨ ¬A ∨ ¬B ¬(A ∨ B) ⫤⊨ ¬A ∧ ¬B
This set-up delivers worlds which are classically impossible, for
Excluded Middle fails at them; and contradiction-realizers where A
and ¬A are both true.This is what we need to have (6.2),A→ (B∨¬B),
and (6.3), (A ∧ ¬A) → B, fail. For (6.2), a counterexample is given
by a normal world w such that Rww1w1, with w1 a world (which
may be normal, or not) where p is true but neither q nor ¬q are. This
happens, by (S¬), when w1 is such that q is false at it but true at its
twin, w∗1. For (6.3), a counterexample is given by a normal world w
such that Rww1w1, with w1 a world (normal or not) where both p
and ¬p are true but q is not. This happens, by (S¬) again, when w1 is
such that q is true at it but false at w∗1.
One may not like the idea of normal worlds – which we think of as
possible worlds – where contradictions are true, or where Excluded
Middle fails. To alleviate such worries, one can add the Classicality
Condition as a constraint on the semantics:
(CC) If w ∈ N, then w = w∗.
When a world w is its own twin, then by (S¬) the behaviour of
negation at it is just the classical one: ¬A is true at w just in case A
is false at the very same world. That world is maximally consistent,
making true exactly one of A and its negation. (CC) guarantees that
all normal worlds are like that. This gives a logic stronger than the
basic relevant B but, with the proviso that w1 is a non-normal world,
the counterexamples to (6.1)–(6.3) still go through.
There is a certain translatability between the Routley Star semantics
for negation and the relational semantics for negation we met in §5.4.
Suppose we define 𝜌wp1 if and only if vwp = 1, and 𝜌wp0 if and only
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if vw∗p = 0. Then 𝜌 will work just like a pair consisting of a w and
its twin w∗ (Priest 2008, 153). In fact, these are equivalent ways of
presenting negation in FDE (§5.4). One reason for resorting to the
Routley Star in this chapter is that adding a relevant conditional
using the ternary R to the relational semantics does not give, in any
but the simplest cases, the usual family of relevant logics.
On the Routley-Meyer semantics, the corresponding logics are,
in an important way, automatically relevant. The Variable Sharing
Property falls straight out of the Routley-Meyer semantics. As Priest
says of this approach,
relevance is not some extra constraint imposed on top of
classical validity. Rather, relevance, in the form of parameter
sharing, falls out of something more fundamental, namely the
taking into account of a suitably wide range of situations. (Priest
2008, 174)
Contrast this situation with filter logics (Smiley 1959, Tennant 1984),
in which relevant validity for conditionals is classical validity plus
a constraint that filters out irrelevancies. There’s something ad hoc
about that approach. The Routley-Meyer semantics, by contrast,
seems to be a natural extension of frame semantics with a binary
relation R, from which the Variable Sharing Property naturally falls.
What’s crucial to this approach is that Priest’s ‘range of situations’ is
wider-than-classical, in that it now comprises non-normal, impossible
worlds. These are essential to the frame semantics of mainstream
relevant logic.
6.2 Stronger Relevant Logics
We can impose further constraints on the ternary relation R to obtain
stronger relevant logics, which validate more principles than those
of B. (This is similar to the way we obtained modal logics stronger
than K in §4.1 by imposing conditions on the binary relation R.) The
following conditions:
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(6.4) If Rww1w2, then Rww
∗
2w
∗
1
(6.5) If there is a x ∈W such that Rw1w2x and Rxw3w4, then there
is a y ∈W such that Rw1w3y and Rw2yw4
(6.6) If there is an x ∈W such that Rw1w2x and Rxw3w4, then there
is a y ∈W such that Rw2w3y and Rw1yw4
validate, respectively, the following principles:
(Contraposition) (A → ¬B) → (B → ¬A)
(Suffixing) (A→ B) → ((B→ C) → (A → C))
(Prefixing) (A→ B) → ((C → A) → (C → B))
These are all desirable principles. With all three accepted, the
corresponding logic is often called TW.
To add further desirable principles, we can add extra information
to the Routley-Meyer frames, in the form a binary relation ≼
between worlds. An expanded Routley-Meyer frame ℰ is now a
quintuple ⟨⟨W ,N,R, ∗, ≼ ⟩⟩, which becomes an expanded model when
the interpretation function v is added. All the familiar components
are as before, and ≼ ⊆W ×W is a binary relation between worlds
satisfying the following conditions. If w ≼ w1, then:
(6.7) If vw(p) = 1, then vw1(p) = 1
(6.8) w∗1 ≼ w
∗
(6.9) If Rw1w2w3, then (w ∈ N and w2 ≼ w3) or (w ∉ N and
Rww2w3)
Think of ‘w ≼ w1’ as saying thatw1 inherits the truths ofw. (6.7) says
that this is so for atomic truths, and (6.8) and (6.9) generalize to all
formulas. Together, these guarantee that, if w ≼ w1, then vw(A) = 1
only if vw1(A) = 1, for all A ∈ ℒ.
There are two further important conditions, the second crucially
involving ≼:
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(6.10) If Rw1w2w3 then there is an x ∈ W such that Rw1w2x and
Rxw2w3
(6.11) If Rw1w2w3 then there is an x ∈ W such that w1 ≼ x and
Rw2xw3
These validate, respectively:
(Contraction) (A → (A→ B)) → (A→ B)
(Assertion) (A→ ((A → B) → B)
Adding all of these principles give us the relevant logic R, possibly
the best-known relevant system. It can be shown that the Variable
Sharing Property holds in R, and hence in the weaker systems as well
(see Priest 2008, 205–6).
Let us now move on to the main topic of this chapter: how to
make sense of the mainstream Routley-Meyer semantics for relevant
logics and, in particular, of its non-normal worlds.
6.3 Relevant Worlds as Information States
Giving an intuitively plausible reading of the ternary relation and
of the Routley Star has proved difficult. Copeland (1979) and
Van Benthem (1979) claimed that the Routley-Meyer frame semantics
are pure, not applied, semantics, for no independent understanding
had been offered of what the ternary R and Routley Star ∗ mean.
Relevant logicians came to the rescue in various ways.We will now
go through three main strategies, paying special attention to how the
worlds of relevant frames are understood in them.
One well-known approach interprets worlds in relevant frames
as states of information, and R as an informational relation on
those states. Urquhart (1972) proposed that ‘Rww1w2’ be read as
claiming that the information in w2 is obtained by merging together
the information in w and that in w1.
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If this information merging is understood as entailing that w1-
information is included in w2-information, then the following would
seem to hold:
(6.12) If Rww1w2, then w1 ≼ w2
But this principle makes B → B true at all worlds, non-normal as
well as normal, which in its turn validates the irrelevant principle
(6.1), A→ (B→ B). So some other notion of information merging is
required.
Systematic information-theoretic readings of the semantics have
been proposed by Mares (2004) and Restall (1995). These rely on
interpreting the worlds in the frames as representing situations in
the sense of Barwise and Perry’s situation theory (Barwise and Perry
1983).
In situation theory, situations are information-supporting struc-
tures, allowing the fine-grained distinctions unavailable within
possible world semantics. Situations need not be maximal: they
can fail to support information about certain topics. The situation
consisting of Mark’s office in Nottingham does not support the
information that it is raining in Amsterdam, nor the information
that it is not raining there. Situations may be abstract as well as
concrete, and may represent logical impossibilities. Barwise and
Seligman (1997) develop situation theory into a general theory of
information flow in distributed systems.
Barwise and Parry’s original approach did not rule out the
possibility that situations act, not only as sites of information, but also
as information channels or conduits between other situations. Restall
(1995) adopts this view. The points of the relevant frame semantics
are taken here as playing both roles. So the situation consisting of
a living room with a TV turned on in Nottingham can support the
information that it is raining in Amsterdam. It does so by connecting
the rainy Dutch situation to the living room via the channel consisting
of the cameras, wires, signals, and so on, connecting the two sites.
We should read ‘Rww1w2’, then, as ‘w is a conduit of information
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from site w1 to site w2’, or as ‘situation w allows information to flow
from situation w1 to situation w2’.
This helps to understand the semantic clause (S→) from §6.1.When
w allows the information that A → B to flow from w1 to w2, and w1
supports the information that A, then w2 supports the information
that B. Vice versa, if w does not allow the information that A→ B to
flow, there must be situations w1 and w2 such that w1 supports the
information that A, but w2 does not support the information that B.
Mares (2004, 2009, 2010) too understands the worlds in relevant
frames as information-conveying situations, in the sense of situation
theory:
a situation w can be said to contain the information that A → B
if on the hypothesis that there is a w1 in the same world that
contains A, we can derive that there is a situationw2 in the same
world in which B. … [This theory] is about making inferences
from the perspective of situations about the situations in a
world. (Mares 2010, 211, notation modified)
(In Mares’s terminology, there are both situations and worlds, and
situations are included in worlds.) This analysis interprets R in terms
of what can be derived from what, so that Rww1w2 says ‘all the
information that we can derive really using the information in both w
and w1 is all contained in w2’ (Mares 2010, 211, notation modified).
Mares thinks of this in terms of situated inference, facilitated
by ‘informational links’ Mares (2004). An informational link is a
‘perfectly reliable connection, such as a law of nature or a convention’
(Mares 2009, 426). Similarly, Devlin (1991, 12) characterizes these
constraints as ‘natural laws, conventions, analytic rules, linguistic
rules, empirical law-like correspondences, or whatever’. A sufficient
condition for Rww1w2, for example, is that a law of nature of w
relates w1 to w2. These informational links ‘are themselves contained
as information in situations’ (Mares 2004, 44).
Mares (2004) also analyses propositions as sets of situations
which satisfy some closure features. There is a relation of situated
implication, Iww1P, holding between situations w and w1 and a
proposition P. It holds when the information jointly supported by w
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and w1 allows us to infer the existence of a situation where P holds.
We then read ‘Rww1w2’ as ‘w2 belongs to every proposition P such
that Iww1P’. When w supports the informational link A → B, and
w1 supports the information that A, then w2 represents a situation
belonging to the proposition expressed by B. Vice versa, if w does not
support A→ B there must be some w1 and w2 such that w1 supports
the information that A, while w2 does not belong to the proposition
expressed by B.
Although these interpretations focus first of all on making sense
of the ternary R, both Restall (1999) and Mares (2004) offer an
interpretation of the Routley Star, too. They use a binary relation of
compatibility,C ⊆W×W, between worlds (see Dunn 1993),whereby
the negation of A holds at world w just in case, at all compatible
worlds, A fails to hold. The clause for negation is then:
(SC¬) vw(¬A) = 1 if for all w1 ∈ W such that Cww1, vw1(A) = 0,
and 0 otherwise.
On this definition, ¬ is a ‘negative modality’: a quantifier over worlds,
restricted by an accessibility relation interpreted as compatibility.
Because we utter negations to express incompatibilities and exclusions
(Berto 2015), a semantics for negation grounded in compatibility
makes intuitive sense.
Restall (1999) then shows how to get the Routley Star negation
(S¬) from §6.1 out of (SC¬), by imposing conditions on compatibility.
It must be symmetric (if Cww1 then Cw1w) and serial (for all x ∈W,
there is a y ∈ W such that Cxy). And each world w must have a
maximal compatible world: some x ∈W such that Cwx and, for all
y, if Cwy then y ≼ x. Restall then claims that
given that the compatibility semantics makes sense and is an
applied semantics, it follows that its simple retelling, involving
the Routley star, also makes sense, and it too is an applied
semantics. (Restall 1999, 63)
These various ways of thinking about R in terms of information
have been popular, and they allow for interplay between relevant logic
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and other theoretical frameworks for reasoning about information,
such as situation semantics. But let us briefly mention a worry for
such interpretations. (We now draw on Jago 2013d.)
Information, as the term is used by Mares at least, has to be
cognitively accessible, for ‘what counts as a situation depends on
the discriminatory capacities of human beings’ (Mares 2009, 350).
So, if w carries the information that A, then it should be possible
for someone in w to get the information that A, and hence to come
to know that A. But this idea is in tension with Excluded Middle,
A ∨ ¬A, which is valid in R. (It’s also valid in other strong relevant
logics, including Anderson and Belnap’s favourite system E, which
adds necessity to the relevant conditional.) But there’s no reason
to think that there is a situation in which, for every A, either the
information that A or the information that ¬A is available.
One can reply, correctly, that the semantics for R or E doesn’t
require every situation to support Excluded Middle. In fact, as we
have seen in §6.1, to avoid irrelevancies it is vital that some points be
inconsistent (i.e., both A and ¬A hold there, for some A), and some
be incomplete (i.e., neither A nor ¬A holds there). But the objection is
that (for logics like R and E) the semantics requires all normal points
to support Excluded Middle. And yet, on the current interpretation,
it is unlikely that there exist such situations. (The objection does not
threaten weaker relevant logics in which Excluded Middle is not a
theorem.)
6.4 Conditionality Interpretations
Beall et al. (2012) take a different approach to interpretations of R
in the ternary semantics. (We follow the presentation in Jago 2013d
in this section.) Beall et al. argue that, whichever way we think of
conditionality in general, we get a suitable interpretation of R. They
consider three general ways of thinking about conditionality:
(6.13) as the exclusion of counterexamples;
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(6.14) as an operator or function; and
(6.15) as the kind of notion supported by conditional logic.
We’ll consider options (6.13) and (6.14) only here, for the relevant
arrows considered in this chapter are not connected to the kind of
ceteris paribus conditionals studied in conditional logic.
Suppose, along with reading (6.13), we think of conditionality as
the ruling out of certain situations: A → B says that there are no
A-situations which are not also B-situations. That’s a very classical
way of thinking about the conditional, where a counterexample
to A → B is any situation where A is true but B is false. We can
also think of a strict conditional A J B (§1.2), understood as the
necessitation of a material conditional, ◻(A ⊃ B), in these terms: w1
is a counterexample to A J B at w when w1 is accessible from w and
A but not B is true at w1.
The difficulty with running this interpretation in the case of
the ternary relation semantics is that the points of evaluation of
antecedent and consequent may differ. To check whether A → B
holds at w, we need to check for A at w1 and B at w2 whenever
Rww1w2. A counterexample to A → B at w, therefore, depends on
what goes on at some pair of points w1 and w2. In just this way,
Beall et al. (2012) propose to treat ‘split points’ ⟨⟨w1,w2⟩⟩ as potential
counterexamples. Truth and falsity at a split point ⟨⟨w1,w2⟩⟩ are fixed
by truth at w1 and falsity at w2, respectively. Rww1w2 then says that
⟨⟨w1,w2⟩⟩ is accessible from (or possible relative to) w. So, just as
in the modal strict conditional case, ⟨⟨w1,w2⟩⟩ is a counterexample
to A → B at w when ⟨⟨w1,w2⟩⟩ is accessible from w, A is true at
⟨⟨w1,w2⟩⟩ but B is false there. We then get the relevant clause (S→)
from §6.1 above.
If this approach is to provide a philosophical interpretation of R,
as opposed to a useful bit of pure semantics, then the notion of a
split point must be well understood. Notice that ⟨⟨w1,w2⟩⟩ cannot in
general be thought of as the pair set of points {w1,w2}, for this is
identical to the pair set {w2,w1}. But not so for split points, in which
the order of the points is essential, as the definitions of truth and
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falsity at a split point make clear. For the same reason, we can’t think
of ⟨⟨w1,w2⟩⟩ as the mereological composition or fusion of w1 and w2,
for the fusion of thing a and thing b is the same as the fusion of thing
b and thing a. We might think of ⟨⟨w1,w2⟩⟩ as some sort of list or
sequence of w1 and then w2. But what is a list or sequence of two
situations, and in what sense are sentences true or false relative to
such lists or sequences? In general, one needs a story on whichw1 and
w2, taken in that order, constitute a counterexample to A→ B, which
does not assume that they constitute a counterexample when taken
the other way around. This problem may not be insuperable, but
more explanation is needed if this is to be a philosophically satisfying
applied semantics.
Now let’s turn to Beall et al.’s option (6.14) for interpreting R. This
involves thinking of the conditional A → B in terms of an operator
or function, taking us from A to B. Intuitionists might think of this
in terms of a function from a proof of A to a proof of B, for example.
More generally, suppose it makes sense to apply one situation w to
anotherw1, as ifwwere a function andw1 an argument.And suppose
the result of this application, w(w1), is in some sense contained in
some other situation, w2. Then we can set Rww1w2 whenever w(w1)
is contained in w2. This gives us an understanding of R in terms of
functional application and containment relations between situations.
It’s easy to make sense of these notions when the points in the frame
semantics are proofs, programs, sets of evidence, or other syntactic
constructions. This provides good reason to think that intuitionists
and other constructivists can make sense of the ternary relation in
this way.
This way of interpreting R resurrects the worry we raised in §6.3
for information-theoretic interpretations, however. Suppose points w
and w1 are understood as the kinds of entities which can be applied
functionally to one another, such as proofs or sets of evidence. What
justification do we then have for thinking that there’s some such w at
which, for every A, either A or ¬A holds? If there are no such points,
then Excluded Middle cannot be valid and we will be unable to give
semantics along these lines for strong relevant logics such as R.
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6.5 The Truthmaking Interpretation
We follow Jago 2013d in this section. An important feature of the
points w,w1,w2 in the ternary semantics is that they may be partial
or incomplete: it may be that neither A nor ¬A holds at some w. Such
points have fairly natural interpretations in epistemic terms, as we
have seen, that is, as information states, evidence, or proofs. But such
interpretations lead to problems in justifying Excluded Middle (§6.3).
This suggests that a non-epistemic interpretation of partial points
would be preferable, at least when considering strong relevant logics.
Restall (1996) suggests one such reading: the points are truthmak-
ers (facts, states of affairs, or whatever else does truthmaking work).
Restall briefly describes a truthmaker semantics which gives the first-
degree fragment (i.e., without embedded conditionals) of the logic
RM, a semi-relevant logic. (Van Fraassen (1969) had already spotted
that a facts-based approach can give semantics for FDE, which we
met in Chapter 5.)
This approach seems to us to overcome the Excluded Middle
worry we raised in §6.3 for the epistemic, information-theoretic
interpretation of worlds. A truthmaker for A will typically not
be a truthmaker for B or for ¬B, unless there is some close
relationship between A and B. So many truthmakers satisfy the
partiality requirement. Yet plausibly, there are ‘big truthmakers’, such
as complete-maximal worlds, which do make everything of the form
A ∨ ¬A true. These can serve as the normal (validity-determining)
points in the semantics. (We mentioned how one can stipulate that
all normal points be maximal in our discussion of the Classicality
Condition (CC) in §6.1 above. We saw there that (CC) poses no
threat to the relevant requirement of the Variable Sharing Property.)
This approach has not been investigated in much detail, but it
promises a philosophical interpretation of relevant logic in terms of
familiar truth-like notions. It also suggests that principles of relevant
logic are pertinent to the metaphysical debate over truthmaking. (The
debate between Jago (2009a) and Rodriguez-Pereyra (2009) over
certain metaphysical principles of truthmaking can be reinterpreted
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as a semantic debate about whether ∧ and ∨ are idempotent, so that
A ∧ A and A ∨ A are both equivalent to A, for example.) As Restall
says, the approach is of interest ‘to all those who seek to understand
contemporary work on relevant logic, and for those who wish to
form a robust theory of truthmaking’ (Restall 1996, 339).
Chapter Summary
Relevant logics aim to avoid the ‘paradoxes’ of the material and
strict conditionals. Their most natural semantics – the Routley-
Meyer semantics – is given in terms of impossible worlds (§6.1).
By placing certain further conditions on those worlds, we can obtain
stronger relevant logics, includingTW and R (§6.2). One of the main
philosophical issues surrounding the general approach concerns how
to interpret the Routley-Meyer ternary relation R on worlds and the
Routley Star ∗. The information-theoretic interpretation has proved
popular but, we argue, it faces philosophical issues (§6.3).
An alternative interpretation takes its cue from ways of thinking
about conditionality in general. We considered the three options
suggested by Beall et al. (2012), but found issues with each of them.
A final option is the truthmaker interpretation of relevant logics,
suggested by Restall (1996), which is promising but underdeveloped.
7The Logic of Imagination
7.1 Hyperintensional Imagination
‘Imagining’ is highly ambiguous, as we saw in §1.5.We use the word
for such different mental activities as daydreaming, hallucinating,
supposing, planning, make-believing. We will focus on mental states
with a propositional content (imagining that A: that Obama is blond-
haired, that Holmes walks through Victorian London).We will target
a notion found in such widely discussed works on imagination
as Chalmers (2002b) and Yablo (1993), and dubbed by the latter
‘positive conceivability’.
Positively conceiving that A is understood as a mental operation
different from merely supposing or assuming that A, as when we
make an assumption in a mathematical proof and, in some sense, as
more substantive (Balcerak Jackson 2016).We represent a situation
– a configuration of objects and properties – of which A is a truthful
description:
Positive notions of conceivability require that one can form
some sort of positive conception of a situation in which A is
the case. One can place the varieties of positive conceivability
under the broad rubric of imagination: to positively conceive of
a situation is to imagine (in some sense) a specific configuration
of objects and properties. … Overall, we can say that A is
positively conceivable when one can imagine that A: that is,
when one can imagine a situation that verifies A. (Chalmers
2002b, 150, notation modified)
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Similarly, Yablo (1993) speaks of conceiving that A as imagining a
world verifying A. (Yablo grants that we do not imagine the world in
all detail.) This seems to be the notion typically at issue in debates on
whether conceivability entails possibility (see e.g. Gendler 2000, Hill
1997, Kung 2010, Roca-Royes 2011, Stoljar 2007, and the essays
in Gendler and Hawthorne 2002). As we also saw in §1.5, in these
debates it is often not clear what kind of mental representation is
involved in the relevant act of conceiving or imagining. It is not clear
whether it involves linguistic mental representations, or pictorial
mental imagery mimicking corresponding sensory modalities. (We’ll
return to the issue in §7.3.)
Conceivability in the sense of Chalmers and Yablo seems to be
linked to mental simulation, a phenomenon studied in cognitive
psychology.We simulate alternatives to reality in our mind, in order to
explore what would and would not happen if they were realized. This
helps us to cope with reality itself, by improving future performance
and allowing us to make contingency plans. (The works in Markman
et al. 2009 explore various empirical phenomena in this ballpark.)
That some things would happen in the envisaged scenario, and some
would not, seems to imply that such exercises have some kind of
logic: some things follow in the imagined situation, and some do not
(Byrne 2005).
Works on the logic of imagination typically resort to a possible
worlds framework, modelling imagination as a restricted quantifier
over possible worlds (Costa Leite 2010, Niiniluoto 1985). But
imagination, qua intentional mental state, is hyperintensional. Lois
Lane can imagine that Superman is in love with her without imagining
that Clark Kent is in love with her, as she ignores their being identical;
we can imagine proving that 107 + 215 = 322 without imagining
proving Fermat’s Last Theorem; and we can imagine that water turns
out not to be H2O (§1.5). This makes the phenomenon difficult to
model via standard possible worlds semantics.
Wansing (2017) uses neighbourhood semantics, which we met in
§5.2, for his logic of imagination. This allows several logical closure
properties to fail for it: one’s imagining that A, and that if A then B,
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for instance, does not entail one’s imagining that B. However, it is still
the case that, as a consequence of the adoption of neighbourhood
semantics, if A is logically equivalent to B and one imagines that
A, one automatically imagines that B and vice versa. But this result
seems wrong. Even in weak logics such as the basic relevant logic B
of §6.1, A is equivalent to A ∨ (A ∧ B). However, one may imagine
that A without imagining that A∨ (A∧B), for every B. One may lack
the very concepts involved in B, for example.
Impossible worlds are thus natural candidates for modelling
imagination as mental simulation. But imagination, so understood,
seems to have further features with which an acceptable model must
comply.We’ll describe them in the rest of this section, and present a
simple impossible worlds semantics in the following §7.2, drawing
on Berto (2014, 2017).
One feature of imagination as mental simulation is that it can
be voluntary in ways belief cannot. One can imagine that all of
one’s home town has been painted yellow but, having overwhelming
evidence of the contrary, one cannot easily make oneself believe it.
Conscious acts of imagination as mental simulation can have an
arbitrary, explicit starting point (Langland-Hassan 2016, Wansing
2017). This may be determined by the agent (as in, ‘now let’s imagine
what would happen if …’), or it may be helped by external inputs
(think of going through a novel, taking the sentences you read as your
explicit input). According to Nichols and Stich’s influential mental
simulation model (2003), we begin imagining with ‘an initial premiss
or set of premisses, which are the basic assumptions about what is to
be pretended’ (2003, 24).
Imagination is not purely inferential, however. ‘Children and adults
elaborate the pretend scenarios in ways that are not inferential’, filling
in the explicit instruction with ‘an increasingly detailed description
of what the world would be like if the initiating representation were
true’ (Nichols and Stich 2003, 26–8; see also Langland-Hassan 2016,
van Leeuwen 2016).You read a Jeffery Deaver book featuring Lincoln
Rhyme, a detective working in New York on some murder case. The
sentences of the book give you the explicit input. You integrate it
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with background information you’ve imported into the scenario, on
the basis of what you know or believe: New York is in the US, and
normally detectives are human beings, although (let’s suppose) the
Deaver story does not state these things explicitly.Absent information
to the contrary, you imagine Lincoln as a human being working in
the US, although this is not entailed logically by the explicit input.
We propose to model this via modal operators interpreted as
variably strict quantifiers over worlds, possible or otherwise. The
variability of the quantifiers accounts for the contextual selection of
the information we import in acts of imagination. As we will see, the
input will play a role similar to a conditional’s antecedent in Lewis’s
(1973b) semantics for counterfactuals.
It’s important, however, not to treat agents as importing too
much background information into acts of imagination.We do not
indiscriminately import arbitrary, unrelated contents into imagined
scenarios. You know that Manila is the capital of the Philippines,
but this is immaterial to your imagining Lincoln Rhyme’s New York
adventures. Such adventures do not involve Manila or the Philippines
at all. So you will not, in general, import such irrelevant content in
your scenario. Of course, you can imagine things about Manila as
well, by some free-floating association of ideas; but you will avoid it
while engaging in mental simulation specifically of Lincoln Rhyme’s
New York adventures. So such exercises of imagination must obey
some constraint of relevance.
7.2 A Semantics of Imagination
We will use a propositional language ℒ with the usual set of atoms
AT closed under negation ¬, conjunction ∧, disjunction ∨, a strict
conditional J, modal operators ◻ and ◇, and square brackets ‘[’ and
‘]’, put to special use. The well-formed formulas are the atoms and, if
A and B are well-formed formulas, then so are:
¬A ∣ (A ∧ B) ∣ (A ∨ B) ∣ (A J B) ∣ ◻B ∣ ◇B ∣ [A]B
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Things of the form ‘[A]’ are modal operators indexed by formulas.
(In conditional logic, this idea goes back to Chellas (1975).) Take a
bunch of acts of imagination, performed by a given agent on specific
occasions, and characterized by an explicit input: what the agent
sets out to imagine (‘Let’s imagine that Holmes chases Moriarty
across London in a horse-drawn carriage’), which can be taken
as corresponding to Nichols and Stich’s ‘initial premiss’, the ‘basic
assumption about what is to be pretended’. This is given directly by a
formula of ℒ. If K is the set of formulas expressing possible explicit
inputs, then for each A ∈ K, [A] is the corresponding modal. (Kmight
be the whole language, or the language free of the ‘[A]’ operators, or
some restricted fragment of it. Just which restrictions should be put
on K is an interesting issue, which we will not pursue here.) We can
read ‘[A]B’ as ‘it is imagined in the act with explicit input A, that B’;
or, more tersely, ‘it is imagined in act A that B’. We will call each [A]
an imagination operator.
The semantics is inspired by the relational frames for FDE (§5.4).
An imaginative frameℱ is a triple ⟨⟨W ,N, {RA ∣ A ∈ K}⟩⟩.W is the set
of worlds;N ⊆W is the subset of normal worlds; the worlds inW−N
are the non-normal or impossible worlds; and each RA ⊆W ×W is
a binary accessibility relation onW, one for each sentence A ∈ K.
A frame becomes a model ℳ = ⟨⟨W ,N, {RA|A ∈ K}, 𝜌⟩⟩ when
endowed with a valuation relation 𝜌, relating (for each world w) the
atoms in AT to truth (‘𝜌wp1’), falsity, (‘𝜌wp0’), both, or neither. We
then extend 𝜌 to the whole language as follows. For the extensional
connectives we have, for all w ∈ N:
(S1¬) 𝜌w(¬A)1 iff 𝜌wA0
(S2¬) 𝜌w(¬A)0 iff 𝜌wA1
(S1∧) 𝜌w(A ∧ B)1 iff 𝜌wA1 and 𝜌wB1
(S2∧) 𝜌w(A ∧ B)0 iff 𝜌wA0 or 𝜌wB0
(S1∨) 𝜌w(A ∨ B)1 iff 𝜌wA1 or 𝜌wB1
(S2∨) 𝜌w(A ∨ B)0 iff 𝜌wB0 and 𝜌wB0
146 the logic of imagination
The familiar modalities get their usual S5 clauses, over normal
worlds. For all w ∈ N:
(S1J) 𝜌w(A J B)1 iff for all w1 ∈ N, if 𝜌w1A1, then 𝜌w1B1
(S2J) 𝜌w(A J B)0 iff for some w1 ∈ N, 𝜌w1A1, and 𝜌w1B0
(S1◻) 𝜌w(◻A)1 iff for all w1 ∈ N, 𝜌w1A1
(S2◻) 𝜌w(◻A)0 iff for some w1 ∈ N, 𝜌wA0
(S1◇) 𝜌w(◇A)1 iff for some w1 ∈ N, 𝜌w1A1
(S2◇) 𝜌w(◇A)0 iff for all w1 ∈ N, 𝜌wA0
As for the [A]s, for w ∈ N:
(S1[A]) 𝜌w([A]B)1 iff for all w1 ∈W such that RAww1, 𝜌w1B1
(S2[A]) 𝜌w([A]B)0 iff for some w1 ∈W such that RAww1, 𝜌w1B0
Read ‘RAww1’ as saying that w1 is accessed by an act of imagination
with explicit input A, performed at w.
These recursive truth conditions have been defined for worlds in
N. For worlds in W − N, 𝜌 relates all formulas directly to truth
values, irrespective of their syntax. (We met this approach to non-
normal worlds in Rantala frames for epistemic logic, §5.3.) Logical
validity and consequence are defined, once again, as truth and truth
preservation (respectively) at all normal worlds in all models.
At normal worlds, the recursive truth and falsity conditions for
[A]-formulas can also be expressed using set-selection functions, as
in Lewis’s (1973b) semantics for counterfactuals. Each A ∈ K comes
with a projection function fA, taking as input the world where the
act is performed and giving the set of worlds made accessible: fAw =
{w1 ∈W ∣ RAww1}.
A key idea in Lewis’s semantics is that fA outputs the A-worlds
that are most objectively similar to the input world. In the context of
a semantics for imagination, we can take it as outputting the worlds
a semantics of imagination 147
that are most subjectively plausible for the agent, given input A.
Imagination, on this model, works as a kind of belief revision. We will
not impose a relation of comparative plausibility for worlds, as Baltag
and Smets (2006), Grove (1988), and Leitgeb and Segerberg (2007)
do. How orderings of this kind should work when impossible worlds
are around involves a number of open issues, and the semantics below
is largely independent of them. We will come back to plausibility
orderings involving impossible worlds in §11.3, in the context of a
treatment of truth in fiction.
Let |A| be the set of worlds where A is true. Then, for w ∈ N:
(S1[A]) 𝜌w([A]B)1 iff fAw ⊆ |B|
(S2[A]) 𝜌w([A]B)0 iff fAw ∩ |¬B| ≠ ∅
So for normal worlds, [A]B is true (false) at w iff B is true at all
worlds (false at some world) in a set selected by fA. The relational
and functional clauses are equivalent, given that RAww1 iffw1 ∈ fAw.
But it will sometimes be easier to talk using one formulation rather
than the other.
A natural constraint on the semantics is that, for all A ∈ K and
w ∈ N:
(Obtaining) If w ∈ N, then fAw ⊆ |A|
Normal worlds access only those worlds where the explicit imag-
inative input obtains. Thus, in an act of imagination with explicit
input A, one looks only at worlds where A is true. (We restrict this
to normal worlds, since the non-normal/impossible worlds can do
what they like.) We will consider only models satisfying obtaining.
To represent the imaginability of inconsistencies, we have allowed
formulas to be related both to truth and to falsity (or to neither). But
we may not want this to happen at normal worlds. We can add to
the semantics a Classicality Condition as we did for relevant logics
in §6.1, requiring all normal worlds to be maximally consistent with
respect to atoms:
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(CC′) If w ∈ N, then for each p ∈ AT, either 𝜌wp1 or 𝜌wp0 but not
both.
This generalizes to all formulas not including imagination operators
(as an easy induction on the complexity of formulas shows).To extend
it to the whole language, we would need a different falsity condition
(S2[A]). One option is to take [A]B to be false when it is not true: for
w ∈ N,
(S2[A]′) 𝜌w([A]B)0 iff it is not the case that 𝜌w([A]B)1.
This prevents inconsistencies accessible via imagination in non-
normal worlds from creating inconsistencies at normal worlds.
Once the framework has been ‘classicalized’ in this way, the
logic induced by the semantics for the connectives other than the
imagination operators is just normal propositional S5. Let us now
move on to an exploration of what is and what isn’t valid in the
semantics.
7.3 The Mereology of Imagination
Our first logical validity is:
⊨ [A]A
The explicit input is always imagined. This is immediately guaranteed
by obtaining. Next come validities that involve conjunction. Firstly,
for reasons to be discussed soon, we may want that, when one
imagines that a conjunction is the case, one imagines each conjunct.
The following condition does the trick:
(Simplification) For all w ∈ N: if RAww1, and 𝜌w1(B ∧ C)1, then
𝜌w1B1 and 𝜌w1C1
This gives the following validities:
[A](B ∧ C) ⊨ [A]B [A](B ∧ C) ⊨ [A]C
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To see why these follow, suppose w ∈ N and 𝜌w([A](B ∧ C))1.
By (S1[A]), for all RA-accessible worlds w1, 𝜌w1B ∧ C1. Then
simplification gives us 𝜌w1B1 and 𝜌w1C1 and so, by (S1[A]) again,
we have 𝜌w[A]B1 and 𝜌w[A]C1.
The companion constraint to simplification is:
(Adjunction) For all w ∈ N: if RAww1, 𝜌w1B1, and 𝜌w1C1, then
𝜌w1(B ∧ C)1
This gives us:
[A]B, [A]C ⊨ [A](B ∧ C)
To see why, suppose w ∈ N, 𝜌w([A]B)1 and 𝜌w([A]C)1. By (S1[A]),
for all RA-accessible worlds w1, we have 𝜌w1B1 and C𝜌w1C1. By
adjunction, 𝜌w1(B ∧ C)1 for any such w1 and so, by (S1[A]),
𝜌w([A](B ∧ C))1.
Imaginative accessibility is then de facto limited by simplification
and adjunction to worlds that behave with respect to conjunction.
But adjunction may be found problematic. Is it so that, when one
imagines that B and that C in a single act [A], one automatically
imagines their conjunction?
A similar question has been asked for counterfactuals, namely
whether different counterfactuals with the same antecedent demand
the conjunction of their consequents, given the role consequents
play in fixing the context of evaluation. Suppose one sets out to
imagine Caesar, the Roman emperor, being in command of the US
troops in the Korean War. (The example is Quine’s (1960, 222).)
This gives an explicit input, A. One can then unfold the scenario as
one where Caesar uses the atom bomb, [A]B, if one imports into the
representation information concerning the weapons available in the
twentieth century. Or, one can get to imagine him using catapults,
[A]C, if one rather allows the Roman military apparatus to step in.
However, we shouldn’t thereby infer [A](B ∧ C), involving Caesar’s
employing both bombs and catapults. One can imagine that, too, if
one likes, but it should not come as an automatic logical entailment.
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We think that something has gone wrong with the reconstruction
of the situation. Acts of imagination are contextually determined, in
that the same explicit input can trigger the importation of different
background information in different contexts (the time and place
where the act takes place, the status of the agent’s background
information, and so on). In Quine’s example, there is a clear
contextual shift. So adjunction can be maintained by adding a
contextual parameter. This can be represented in the formalism by a
set of contexts and variables ranging over them, indexing imaginative
acts. [A]x and [A]y will then stand for two distinct acts with the same
explicit input A. Once the adjunctive inference is parameterized to
contents with the same index, it avoids the worry in Quine’s example.
We think adjunction is important in modelling an independently
plausible conception of imagination. Imagination, in the relevant
sense, is more than mere supposition of a content, A. Rather, it
is positive conceivability in Chalmers’s (2002b) sense: someone’s
representing a scenario or a state of affairs which makes A true. It
is a generally agreed principle of the logic of (inexact) truthmaking
(Fine 2014, Yablo 2014) that truthmakers behave in such conjunctive
fashion. This mirrors the idea that states of affairs themselves can
stand in parthood relations. (A conjunctive state of affairs that object
m is P and object o is Q includes as constituents the individual states
of affairs that m is P and that o is Q. We discuss logically complex
states of affairs in Barker and Jago 2012 and Jago 2011.)
If imagination crucially involves mental imagery (as Kind (2001) ar-
gues), then there may be a certain mereological structure implemented
in the mind, and we may find evidence for this in empirical psychology.
(We mentioned the issue back in §1.5.) Empirical evidence for the
quasi-spatial features of pictorial mental imagery has been gathered
since the 1970s, including experimental work on mentally scanning
images (Block 1983, Pinker 1980, Shephard and Metzler 1971). Such
work showed, for instance, that the time taken to scan between two
points of a mental image is often proportional to their subjective
distance in the pictorial representation; that larger objects ‘fill’ the
space sooner than smaller ones; and that the level of detail of the
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depicted situations decreases at the periphery of the image, similarly
to what happens with our visual field.
The view is disputed, however. Zenon Pylyshyn (1973, 1981,
2002) accepts the existence of mental images, but claims that their
representational features can be reduced to non-pictorial, linguisti-
cally encoded representations. This ‘imagery debate’ is one of the
most intractable controversies in contemporary cognitive psychology.
If it resolves in favour of the quasi-spatial features of pictorial
mental imagery, then we should include both simplification and
adjunction in the semantics. If Pylyshyn is right, and mental imagery
can be reduced to linguistic representation, then we may want to
drop simplification or adjunction (or both).
7.4 The Under-Determinacy of Imagination
We move on to issues concerning disjunction. Imagination generally
under-determines its contents: we imagine things vaguely, without
this entailing that we imagine vague things. When you imagine
Sherlock Holmes, by default you imagine him either left-handed
or right-handed (or ambidextrous); but it’s perfectly possible to not
imagine him left-handed and not imagine him right handed either.
Our semantics captures this:
[A](B ∨ C) ⊭ [A]B ∨ [A]C
For a countermodel, take three normal worlds w,w1,w2:
w w1w2
q 1
r 0
q 0
r 1
RpRp
Every world Rp-accessible from w verifies q ∨ r and so w verifies
[p](q ∨ r). But since w1 doesn’t verify r and and w2 doesn’t verify q,
w verifies neither [p]q nor [p]r.
Notice that this countermodel does not require non-prime worlds,
which make a disjunction true without making either disjunct true.All
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worlds in the countermodel are normal. (This isn’t required, however:
only w must be a normal world for the countermodel) The under-
determinacy of imagination is delivered by the plurality of worlds
accessed via RA. Each accessible world may fill in the unspecified
details in different ways. Since each [A] is a universal modal operator,
differences between the accessible worlds translate into unspecific
acts of imagination.
We need worlds where disjunction behaves non-normally for
another reason, however.When one imagines that B, one need not
thereby imagine the disjunction of B and any arbitrary C (§7.1). One
may lack the concepts involved in C. Our semantics captures this
feature, too:
[A]B ⊭ [A](B ∨ C)
For a countermodel, we need a normal world w and non-normal
world w1:
w w1
q 1
q ∨ r 1
Rp
(Here, we’ve written q ∨ r 1 to show that w1 doesn’t verify q∨ r. This
is possible because w1 is a non-normal world: 𝜌w1 can relate any
formula to any value or none.) In the model, by (S1[A]), w verifies
[p]q but not [p](q∨ r). If we use our original clause (S2[A]) for falsity,
then [p]q ∨ r is neither true nor false at w. But if we use the revised
clause (S2[A]′), then [p]q∨r is false atw. Either way, the countermodel
requires w1 to be non-normal, else q’s being true would force q ∨ r
to be true.
7.5 Non-Monotonicity and Relevance
Imagination operators are non-monotonic, in the following sense:
[A]B ⊭ [A ∧ C]B
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To see why, consider this counterexample, with w a normal world:
w w1
Rp∧r
Since w1 does not verify q, w does not verify [p ∧ r]q. But since no
world is Rp-accessible, w trivially verifies [p]A for every A, including
[p]q. So [p]q ⊭ [p ∧ r]q.
As an act of imagination (in a given context) is individuated by its
explicit content, one cannot in general import information into the
explicit content itself without turning it into a different act. As you
imagine Holmes walking across London, you imagine him walking
across a British city. But if you imagine Holmes walking across
London and that London has been displaced to France, you will
not imagine him walking across a British city.
Other invalidities highlight the hyperintensional nature of imagi-
nation:
A J B ⊭ [A]B
Here’s the counterexample, with w a normal and w1 a non-normal
world:
w w1
q 1 Rp
At every normal world (just w), if p then q, and hence w verifies
p J q. (Recall that the strict conditional J looks at normal worlds
only.) But this does not guarantee that, in imagining that p, we must
thereby imagine that q. What we imagine may be impossible, as it is
at w1.
In particular, strict irrelevant conditionals fail the Variable Sharing
Property from §6.1. But those conditionals do not entail the corre-
sponding irrelevant imaginings. Here’s an irrelevant but valid strict
conditional:
⊨ (A ∧ ¬A) J B
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But the corresponding imagination formula isn’t valid:
⊭ [A ∧ ¬A]B
and so
(A ∧ ¬A) J B ⊭ [A ∧ ¬A]B
Here’s the counterexample, with w a normal and w1 a non-normal
world:
w w1
q 1R(p∧¬p)
Imagining an inconsistent scenario does not trivialize our act of
imagination.We can discriminate between different logical necessities
and we do not imagine them all automatically whenever we explicitly
imagine something. Thanks to non-normal worlds we have:
◻B ⊭ [A]B ¬◇A ⊭ [A]B
A constraint that should not hold in our semantics is (the
counterpart of) what Lewis (1973b) called ‘Weak Centring’:
(Weak centring) If w ∈ |A|, then w ∈ fAw.
This entails that, if a world w realizes the explicit content of an act
of imagination A, then w is one of the worlds in the set outputted by
the selection function for A. Even restricted to normal worlds, weak
centring validates a sort of modus ponens for imagination:
A, [A]B ⊨? B
According to this principle, if the explicit content A of an act
of imagination is true, and it is imagined in that act that B, then
B also true. But this is wrong. Franz and Mark imagine that, in
setting themselves a writing deadline, frenetic and productive writing
will ensue ([A]B). They set the deadline (A); but things go on much
as before for them (¬B). Well-intentioned Brenda imagines, in her
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country leaving the EU, things getting better for her ([A]B). Her
county does leave (A), but things get worse for Brenda (¬B). So we
should not accept weak centring.
One way weak centring can go wrong is when an agent imports
false beliefs into her imaginings. We have spoken of importing
information into imaginings, but we shouldn’t assume that what’s
imported must be true. (If you think information is by definition
factive, then we’re speaking of non-factive quasi-information.) ‘What
people do not change when they create a counterfactual alternative
[in imagination] depends on their beliefs’ (Byrne 2005, 10), and
false beliefs may sneak in. You imagine Merkel signing treaties in
Brussels ([A]), but you mistakenly believe Brussels to be in France.
You import that belief and imagine Merkel to be signing treaties
in France ([A]B). Merkel does in fact sign in Brussels (A), but this
doesn’t imply Brussels is in France. In general, the role of the world
w where the act of imagination takes place is to fix the agent’s beliefs,
rather than to fix what is in fact the case.
7.6 Imaginative Equivalents
So far our logic of imagination is relatively weak, due to its highly
hyperintensional features and the variability in the selection of the
accessible worlds.We may add a Principle of Imaginative Equivalents
(mimicking an analogous principle that holds in conditional logics
(Priest 2008, 92)), whose effect is to limit the hyperintensionality of
imagination:
(PIE) If fA ⊆ |B| and fB ⊆ |A|, then fAw = fBw.
This says: if all the selected A-worlds make B true and vice versa, then
A and B are ‘imaginative equivalents’. When we set out to imagine
either, we look at the same set of worlds. Given (PIE), we have:
[A]B, [B]A, [A]C ⊨ [B]C
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To see why, suppose normal world w verifies [A]B, [B]A, [A]C. By
(S1[A]), we have fAw ⊆ |B|, fBw ⊆ |A|, and fAw ⊆ |C|. (PIE) then
gives us fAw = fBw and hence fBw ⊆ |C|. So by (S1[A]), w verifies
[B]C.
This inference tells us that ‘imaginative equivalents’ A and B can be
replaced salva veritate as modal indexes in [⋅]. Given the number of
hyperintensional distinctions we can make in our imagination, there
may be few imaginative equivalents for a given agent. But suppose
that bachelor and unmarried man are imaginative equivalents for
you (as they should be, we guess, for any competent English speaker):
you are so firmly aware of their meaning the same that you cannot
imagine someone being and not the other. So when you imagine that
John is unmarried, you imagine that John is a bachelor ([A]B) and
vice versa ([B]A). Suppose, in imagining that John is a bachelor, you
imagine that he has no marriage allowance ([B]C). Then the same
happens when you imagine that he is unmarried, [A]C.
(PIE) also licenses an inference we’ll call Special Transitivity:
(ST) [A]B, [A ∧ B]C ⊨ [A]C
To see why, suppose normal worldw verifies [A]B and [A∧B]C. Given
obtaining, w also verifies [A]A and so, by adjunction, [A](A ∧ B).
From obtaining and simplification, we have [A ∧ B](A ∧ B) and
hence [A ∧ B]A at all worlds. Then fAw ⊆ |A ∧ B| and fA∧Bw ⊆ |A|
and so, by (PIE), fAw = fA∧Bw. Since w also verifies [A ∧ B]C, we
have fA∧B ⊆ |C|, hence fAw ⊆ |C|, and so w verifies [A]C too.
Should we accept (ST)? Some instances seem good.You imagine, in
winning the lottery, having a lot of money ([A]B). You then imagine,
in winning the lottery and having lots of money, that you’ll have to
pay a substantial amount of tax ([A ∧ B]C). It seems OK to infer in
the same context that, in imagining winning the lottery, you thereby
imagine having to pay a substantial amount of tax ([A]C). Of course,
you can also imagine winning the lottery and avoiding paying any
taxes. But that seems to create a different context from the one in
which you imagined having to pay the taxes, on winning the lottery
and so having lots of money.
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It may be that there are intuitive counterexamples to (ST) forceful
enough for us to reject it. If so, we must drop either (PIE) or one
(or both) of simplification and adjunction. Perhaps what we
should take from a counterexample to (ST), should one exist, is that
imagination does not have a nature which respects conjunction after
all (§7.3). If that’s right, then we should drop either simplification
or adjunction (or both), without which the proof of (ST) will not
go through, and retain (PIE) for the additional inferential power it
gives us.
Chapter Summary
Imagination seems to have a logic, albeit one which is hyperinten-
sional and sensitive to context (§7.1). We offered a semantics of
imagination, with operators expressing ‘imaginative acts’ of mental
simulation (§7.2). We then discussed a number of conditions we
could impose on the semantics, in order to validate certain inferences
(§7.3). One important issue is how acts of imagination interact with
disjunction. One can imagine some disjunction as obtaining without
being imaginatively specific about which disjunction obtains, for
example (§7.4). We then turned to the issue of non-monotonicity:
how B may follow from imagining that A, but not from imagining
that A ∧ C (§7.5). Finally, we discussed the Principle of Imaginative
Equivalents, which, if valid, adds considerable power to the logic
(§7.6).

Part III
Philosophical Applications

8Hyperintensionality
8.1 Is Hyperintensionality Real?
In §1.3, we introduced the concept of hyperintensionality. We said
that an operator ℋ is hyperintensional when ℋA and ℋB can
differ in truth value, even when A and B are necessarily (logically,
mathematically, or metaphysically) equivalent. We identified concepts
which have been given an intensional possible worlds account, such
as knowledge, belief, meaning and semantic content, propositions,
information, counterfactual conditionals. We claimed that these
concepts are hyperintensional and hence that their possible worlds
account falls short of capturing the concept.
Some philosophers deny that some of these concepts are genuinely
hyperintensional. Some deny that there are any genuinely hyper-
intensional concepts. These denials sometimes derive from other
theoretical commitments. A philosopher who analyses content or
meaning in terms of possible worlds will be unable to find any
content or meaning in hyperintensional operators. She will view
any purported hyperintensional operators as meaningless. But since
knowledge, belief, and so on are meaningful concepts, she will deny
that these are hyperintensional. She’ll then argue that the appearance
of hyperintensionality (in examples involving knowledge and belief
reports, for example) are illusory. She may also offer a positive
analysis of the concept, showing why it can’t be hyperintensional.
In the cases of knowledge and belief, we find these moves in
Lewis (1982, 1986b) and Stalnaker (1984). Both authors support the
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possible worlds analysis of knowledge, belief, and content. They base
their support on considerations of the nature of these concepts. Both
acknowledge that we do not seem to know all consequences of what
we know, that logical reasoning seems to be informative, and so on.
But, they argue, the appearances are misleading.We’ll discuss their
suggestions in §8.2.
Belief and knowledge are everyday concepts, and so we may draw
on everyday reflections on those concepts as (defeasible) evidence
for hyperintensionality. Proposition, essence, grounding, and (to
some extent) meaning and content are, by contrast, terms of art.
A philosopher has more scope to rebut purported examples of
hyperintensionality using these concepts. ‘That’s not how I use that
concept’, she may say. She may even reject the concept outright. So
our claims here will be somewhat conditional in nature. If one wants
to adopt one of these concepts (in the way that we think is the most
philosophically useful), then one had better accept hyperintensionality.
We’ll discuss these cases in §8.3.
8.2 The Epistemic Case
For Stalnaker, the nature of belief, as a rational attitude, rules out a
hyperintensional analysis. He begins with an ‘impressionistic’ picture
of human representational states:
Representational mental states should be understood primarily
in terms of the role that they play in the characterization and
explanation of action. What is essential to rational action
is that the agent be confronted, or conceive of himself as
confronted, with a range of alternative possible outcomes of
some alternative possible actions. The agent has attitudes, pro
and con, toward the different possible outcomes, and beliefs
about the contribution which the alternative actions would
make to determining the outcome. One explains why an agent
tends to act in the way he does in terms of such beliefs and
attitudes. And, according to this picture, our conceptions of
belief are conceptions of states which explain why a rational
agent does what he does. (Stalnaker 1984, 4)
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The key idea here is that human agents take attitudes, pro and
con, toward the different possible outcomes. Suppose we assign a 1
to each possible outcome to which the agent takes a pro attitude, and
a 0 when she takes a con attitude. Then the content of the attitude is
captured as a characteristic function from possible outcomes to 1 or 0.
Such functions are mathematically equivalent to the set of outcomes
assigned 1. The content of any rational attitude is (equivalent to) a set
of possibilities, on this analysis. Importantly, this argument doesn’t
proceed from a prior commitment to possible worlds semantics.
Rather, it proceeds from an analysis of ‘the role of beliefs and desires
in the explanation of action’ and concludes that ‘the contents of
those attitudes [must] distinguish between the alternative possibilities’
(Stalnaker 1984, 23). Hence the possible worlds analysis.
Stalnaker acknowledges that we do not seem to be logically
omniscient. The situation, he thinks, is that ‘we have an argument to
show that the identity conditions [on contents] are right, as well as
examples that seem to show that they are wrong’, and so ‘the proper
response is not so clear’ (Stalnaker 1984, 24).
One suggestion he offers is a metalinguistic approach, on which
the apparent failure to see that a proposition is necessarily
true, or that propositions are necessarily equivalent, is to be
explained as the failure to see what propositions are expressed
by the expressions in question. (Stalnaker 1984, 84)
How might this explanation go? Stalnaker elaborates:
Relative to any propositional expression one can determine
two propositions: there is the proposition that is expressed,
according to the standard rules, and there is the proposition
that relates the expression to what it expresses. If sentence S
expresses (according to the standard rules) proposition p, then
the second proposition in question is the proposition that S
expresses p. In cases of ignorance of necessity and equivalence,
I am suggesting, it is the second proposition that is the object
of doubt and investigation. (Stalnaker 1984, 84–5)
It seems that if I do not know a necessary truth, A, then what I do not
know is that the sentence ‘A’ expresses the proposition that A. I do
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not know that ‘A’ expresses the set of all possible worlds, according
to Stalnaker. I countenance possibilities in which the words in ‘A’
mean something other than their actual meaning and so, at some
level, I fail to understand what ‘A’ means. For
Whenever the structure of sentences is complicated, there will
be a nontrivial question about the relation between sentences
and the propositions they express, and so there will be room
for reasonable doubt about what proposition is expressed by a
given sentence. (Stalnaker 1984, 84)
This is clearly a genuine phenomenon. Anyone who’s read enough
German, or even old-fashioned English, knows the feeling. You know
what each word in turn means but, as the sentence runs on and on,
you lose the overall meaning. You don’t know what proposition is
expressed. It happens. But we question whether it happens enough
to make Stalnaker’s case. Is it the case that, whenever one seemingly
fails to know (or believe) a necessary truth, one is confused about
what the sentence in question means? That seems implausible.
Here are two examples (from Jago (2014a)) to make the case. The
first is mathematical. You learn, in school, about integers, equations,
addition, and exponentiation. You don’t learn all there is to know
about them, of course, but enough to be comfortable with what those
terms mean. (Let’s say, you know how to relate exponentiation to
multiplication to addition, and you know well what addition is.) You
also know how to understand notation involving variables (quantified,
implicitly, over integers). So you have no trouble understanding an
equation like
xn + yn = zn
Do you thereby know that, when n > 2, there are no three integers
x, y, z fitting the equation? Of course not! It took mathematicians
centuries to find a proof for that claim. Nevertheless, it’s a mathemat-
ical and logical necessity (with ‘logic’ understood so as to contain
basic arithmetic). In this case, Stalnaker must claim that you don’t
understand something about that statement. But, given the way we
set up the example, that’s hardly plausible.
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The second example is more practical. Suppose you’re playing chess
(with no time controls) and agree to count a draw as a win for black.
(Or suppose you’re in a competition, and black needs only a draw
to win the competition overall.) Here’s a surprising mathematical
fact: at each stage of the game, either you or your opponent has a
winning strategy available. That’s a function for generating the next
move which, if followed to the letter, will result in victory (including a
draw for black), regardless of what the other player does. A winning
strategy exists right from the first move, either for white or for black
(but we don’t know which). If players always followed a winning
strategy, then the same colour would always win (always white, or
always black). In reality, that doesn’t happen. Either the players don’t
know the winning strategy when it’s there (they don’t know that, say,
Qe7 is the first move of a winning strategy), or else they’re really
not that fussed about a guaranteed win. (And it’s obviously not the
latter.)
In this case, Stalnaker again has to claim that we fail to know some
of the meanings involved. But all that’s required (mathematically
speaking) to entail a winning strategy are (1) a precise specification
of the rules of chess, (2) a precise specification of the conditions
for winning, and (3) a precise description of the current state of the
board. Given those facts, a description of a winning strategy (for
one or other of the players) follows mathematically. So, the claim
has to be that no chess player (who ever lost without wanting to)
understands the meaning of the rules, the winning conditions, or the
way we describe the state of the board. That is highly implausible.
In short, the phenomenon Stalnaker describes, not knowing which
proposition is expressed by a given sentence, is genuine. But it is not
able to account for many of the cases in which an agent seems not to
know some necessary truth.
A different approach is to think of an agent’s overall epistemic state
as being split into fragments, or multiple ‘frames of mind’. An agent
may believe something in one frame of mind, something else in some
other frame of mind, and never combine the two bits of information.
She fails to believe all consequences of what she believes, on this
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approach, because (as it were) she never puts two and two together.
Lewis (1982) describes how to make sense of the phenomenon:
I used to think that Nassau Street ran roughly east-west; that the
railroad nearby ran roughly north-south; and that the two were
roughly parallel. … So each sentence in an inconsistent triple
was true according to my beliefs, but not everything was true
according to my beliefs.…My system of beliefs was broken into
(overlapping) fragments. Different fragments came into action
in different situations, and the whole system of beliefs never
manifested itself all at once. … The inconsistent conjunction of
all three did not belong to, was in no way implied by, and was
not true according to, any one fragment. That is why it was not
true according to my system of beliefs taken as a whole. (Lewis
1982, 436)
On Lewis’s approach, each fragment of belief can be treated in
the possible worlds tradition. So, each fragment corresponds to a
proposition, representing a consistent and logically closed set of
beliefs. Yet the agent’s beliefs in total are not closed under entailment
and need not be consistent, as in Lewis’s example. Stalnaker (1984)
supports a similar view (which he holds in combination with the
metalinguistic approach described above). Fagin and Halpern (1988)
develop the idea into a formal semantics, which they call a model of
‘local reasoning’. (The idea is that the logically omniscient ‘reasoning’
is local to each fragment, rather than a global feature of the agent’s
total belief state.)
Formally, the approach is similar to a non-adjunctive subval-
uational semantics, on which premises A, B do not entail their
conjunction, A ∧ B (§4.4). On this approach, we consider a range of
classical valuations, and consider a sentence to be true (simpliciter)
when it’s true-on-some-valuation.When A is true on one valuation
and B true on another, but no valuation makes both A and B true
simultaneously, we have a situation in which both A and B are true
(simpliciter) but A ∧ B is not. In the doxastic setting, this translates
to the situation Lewis describes: he did not believe the inconsistent
conjunction of the information he held about Nassau Street and the
railroad.
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As with the metalinguistic approach, the phenomenon described
by this approach is genuine, but it cannot explain away enough cases
of non-omniscience. Consider our chess example from above. Let’s
assume that our players are highly competent players, who hold all
the relevant information (the rules, what it takes to win, and the
current state of the game) in their current frame of mind. (Not all
players are like that, of course. But many who reach a high level
of competence are.) According to the fragments of mind approach,
those players will know (and be able to act upon) a winning strategy.
But, as we know from experience, that just isn’t the case, not even
for the very best players.
Following Jago (2014a), we think that the fragments of mind
approach misdiagnoses why real agents aren’t logically omniscient.
According to the view, an agent doesn’t believe a consequence of what
she believes because she hasn’t put the relevant premises together.
But when she does put those premises together, she thereby, all of
a sudden, comes to believe all their consequences. It’s as if all the
agent’s deductive effort goes into combining the premises into a
single belief state: from A1,… ,An to A1 ∧ ⋯ ∧An. But that’s the easy
bit, deductively speaking. The hard bit, for real agents, is deriving
further non-trivial consequences. Whether she derives these from
the individual premises taken together, or from their conjunction,
doesn’t make that much difference. The information conveyed by a
non-trivial valid deduction does not correspond to the move from
individual premises to their conjunction, but rather in the deductive
move from those premises (or their conjunction) to the conclusion.
The fragments of belief approach can’t account for this phenomenon.
There are also technical problems with the approach. Although
an agent’s total belief state is not closed under under entailment, on
the fragments view, it is closed under single-premise entailment. If A
entails B and she believes that A, then she automatically believes that
B (and similarly for knowledge). This is condition (C1) from §5.1.
This holds because each fragment is logically closed. The approach
also validates (C2)–(C5), (C7), and (C8) from §5.1. These are all
forms of logical omniscience we would like to avoid, both for belief
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and for knowledge (with the exception of (C3) for knowledge, since
one can’t know inconsistent things). So, even on technical grounds,
the fragments of belief approach isn’t a sufficient solution to the
problems of logical omniscience.
We’ve phrased our discussion in terms of logical omniscience. How
does this relate to hyperintensionality? Non-hyperintensionality is one
form of logical omniscience: (C4) from §5.1, Closure under logical
equivalence. It says that knowledge (or belief) never distinguishes
between logically equivalent contents. This is the very definition of a
non-hyperintensional concept.
Closure under logical equivalence (C4) is closely related to closure
under single-premise entailment. Suppose that A logically entails B.
Then A is equivalent to A ∧ B. Given (C4), an agent who knows that
A thereby knows A ∧ B too. And if she knows the conjuncts of each
conjunction she knows, then she knows that B too. (Similarly for
belief.) The latter principle is Closure under conjunction, (C7). So
(C4) plus closure under conjunction, (C7), implies (C1). If agents are
not logically omniscient at all, then (C1) is false. But as we argued
above, we cannot pin this failure on (C7), and so (C4) must be false
too. So if agents are not logically omniscient, as we’ve been arguing,
then (C4) is false, then knowledge and belief are hyperintensional
concepts.
Here’s the situation, as we see it. Examples such as our chess case
intuitively show that agents aren’t logically omniscient. Lewis’s and
Stalnaker’s attempt to convince us otherwise fail. Absent a successful
attempt along those lines, the evidence directs us to accept that
knowledge and belief are genuinely hyperintensional.
8.3 The Case from Content
We’ve been discussing doxastic and epistemic contents. But the general
notion of content is much broader. Every meaningful expression has a
semantic content, not just those that are known, believed, or uttered.
If epistemic or doxastic contents are hyperintensional, then content
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in general is a hyperintensional notion. But there are independent
(non-epistemic) reasons for thinking that this is the right way to think
about content. The content of a truth-apt sentence is a proposition.
We’ll talk in terms of propositions, since there’s a straightforward
notion of logical equivalence for propositions. (We can also talk
about logically equivalent subsentential terms, such as descriptions,
but this would needlessly complicate our discussion.)
Both Lewis (1973b, 1986b) and Stalnaker (1976a, 1976b, 1984)
take propositions to be sets of possible worlds. There’s a very simple
argument for that view. It’s common to identify propositions with
truth-conditions. But what, ontologically speaking, is a condition?
Let’s say we’re interested in whether something meets condition X
in such-and-such situations. We treat that condition as a function
from the situations to the answers, yes or no. Mathematically, such
functions are characteristic functions, and each such function defines
a set, containing all and only the input entities for which the function’s
output is yes. It is then both very natural and mathematically elegant
to identify the condition itself with the set of ‘yes’ situations. In the
case of a truth-condition, the input situations are possible worlds
and the outputs are true or false. So, on this very natural view, a
truth-condition is a set of possible worlds. (This is similar to the
argument we met at the start of §8.2.)
On this approach, the proposition ⟨A⟩ is the set of all possible
worlds according to which it is the case that A. (Alternatively, the
worlds which are such that, were they actual, then it would be the
case that A.) This story comes with a ready-made account of what
logically complex propositions are, for the set-theoretic account gives
a Boolean algebra for propositions: ⟨A∧B⟩ is simply the set of worlds
⟨A⟩ ∩ ⟨B⟩ and similarly, ⟨A ∨ B⟩ = ⟨A⟩ ∪ ⟨B⟩, ⟨¬A⟩ = ⟨A⟩c (the set-
theoretic complement of ⟨A⟩, on the domain of all possible worlds)
and ⟨A → B⟩ = ⟨A⟩c ∪ ⟨B⟩. A consequence of this account is that
necessarily equivalent propositions are identical (Stalnaker 1976a,
9). That is to say, the approach is intensional, not hyperintensional.
Despite the simplicity and naturalness of the approach, its short-
comings are many.We’ll discuss two (related) ways to bring these out
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(following Jago (2018b)). First, the truthmaker objection. Consider
these two propositions:
(8.1) ⟨Lenny exists⟩
(8.2) ⟨Lenny exists ∧ 3 exists⟩.
True propositions have truthmakers. (Or, at the very least, true
existential propositions have truthmakers.) Lenny alone truthmakes
(8.1). But Lenny on his own does not truthmake (8.2): the number 3
gets in on the act, too. It’s in virtue of the existence of both Lenny
and the number 3, taken together, that (8.2) is true. Lenny is a full
truthmaker for (8.1), but not for (8.2).Hence (8.1) stands in a relation
to Lenny which (8.2) does not and so, by Leibniz’s Law, (8.1) and
(8.2) cannot be one and the same proposition. But they are necessarily
equivalent and hence, according to the possible worlds view, one and
the same proposition. Contradiction.
A related objection to the possible worlds account is the aboutness
objection. Aboutness is ‘the relation that meaningful items bear
to whatever it is that they are on or of or that they address or
concern’ (Yablo 2014, 1). Research on aboutness has been flourishing
recently, mainly thanks to Fine (2016) and Yablo (2014). Even before
introducing a ‘grand-sounding name for something basically familiar’
(Yablo 2014, 1), logicians and semanticists were looking for a content-
preserving entailment relations: relations that holds between two
meaningful items A and B only when B introduces no content alien
to what A is about. Tautological entailment (Van Fraassen 1969),
analytic containment (Angell 1977, Correia 2004), and analytic
implication (Parry 1933) are all variations on this theme.
As an example of how aboutness creates problems for the standard
possible worlds account, consider the propositions:
(8.3) ⟨Lenny is stretching ∨ ¬Lenny is stretching⟩
which is about Lenny, not Bertie, and
(8.4) ⟨Bertie is barking ∨ ¬Bertie is barking⟩
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which is about Bertie, not Lenny. They’re about different things, and
hence are different propositions.Aboutness should thus relate (8.3)
to Lenny, not Bertie, and (8.4) to Bertie, not Lenny. So (8.3) and
(8.4) stand in different relations, and hence are distinct entities. But
they are logically equivalent. The possible world view then says they
are one and the same proposition. Contradiction. In each case, we
say, it’s the possible worlds view of propositions that’s at fault. It
cannot model aboutness and aboutness-preserving entailment. There
is broad agreement that a semantics that works properly for these
notions should be hyperintensional (Yablo 2014, 62). (That said,
Yablo himself works within the possible worlds framework, but with
additional hyperintensional resources.)
We’ve argued that at least some concepts are hyperintensional.And
unsurprisingly, we find the best way to account for such concepts is
in terms of impossible (as well as possible) worlds. Impossible worlds
give us a very natural and flexible way to account for hyperintensional
concepts.
Let’s continue with our focus on propositions. As we said above,
it’s common to identify propositions with truth conditions, and in
general to identify conditions with characteristic functions. So a
proposition is identified with the set of situations in which it is
true. As we emphasized above, that’s a very natural view. But there’s
nothing in this argument that says the situations in question have to
be possible worlds. We take them to be sets of worlds, both possible
and impossible. So we can accept the motivation whilst accepting
that propositions are hyperintensional.
Just what logical properties such propositions have depends on the
properties of impossible worlds. It depends on which logical rules, if
any, impossible worlds must preserve. This is the granularity issue,
our topic for §8.4.
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8.4 The Granularity Issue
Given that a world represents such-and-such, what else must it
represent? This is one of the most difficult issues surrounding
impossible worlds. A logically possible world which represents that
A and that B must thereby represent that A ∧ B, that A ∨ B, that
¬¬A, and so on. Which of these closure principles, if any, apply to
impossible worlds? We call this the granularity issue. In this section,
we’ll discuss some considerations on granularity in general. We’ll
then look at how different considerations might apply to different
hyperintensional concepts.
Let’s begin with Nolan’s Principle (Nolan 1997, 542):
(NP) If it is impossible thatA, then there’s an impossible world which
represents that A.
Nolan thinks of this as a kind of unrestricted ‘comprehension
principle’ for impossibilities. If true, it tells us something about both
the nature and the scope of impossible worlds.
Given (NP), you might think we can show that impossible worlds
needn’t obey any particular logical closure principle (other than
identity, A ⊨ A). If that’s right, then impossible worlds are open
worlds (Priest 2005, Rantala 1982a). We defined open worlds in §5.3
as worlds which, in general, obey no logical closure principle other
than A ⊨ A. (From now on, when we say ‘closed under no principle’,
we’ll always mean ‘no principle except A ⊨ A’.)
The argument from (NP) to open worlds goes as follows. Take any
putative closure principle, taking us from some premises A1,A2,… to
C. If the principle isn’t valid, then there’s a logically possible world
such that A1,A2,… but not C. If it is valid, by contrast, then it cannot
be the the case that A1,A2,… but not C. But then, by (NP), there is
an impossible world such that A1,A2,… but not C. Generalizing, for
any closure principle, there is a world not closed under that principle.
This argument is flawed, for it misapplies Nolan’s Principle. As
stated, Nolan’s Principle allows us to take any single sentence ‘A’
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which cannot be true, and infer the existence of an impossible world
which represents that A. But the argument above considered multiple
sentences, ‘A1’, ‘A2’,… and ‘C’. These cannot together be substituted
into (NP) as stated. (We’ll discuss more general principles, which
Nolan may have had in mind, later in this section.)
We can always substitute for ‘A’ in (NP) the single sentence, ‘A1 ∧
A2∧⋯ ∧¬C’.This is impossible iff it cannot be the case thatA1,A2,…
but not C. So, using this sentence, (NP) legitimately gives us an
impossible worldwwhich represents that A1∧A2∧⋯ ∧¬C. However,
there is no guarantee that w represents each Ai but does not represent
that C. We haven’t yet fixed which principles hold of impossible
worlds and so, in particular, we can’t assume those principle. It may
be that w represents a conjunction without representing each of the
conjuncts. It may represent both ¬C and C.
We could instead try substituting a sentence of the metalanguage
for ‘A’ in (NP), such as this one: ‘‘A1’, ‘A2’,… are true, but ‘C’ is not
true’. Then (NP) gives us an impossible world w where that entire
sentence is true. But again, this need not be a world where the Ais
hold butC does not.To make that inference,wwould need to support
the inferences from A’s being true to A’s being the case and from A’s
not being true to A’s not being the case. But since w is an impossible
world, we can’t assume that those principles hold of it. So however
we try, we can’t get directly from (NP) to the failure of all closure
principles.
Priest (2016a) adopts two principles that are similar to, but
stronger than, (NP): ‘everything holds at some worlds, and everything
fails at some worlds’ (Priest 2016a, 5) and, for any distinct A,B,
‘there are worlds where A holds and B fails’ (Priest 2016a, 7). More
specifically, in our terminology:
(8.5) For any A, there is a world which represents that A and a world
which does not represent that A.
(8.6) For any distinct A and B, there is a world which represents that
A but does not represent that B.
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Priest calls these the ‘primary directive’ and ‘secondary directive’ on
impossible worlds, respectively. The latter implies the former, which
in turn implies (NP), but neither converse holds. To see this, first
suppose that it is impossible that A. Then (8.5) says there is a world
such that A, which by definition is an impossible world. So (8.5)
implies (NP). Suppose instead that A is necessary. Then (8.5) implies
that there is an impossible world which does not represent that A.
But (NP) does not imply this. Since A is necessary, ¬A is impossible,
and so (NP) says there is an impossible world which represents that
¬A. But this need not be a world which does not represent that A: it
may represent both that A and that ¬A, as some of the FDE-worlds
from §5.4 do. In general, (NP) tells us only about the existence of
worlds which represent such-and-such. It does not tells us about the
existence of worlds which fail to represent such-and-such. That’s why
(8.5) is strictly stronger than (NP).
It’s clear that (8.6) implies (8.5), but the converse does not hold.
For any pair of sentences ‘A’ and ‘B’, (8.5) tells us that there is a world
which represents that A and a world which fails to represent that B.
But these could be distinct worlds. Since there’s no way to infer that
they’re the same world, as (8.6) requires, (8.5) doesn’t imply (8.6).
So we get increasingly strong principles as we go from (NP) to (8.5)
to (8.6).
To illustrate the extra power (8.6) gives us (over (8.5) and (NP)),
consider Simplification, the inference from A∧B to A, or Disjunction
Introduction, from A to A ∨ B. (8.6) directly entails that there are
worlds where these rules fail. These are not FDE-worlds (which
respect the classical rules for conjunction and disjunction).
But even (8.6) does not get us to the existence of openworlds,where
any logical rule (except A ⊨ A) can fail. For consider adjunction,
from A and B to A∧B. Given (8.6), we may infer that there’s a world
which represents that A but not A∧B, and that there’s a world which
represents that B but not A ∧ B. But we can’t get to a world which
represents both that A and that B, but not that A∧B. (It clearly won’t
help to consider the premises conjunctively: there’s no world which
represents and does not represent that A ∧ B.)
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To infer the existence of open worlds from such-and-such being
impossible, we need a stronger principle still, such as the following:
(NP+) If it is impossible that A1,A2,… but not C, then there’s an
impossible world which represents that A1,A2,… but not C.
This is very much in the spirit of the original (NP). Given it, for any
logical principle (other that A ⊨ A), there’s a world which breaks that
principle. If (NP+) is true, then we need to include open worlds in our
theory. However, there is virtually no gap between (NP+) and that
conclusion: (NP+) says, in effect, that for any logical rule, there’s a
world which breaks that rule. It too needs an argument. And whereas
Nolan’s original principle (NP) has plenty of intuitive force (for those
who believe in the existence of impossible worlds to begin with), we
can hardly claim that for (NP+).
Despite the failure of this argument, we believe that there exist
open worlds. There are three arguments we can offer. The first is
an argument from logical rules. If there are impossible worlds at
all, then there are worlds which break some logical rule. More
carefully: if there are qualitatively distinct impossible worlds, then
there are impossible worlds which do not represent that A for
every A. Such worlds are not governed by all the usual logical
inference rules. Let’s fix on the standard introduction and elimination
rules for each connective, such as Adjunction and Simplification for
conjunction. Each connective’s meaning is intimately related to its
introduction and elimination rules. (Just think about how Adjunction
and Simplification fix what ‘∧’ means.) But if one of these meaning-
fixing rules can be broken by an impossible world, then surely any of
them can. And if our domain of worlds does not in general respect
any logical rule, we have a domain of open worlds. This argument
doesn’t give us a positive reason for thinking that all rules are broken
by impossible worlds. Rather, it looks to convince us that there’s no
reason to reject that approach.
The second argument is an argument from epistemic states such
as belief. (Jago (2014a) and Priest (2016a) give a similar argument.)
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Take any putative closure principle P, from A1,A2,… to (distinct) C.
If all worlds are closed under P, and we analyse belief in terms of
accessible worlds, then any agent who believes that A1,A2,… will
thereby be modelled as believing that C, too. But it is at least possible
for some agent to believe A1,A2,… but not believe that C. So not all
worlds are closed under P.
The argument is quite general. If some possible agent can believe
the premises of some logical principle but not the conclusion, then
there must be an epistemically accessible world which represents those
premises but not the conclusion. That was basically our argument,
in §5.4, against using a weaker-than-classical logic to account for
epistemic states. If we restrict the worlds accessible to an agent to,
say, the FDE worlds, then the agent remains logically omniscient,
with respect to the first-degree entailments of her beliefs. To avoid
that situation, for any closure principle, there must be an accessible
world which doesn’t obey that principle. That’s the argument for
open worlds from epistemic states.
The third argument for open worlds is an argument from counter-
possible reasoning. (Priest (2016a) gives a similar argument.) Suppose
we’re debating whether some putative logical principle should be
accepted.We might be studying philosophy of logic, and discussing
arguments in favour of intuitionism or paraconsistency, for example.
Then we might make suppositions about the validity (or otherwise) of
Excluded Middle (A∨¬A), Double-Negation Elimination (¬¬A ⊨ A),
or the Explosion Principle (A, ¬A ⊨ B). We’ll consider what happens
if that principle fails. If the principle is in fact valid, then we’re making
a counterpossible supposition (§1.3).
If we want to analyse counterpossibles using impossible worlds (as
we propose in Chapter 12), then we need impossible worlds in our
account which violate that particular logical principle. It seems that
we can engage in this kind of supposition for any logical principle
(other than A ⊨ A). For each such principle, we’ll need impossible
worlds in our account which violate it. So impossible worlds in
general cannot be closed under any logical principle (other than
A ⊨ A). That’s just to say that we need open worlds in our account.
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It doesn’t follow from these arguments that one singleworld breaks
all closure principles. It might be that each closure principle is broken
by some world, although no world breaks them all. So, although the
arguments above establish that we need open worlds in our account,
it doesn’t establish that the full range of open worlds (including
worlds which respect no closure principle whatsoever) is required.
Nevertheless, the simplest semantics available (given that open worlds
are required at all) is to allowmodels to be built from any collection of
open worlds, with no restrictions.Then some models will involve only
worlds which meet a certain condition; but there will also be models
containing worlds which don’t meet that (or any other) condition.
For this perspective to make sense, we need a very fine-grained
notion of how worlds represent. We need world-representation to
be at least as fine-grained as the sentences of the object language.
For otherwise, there would be distinct object-language sentences A,B
such that a world represents that A iff it represents that B. But this
gives us a closure principle (A ⫤⊨ B) which all worlds must obey,
contrary to what we established above.
Linguistic ersatzism is the most straightforward way to realize this
very fine-grained notion of world-representation. If impossible worlds
are themselves sets of sentences, and any such set counts as a world,
then world-representation will be as fine-grained as the worldmaking
language itself. That is, for any pair A,B of worldmaking sentences,
there will be a world which represents that A but not B. Moreover,
as we argued in §3.6, linguistic ersatzism is probably the best way to
make sense of impossible worlds. (This argument is neutral between
linguist ersatzism proper and the linguistic variant of the hybrid
account from §2.5, on which the possible worlds are Lewisian and
the impossible worlds are sets of sentences.)
If we then make use of the class of all such worlds, we obtain
extremely fine-grained analyses of hyperintensional concepts. But
this is a problem in itself.We saw in §5.3, in our discussion of logical
omniscience in epistemic logic, that this ‘anything goes’ approach
to knowledge or belief tells us nothing about those concepts. If an
agent can believe anything, whilst disbelieving anything else, then in
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what sense do we have a model of belief at all? This ‘anything goes’
approach to belief seems equivalent to the purely syntactic approaches
of Eberle (1974) and Moore and Hendrix (1979). These contain an
arbitrary set of sentences, which are taken as representations of the
agent’s beliefs. If we can do things that way, why bother with the
worlds apparatus in the first place?
Here, we have reached a deep puzzle about hyperintensionality.
Hyperintensional concepts require our models to be extremely fine-
grained. Yet when we achieve that fine granularity, we seem to have
surrendered the benefits of the approach.
We find the arguments above, over the granularity of worlds,
convincing. So we accept the open worlds picture: in general, worlds
need be closed under no particular logical rule. Our metaphysics
of what worlds are, and of how they represent, must be in accord
with this principle. But it doesn’t follow that ‘anything goes’ with
any analysis of a hyperintensional concept, for two reasons. First, a
particular concept may require a certain kind of world, obeying
certain conditions. When analysing possibility and necessity, for
example, we restrict our attention to the possible worlds only.
Although these are not intensional concepts, a similar restriction
applies to many hyperintensional concepts. If we’re interested in
what’s possible or necessary with respect to intuitionistic logic, or
with respect to paraconsistent logic, we restrict our attention to the
worlds which obey those logics.
There are (hyperintensional) notions of semantic content which,
we think, require us to restrict the domain of worlds. (We discuss one
such notion in §9.6.) These notions require worlds more fine-grained
than classical possible worlds, but not as fine-grained as open worlds.
We obtain those worlds by narrowing down the class of all open
worlds, based on certain principles we want to enforce on our analysis.
None of these cases allow that ‘anything goes’. As we shall see in §9.6,
there are substantial, non-trivial equivalences on semantic contents,
which we can capture in our impossible worlds framework. That’s
the first reason why adopting open worlds doesn’t imply ‘anything
goes’ for a hyperintensional concept.
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The second reason is that an account of a hyperintensional concept
may involve non-trivial structure, even if its worlds are themselves
unstructured open worlds. One example is given by worlds-theories
of counterfactuals (§1.2), which involve a similarity metric on worlds.
We can adopt that approach even if we include open worlds in the
account. (Again, we discuss counterpossible conditionals in detail in
Chapter 12.) The metric can give us structure when we want it, but
not when we don’t. Let’s counterfactually suppose that intuitionistic
logic is the correct account of validity, as in our example above. Then
the similarity metric will select worlds where intuitionistic principles
operate but which (let’s assume) are otherwise most similar to our
own. This approach tells us that, if intuitionistic logic were correct,
Double Negation Elimination would not be valid. But it also tells us
that, if intuitionistic logic were correct, Nottinghamwould still be wet
today. And it doesn’t tell us that, if intuitionistic logic were correct,
there would be flying elephants in Amsterdam. (This all depends on
the details of the similarity metric.)
In this kind of approach, anything may be supposed. But it isn’t the
case that anything goes within a supposition.The similarity metric (or
some other metric, if you prefer) gives us appropriate structure within
any counterfactual supposition. There may or may not be principles
governing counterfactual supposition across the board (Chapter 12).
But even if there aren’t, it’s not the case that ‘anything goes’ within
any counterfactual supposition. That’s enough to convince us that
the open worlds approach isn’t trivial.
What of the worry, mentioned previously, that a model of belief
with open worlds is trivial? This is one of the toughest problems to
address, given that there seem to be no necessary closure conditions
on what we can believe. Our answer (much as in the case of
counterpossibles) is that a model may include important structure,
even if the worlds it involves do not. We discuss the issue in
§§10.3–10.4 and present a formal model in §10.5, based on some
ideas discussed in §9.5.
There is one further worry the open worlds approach should
address: that it results in disjunctive truth-conditions and implausible
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consequences for a theory of meaning. (We touched on this issue in
§4.3.) We’ll discuss the worry and offer a response in §8.5.
8.5 The Compositionality Objection
Compositionality is the principle that the meaning of a complex
expression is a function of the meanings of its constituent expressions.
It’s commonly taken to be a mandatory feature of any adequate
theory of meaning. The argument is that, as competent speakers of a
language, we are in principle capable of grasping the meanings of a
potentially infinite number of sentences. And since we’ve learnt the
meanings of a limited number of words, this is possible only if the
meanings of complex sentences are obtainable recursively from the
meanings of their constituent parts (Davidson 1965).
Take this very simple example. If you know what ‘badgers are
great’ and ‘and’ mean in English, then you know what
(8.7) Badgers are great, and badgers are great, and badgers are great,
and badgers are great, and badgers are great, and badgers are
great
means. Chances are, you never encountered that sentence before
reading it here, yet you understood it straight away. How so? Because
you understood all the component parts, of which the meaning of
the whole is a function. That’s compositionality.
The argument applies equally to notions of content: the content
of a complex expression must be a function of the content of its
constituents. The content of a conjunction A ∧ B, for example, must
be a function of the contents of A and of B. The content of A∨B will
be some other function, also of the contents of A and of B.
The possible worlds account of propositions (§8.3) clearly meets
this requirement: if the contents of A and of B are sets of possible
worlds, then the content of A∧B is their intersection and the content
of A∨B is their union. Since each pair of sets has a unique intersection
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and union, this account of content (for the Boolean connectives, at
least) is compositional.
In this example, we see a link between compositionality and truth-
conditions. Given that ∧ requires the truth of both its conjunctions,
the possible-worlds content of A ∧ B must be all those worlds where
both A and B are true. On any account of worlds, that’s just the
intersection of the A-worlds with the B-worlds. So here, there is a
direct link between the connective’s truth-condition and the function
on contents. Similarly for the other truth-functional connectives.
This link breaks down with open worlds. At an open world, it is
in general not the case that A∧B is true just in case both A and B are
true. There are open worlds where badgers are great but our badger
sentence (8.7) is not true. So, when contents may include open worlds,
we do not obtain the content of A ∧ B by taking the intersection of
the A-worlds with the B-worlds. Indeed, insofar as the truth of A∧B
is independent of the truth of A and of B at an open world, there
appears to be no function from the open-world contents of A and B
to the content of A ∧ B. But that’s just to say that the account isn’t
compositional.
This is a serious worry for the open worlds approach. If it can’t be
met, then it could well be a fatal objection. (Note that it should be
seen as a worry concerning meaning or content, not validity. For we
analyse validity in terms of what’s the case according to the possible
worlds; and for possible worlds, the usual recursive clauses for the
connectives hold.)
Our response to the problem is in two parts. First, we distinguish
two aims for a formal theory. A formal theory might be (part
of) a theory of meaning, in which case, it must be compositional.
But a formal theory may be intended as a useful model of some
notion (information, or belief, or logical consequence), without
claiming to be a theory of meaning. In this sense, a model might
get things extensionally correct, whilst not respecting the underlying
mechanisms of why the modelled concept works they way it does.
In short, the accounts we’ve presented might be fine for some tasks,
but not for others, including giving a theory of meaning. (This kind
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of attitude seems implicit in the work of those who have employed
non-normal worlds for various logical purposes, which we examined
in Chapters 4–7.)
The second, and less defensive, part of our response is to show that
at least some open worlds-based approaches are compositional. This
would show that a full theory of meaning can be given by including
open worlds. To do this, we’ll need to return to the metaphysics of
worlds, which we discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.
Consider the various metaphysics of worlds we gave throughout
those chapters, and what they say about truth-at-a-world. If w is a
concrete world, then A is true at w iff things are such that A, once
quantifiers are restricted to w. If w is an ersatz world, then truth-at-w
might be a matter of which properties comprise (or are encoded by)
w. Or it might be a matter of which propositions or worldmaking
sentences are members of w. Or it might be some other feature of
w’s construction.
We’re going to focus on the linguistic ersatz approach, on which
worlds are sets of sentences (§3.6). Such worlds represent explicitly,
by containing a sentence that says such-and-such. These need not
be sentences of the object language. Indeed, it’s best they’re not, else
we make little progress in connecting the object language to reality.
Let’s write ‘A∗’ for the translation into the worldmaking language of
the object language sentence ‘A’. Truth-at-a-world is then defined in
terms of world-membership:
(Tw) A is true at w iff A
∗ ∈ w
This definition applies to all worlds w and all sentences A, without
regard for whether w is possible or impossible, open or not, and
whether A is atomic or complex.
Next, let ‘⟦A⟧’ denote the content assigned to the object language
sentence A: the set of all worlds at which A is true. This is the set of
all worlds which contain A∗, {w ∣ A∗ ∈ w,w ∈W} (whereW is the
set of all worlds). But, given that any set of worldmaking sentences
is a world inW, if we add A∗ to every world inW, the set we obtain,
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{w ∪ {A∗} ∣ w ∈W}, is none other than ⟦A⟧. Moreover, these worlds
all have A∗, and no sentence but A∗, in common.More precisely, their
intersection, ⋂⟦A⟧, is none other than {A∗}.
Given these facts, we can always move back-and-forth between
the content c of an object language sentence A and the corresponding
worldmaking sentence A∗. So, as long as we can build up complex
worldmaking sentences from more basic ones, in roughly the way
we do for object language sentences, the semantics will be fully
compositional. What follows is one way to make this precise.
Let’s abstract from the precise grammatical details and suppose
that complex worldmaking sentences are built using 1-place sentence
operators,written prefix, and 2-place sentence operators,written infix.
(These might include the Boolean connectives, various conditionals,
and unary and binary modalities). Let O1 be any such 1-place
operator and O2 be any such 2-place operator, and let x⌢y be the
concatenation of worldmaking strings x and y. Then O1⌢A
∗ and
A∗1
⌢O2⌢A
∗
2 are worldmaking sentences.
Next, we define two semantic functions, f1 (on the contents of a
1-place operator and a sentence, both from the object language) and
f2 (on the contents of a 2-place operator and two sentences):
f1(o, c) = {w ∪ {o
⌢x ∣ x ∈⋂ c} ∣ w ∈W}
f2(o, c1, c2) = {w ∪ {x
⌢o⌢y ∣ x ∈⋂ c1, y ∈⋂ c2} ∣ w ∈W}
To understand what’s going on here, recall that, when c is the content
of an object language sentence, ⋂ c will be some singleton {A∗}.
So the definition of f1 sets x to be equal to some worldmaking
sentence A∗, to which it concatenates o, and then returns the set
of all worlds containing that complex worldmaking sentence. Let’s
write ‘¬∗’ for the translation into the worldmaking language of the
object language negation ‘¬’. Then f1(¬
∗, ⟦A⟧) returns ⟦¬A⟧, the set
of worlds according to which ¬A is true.
The same goes for f2. Given an object language conjunction A ∧ B,
we use f2 on ∧
∗ (the worldmaking translation of ‘∧’) and the contents
of A and B. Then f2(∧
∗, ⟦A⟧, ⟦B⟧) returns ⟦A ∧ B⟧, the content of
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A ∧ B. That’s all we need to demonstrate that the semantics is fully
compositional.
How is it that this approach is compositional, when various
semantics with open worlds presented throughout Chapters 4–7
are not? We gave those semantics in terms of a primitive valuation
function or relation, assigning truth-values to sentences at worlds.
For open worlds, the valuation (or relation) assigns truth-values
to all sentences directly, and without restriction. That valuation
is non-recursive. But the content assigned to a sentence depends
on that valuation, and so this notion of content is non-recursive.
Compositionality in the linguistic ersatz approach, by contrast,
relies on a recursive translation from object language sentences to
worldmaking sentences. The worldmaking sentence A∗ does a lot of
the heavy lifting in giving A’s content. That’s why the linguistic ersatz
approach delivers a recursive characterization of the content of any
object language sentence.
Chapter Summary
We began our discussion by asking whether hyperintensionality is
a genuine phenomenon, or rather, a feature to be explained away
(§8.1).We then focused on the epistemic case, considering arguments
from Stalnaker and Lewis which attempt to explain away hyperin-
tensionality (§8.2). We argued that they are not successful. We then
considered the argument for a genuinely hyperintensional notion of
content (§8.3). Having made the case for genuine hyperintensionality,
we turned to the granularity issue (§8.4): how fine-grained are
impossible worlds? This is one of the most difficult issues any theory
of hyperintensionality faces.We then returned to the compositionality
objection, and argued that some accounts of impossible worlds deliver
a fully compositional theory of meaning (§8.5).
9Information and Content
9.1 Informative Statements
Here are some informative statements. It’s currently cold but dry in
Nottingham. James Newell Osterberg is Iggy Pop. Fermat’s Last
Theorem is true. If all truths are knowable, then all truths are
known. And here, by contrast, are some uninformative statements.
No bachelor is married. Iggy Pop is Iggy Pop. 1 + 1 = 2. Either all
truths are knowable or they’re not.
The first list of statements might be informative to some people
and not to others. For someone standing outside in Nottingham right
now, it’s probably not informative to be told that it’s currently cold
but dry there. For someone who knows lots about Iggy Pop, it’s
probably not informative to be told that James Newell Osterberg is
Iggy Pop. To those who’ve encountered Fitch’s paradox, it’s probably
not informative to be told that, if all truths are knowable, then
all truths are known. To modern mathematicians, it’s probably not
informative to be told that Fermat’s Last Theorem is true.
Whether a statement is informative to someone depends on what
information that person already has. It also depends on the way in
which they have that information. Take our person standing outside
in Nottingham right now. She may be confused about where she is. If
she doesn’t know she’s in Nottingham, then experiencing the weather
in her immediate surroundings won’t help her to conclude that it’s
currently cold and dry in Nottingham. Then her weather app, which
says currently cold and dry in Nottingham, might be informative to
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her. In some sense, one might think, she already knew this. She knew
it’s currently cold and dry where she is, and Nottingham is where she
is. But still, it was informative to her to be told that it’s currently cold
and dry in Nottingham.What’s informative depends also on how the
information is presented.
In this chapter, we investigate accounts of what it is for a statement
to be informative. We’re interested in what information is, in and of
itself.We’re also interested in how a statement gets to be informative.
As the examples above suggest, logical and mathematical truths can
be informative (to some people, at least). This in turn hints that
an impossible worlds framework is a promising way to understand
this phenomenon. Yet, as the examples also suggest, not all logical
and mathematical truths are informative (to anyone). So, if we go
down the impossible worlds route, we need to be careful about which
impossible words are included in the analysis.
Similarly, some but not all identity statements are informative (to
some people). If identity is necessary, as most philosophers hold after
Kripke (1980), then impossible worlds seem to be an attractive way
to go. But again, we will need to be careful about which impossible
worlds feature in the analysis. Informativeness, it will turn out, is a
very puzzling concept.
9.2 Information as Ruling Out Scenarios
According to a popular analysis, for a sentence (or the expressed
proposition) to be informative is for it to rule out certain scenarios, or
would-be possibilities. Hintikka (1962) gave the classic presentation
of this view, which Chalmers (2002a, 2010), Lewis (1975, 1986b),
and Stalnaker (1976b, 1984) then put to work in various ways.
Van Benthem (2011) and Van Benthem and Martinez (2008) discuss
the recent literature.
The proposition that it often rains in Manchester is informative
because it excludes scenarios in which it rains infrequently in
Manchester. Before an agent comes to believe that proposition, it was
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possible, as far as she was concerned, that it rains infrequently in
Manchester. In coming to believe that proposition, she ceases to treat
such scenarios as ways the world might be, for all she knows.
We can think of all scenarios according to which it often rains
in Manchester as constituting a notion of content for ‘it often rains
in Manchester’ which is suitable for various epistemic purposes. To
believe that proposition is to treat only those scenarios according to
which it often rains in Manchester as being doxastic possibilities; and
to know that proposition is to treat only those scenarios according
to which it often rains in Manchester as being epistemic possibilities
(Chapter 5). That content is informative for an agent iff coming to
believe (or know) that proposition narrows down her doxastically (or
epistemically) accessible scenarios. To be informative at all, therefore,
a statement must have a non-empty content.
If the scenarios in question are all possible worlds, then problems
ensue. In §1.2, we introduced the Bar-Hillel-Carnap theory of
information (Bar-Hillel and Carnap 1953). This claims that the
informative role of a sentence consists in splitting the totality of
possible worlds into those where it is true, and those where it is false.
The consequence outlined in §1.3 is that identity statements of the
form a = b, and metaphysical, logical, and mathematical truths, all
end up being treated as uninformative.
As a consequence, the Bar-Hillel-Carnap theory denies that any
logical deduction or mathematical proof can ever be informative.
This is implausible as a characterization of information for limited,
resource-bound, and fallible cognitive agents like us all. The issue,
which Floridi (2015, §4.1) calls the ‘Bar Hillel-Carnap paradox’, is in
fact just a variation on the logical omniscience problem in epistemic
logic (Chapter 5), which we’ll discuss further in Chapter 10.
Acknowledging the problem, Bar-Hillel and Carnap say that their
account should not
be understood as implying that there is no good sense of ‘amount
of information’ in which the amount of information of these
sentences will not be zero at all, and for some people, might
even be rather high. (Bar-Hillel and Carnap 1953, 229)
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This ‘good sense’ is a kind of ‘psychological information’ (1953, 229),
on which the Bar-Hillel-Carnap theory has nothing further to say. On
this view, there is one kind of information, semantic (and, presumably,
non-psychological) information, which applies to contingent, empiri-
cal statements. And there is distinct ‘psychological’ notion which, in
some unspecified way, makes sense of the informativeness of certain
necessary truths.
That approach looks messy and poorly motivated.We don’t find
pre-theoretical reasons for wanting to divide notions of information
along these lines. Learning about the logical consequences of some
supposition, or of a putative move in a game of chess, seems to us to
be informative, in much the same sense that contingent statements can
be informative. If asked whether it’s currently raining in Sydney, or
whether Qe4 is a good next move, an uninformed agent might in each
case say ‘could be’. In each case, becoming informed rules out would-
be possibilities for the agent in question. Both cases link to belief and
knowledge in the same way. In each, gaining information leads to new
beliefs and, in the right circumstances, to fresh knowledge. Moreover,
both cases have a psychological element. Both can be surprising; both
contents can be the objects of an agent’s hopes or fears; both may
interact with the agent’s emotions. In short, we think a unified notion
of semantic informational content, one which can deal with both
cases, is preferable.
We don’t thereby want to claim that there is only one good notion
of information. Far from it: there are many such notions, and more
than one may be theoretically useful. In §9.1, we contrasted the
concept of being potentially informative to some agent with being
informative to agent x, for a specified x. In §9.6, we’ll discuss a
distinct notion of informational content, which concerns what is said
by a speaker in making an utterance. Our overall strategy is the one
we discussed in §8.4.We start with fine-grained worlds.We impose
additional inter-world structure, or intra-world closure conditions,
depending on the concept of information under investigation.
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9.3 Informative Identities
James Newell Osterberg recently turned 70. That information would
be of little interest to us (to Franz and Mark, at least) if we didn’t
also know that James Newell Osterberg is Iggy Pop. Given what we
know about his time in The Stooges, it’s somewhat surprising that he’s
made it to 70. If we didn’t know that James Newell Osterberg is Iggy
Pop, we’d not find it so surprising that James Newell Osterberg has
reached 70. ‘James Newell Osterberg is Iggy Pop’ is an informative
identity. It allows us to connect our attitudes to particular bits of
information to other bits of information. It allows us to connect our
Iggy Pop information, and the attitudes we take to it, to our James
Newell Osterberg information.
How can ‘James Newell Osterberg is Iggy Pop’ be informative?
Since it’s true, ‘Iggy Pop’ is a name for Osterberg, as is ‘James Newell
Osterberg’. Both names pick out the same individual. So, semantically,
‘James Newell Osterberg is Iggy Pop’ would seem to express the
proposition that Osterberg is Osterberg. But that’s utterly trivial
and uninformative. So how are we to understand the information
conveyed by ‘James Newell Osterberg is Iggy Pop’?
This is a version of Frege’s puzzle (Frege 1892). Frege’s own
solution was (in effect) that propositions are not identified by
the worldly entities they are about, but rather by the modes of
presentation of those worldly entities (he called them Sinne, senses).
If the modes of presentation of ‘a’ and ‘b’ differ, then the Fregean
propositions (which Frege called ‘thoughts’) that Fa and that Fb
differ. This allows an agent to stand in a relation (such as believing
or knowing) to one proposition but not the other. So, in particular,
one can learn that Iggy Pop has turned 70, even if one already knew
that Osterberg has turned 70. In this way, Frege can explain how
replacing ‘Osterberg’ with ‘Iggy Pop’ can be informative. In particular,
he can explain how ‘Osterberg is Iggy Pop’ is informative, whereas
neither ‘Osterberg is Osterberg’ nor ‘Iggy Pop is Iggy Pop’ are.
To support this approach, Frege requires some rather elaborate
semantic machinery.On a straightforward semantic account, ‘a’ refers
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to a, ‘b’ to b, and it is these referents, a and b, which feature in the
truth-conditions for the utterance in question. And so it goes on
Frege’s analysis, in direct discourse. But in indirect discourse, such
as the sentence following ‘it is informative that’ or ‘believes that’, ‘a’
and ‘b’ refer not to a and b but to their mode of presentation. It is
these modes of presentation which feature in the truth-conditions of
the utterance as a whole. Thus, on the Fregean view, indirect contexts
induce a switch of reference, from the usual worldly entities to their
modes of presentation.
The Fregean approach is rich and powerful. It’s not our intention
here to evaluate it. Our topic is impossible worlds. Our aim is to show
that a worlds-based approach can analyse informative identities (and
belief reports: see Chapter 10) as well as the Fregean approach.
If we’re successful, then we can avoid a question that troubles
the Fregean approach: just what are senses? Frege speaks of the
‘realm of senses’, distinguished from the ‘realm of reference’ (Frege
1956). It seems that, for Frege, senses are sui generis entities, neither
physical nor mental (see Dummett 1993a, 154). Dummett notes that,
for Frege, ‘the realm of sense is a very special region of reality; its
denizens are, so to speak, things of a very special sort’ (Dummett
1993a, 154). Senses must be entities of some kind, else they could
not be referents in belief-contexts (as Frege’s theory claims). But if
they are primitive, non-causal abstract entities, how can we refer to
them in belief reports?
There may well be good answers to these questions. (Chalmers
(2002c) identifies Fregean senses with ‘primary’ or ‘epistemic’ in-
tensions, a particular function from possibilities to extensions. But
Chalmers’s approach makes no concession to hyperintensional no-
tions.)We avoid the worry entirely if we can show that a worlds-based
approach is up to the job. (Indeed, Bjerring and Rasmussen (2017)
and Jago (2014a) suggest that the best approach to understanding
senses is in terms of functions on possible and impossible worlds.)
Our alternative to the Fregean approach goes as follows. If we
accept Nolan’s Principle (NP), or any of the other principles from
§8.4, then for any non-empty terms ‘a’ and ‘b’, there are guaranteed
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to be worlds which represent that a = b and worlds which represent
that a ≠ b. For suppose a = b. Then the actual world represents that
a = b. And since it is impossible that a ≠ b, by (NP) some impossible
world represents that a ≠ b. If we suppose instead that a ≠ b, then
the argument is similar. (Just how a world represents that a ≠ b, given
that in fact a = b, is a further question. Jago 2014a, §§5.5–5.6 is one
attempt at a solution.)
Since there are guaranteed to be worlds according to which a ≠ b,
a true identity statement ‘a = b’ is guaranteed to have a non-empty
content. An agent may take any doxastic attitude to that content:
belief, disbelief, or neither. If she does not believe it, it is because
she takes some of the worlds where a is not b (which are, in fact,
impossible) to be ways the world could be, for all she knows. This is
compatible with her being a rational agent and perfectly competent
language-user (she might even be a heavily idealized agent who knows
all a priori truths). So there is no rational compulsion for her to believe
that content. She may go from not believing it to believing it and, in
the right circumstances, she may gain it as knowledge in the process.
If she does, it is informative to her.
On this approach, true identity statements ‘a = b’ are potentially
informative. This approach maintains the benefits of the Fregean
approach, but without relying on reference switching mechanisms.
(In Chapter 10, we’ll also argue that the impossible worlds approach
can make sense of belief ascriptions without resorting to reference
switching.)
Won’t the approach incorrectly treat ‘a = a’ as being informative,
too? The worry arises because a = a is a logical truth, and hence it’s
logically impossible that a ≠ a. So, given (NP) or one of the stronger
principles from §8.4, there are worlds which represent that a ≠ a.
Mustn’t we then treat ‘a ≠ a’ and being potentially informative?
We can resist this final move. Some contents are not suitable objects
of epistemic attitudes. Not all impossible worlds are epistemically
possible: some are not epistemically accessible for any agent. Some
such worlds represent blatant contradictions, like representing some
A as being both true and false. On the account of logical information
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we offer in §9.5, such worlds are deeply epistemically impossible.
No such world is accessible to any possible agent. The details of the
view will have to wait until §9.5. But we can already anticipate that,
in just the same way, worlds which represent some a as not being
self-identical are deeply epistemically impossible. So, although there
are sets of worlds which represent that a ≠ a, no such set of worlds
is an epistemic content.
To be informative, a statement ‘A’ must be capable of being
disbelieved. It must be possible for an agent to believe that A, or
to believe that ¬A instead. But since a ≠ a cannot be believed (on the
account we’re suggesting), it follows that a = a is treated correctly as
an uninformative identity.
9.4 Informative Inference
This section draws on Jago (2013b). Deductive reasoning is essential
to philosophy, mathematics, and logic. In those areas and others, its
use is beyond question, and this must be so, at least in part, because
of information it conveys. But how can deduction carry information,
if, in some sense, the premises already guarantee the conclusion? In
‘The Justification of Deduction’, Dummett (1978a, 297) asks how
deduction can be both justified and useful. If it is justified, it must
be guaranteed to preserve truth from premises to conclusion. To be
useful, it must inform us of something.
How, wonders Dummett, can the move from premises to conclu-
sion be informative, if the former already guarantee the latter? It is ‘a
delicate matter so to describe the connection between premisses and
conclusion as to display clearly the way in which both requirements
[justification and usefulness] are fulfilled’ (Dummett 1978a, 297).The
task is to capture this notion of information content whilst respecting
the fact that the content of the premises, if true, already secures the
truth of the conclusion.
We might think of the information content of a valid deduction
Γ ⊢ A, from premises Γ to conclusion A, in terms of the differences
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an agent’s belief state might undergo in performing that deduction.
We can consider an agent who initially believes the premises but not
the conclusion, and who ends up believing the conclusion (on the
basis of the deduction she performs). Alternatively, we can think in
terms of an agent discovering the incompatibility of the premises
Γ with the conclusion’s falsity. Either way, we are analysing some
relationship between the content of the premises and the content of
the conclusion.
Let’s use the notion ‘|A|’ to denote the set of worlds (possible or
impossible) which represent that A. For sets of sentences Γ, we’ll use
‘|Γ|’ to denote the set of worlds which represent that B, for each B ∈ Γ.
Our approach throughout this book has been to analyse notions of
content in terms of possible and impossible worlds. In our present
setting, the worlds in question have to outrun the logically possible
ones. For suppose we limit each set |A| to the possible worlds. Then
if Γ entails A, |Γ| already includes |A|, and so already excludes A’s
being false. So, however we analyse the relationship between premise
and conclusion contents, we will be working with sets that include
logically impossible worlds. As a minimal requirement, what they
represent must not be closed under classical logical consequence.
A popular place to look for such worlds is the model theory of
paraconsistent and paracomplete logics, which we encountered in
§5.4 in the guise of FDE worlds. At an FDE world, a sentence may
be true, false, both, or neither. This is accomplished by replacing
the usual valuation function with a relation, 𝜌, which may relate a
sentence to 1 or 0, to both, or to neither.
Let’s take the content of premises and conclusion to be given in
terms of such worlds.Our first notion of content of an inference Γ ⊢ A
focuses on the difference between the premises without the conclusion
and the premises with the conclusion. This amounts to those worlds
according to which the premises are true, but the conclusion is not:
|Γ| − |A|. Call this content1. Our second notion analyses the content
of Γ ⊢ A in terms of those worlds where the premises are true but the
conclusion is false. In FDE worlds, A is false iff ¬A is true, and so this
notion of content amounts to |Γ| ∩ |¬A|. Call this notion content2.
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These notions are classically equivalent but differ in our paracon-
sistent and paracomplete FDE setting, since, as we saw in §5.4, being
false and failing to be true come apart at FDE worlds.We shall say
that an inference is trivial1 (or trivial2) just in case its content1 (or
content2) is the empty set. We’ll use ‘non-trivial1/2’ and ‘contentful1/2’
interchangeably, and we’ll reserve ‘trivial’, without a subscript, to
capture the non-technical sense in which inferences like A ⊢ A (but
not all valid inferences) seem obvious and uninformative.
FDE models are not in general closed under modus ponens for
the material conditional ⊃: there are worlds w where both A ⊃ B
and A are true, but B is not: 𝜌w(A ⊃ B)1 and 𝜌wA1 but not 𝜌wB1. So
|{A ⊃ B,A}| − |B| is non-empty: modus ponens on ⊃ is non-trivial1.
Similarly, it is non-trivial2, since there are worldswwhere both A ⊃ B
and A are true, but B is false: 𝜌w(A ⊃ B)1, 𝜌wA1 and 𝜌wB0.
On this picture, not all valid deductions come out as being
contentful1. The deduction A,B ⊢ A ∧ B remains trivial1, since any
FDE world verifying A and B individually also verifies A ∧ B, and
so |{A,B}| − |A ∧ B| is empty. Indeed, any classically valid inference
whose only connectives are ‘∧’ and ‘∨’ will be deemed trivial1, on this
view. This is a puzzling feature for an account of content. Modus
ponens and Conjunction Elimination (for example) do not seem to
be wholly different kinds of inference rule. If one is deemed trivial,
then why not the other?
By contrast, every valid inference is deemed contentful2. In FDE
worlds, the conclusion may be both true and false. So even where the
premises guarantee the truth of the conclusion in our FDE setting,
they do not thereby rule out its falsity. Even the most seemingly
trivial inference of all, A ⊢ A, is deemed contentful2. Its content2 is
|A| ∩ |¬A|, which is the set of all worlds w where A is both true and
false: 𝜌wA1 and 𝜌wA0. This is an even worse consequence than the
results for content1. Surely some inferences are so trivial as to contain
no information whatsoever. If A ⊢ A is deemed informative, then we
seem to have a worthless notion of information.
There is a deeper problem with the FDE worlds approach: it fails
to explain why the worlds it provides are suitable tools for analysing
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epistemic notions of content and information. It is a consequence of
the account that both the content1 and content2 of a valid deduction
Γ ⊢ A can contain only glutty worlds, which assign both 0 and 1
to some sentence. To see why, assume that Γ ⊢ A. Then for any
consistent assignment 𝜌w on which 𝜌wB1 for each B ∈ Γ, 𝜌wA1 too,
and hence (given consistency) not 𝜌w¬A1. But then w ∉ (|Γ| − |A|)
and w ∉ (|Γ| ∩ |¬A|). So each notion of content can contain only
explicitly contradictory worlds, at which some A is both true and
false.
The problem is that it is hard to see why such explicitly contradic-
tory worlds should play a role in an epistemic notion of content. If
what a world represents is obviously impossible to any agent who
meets minimal standards of rationality, then there’s no sense in which
ruling out that world corresponds to gaining new information.
This is the very feature which makes our problem difficult. If we
are to model the content of a valid deduction as a set of worlds, then
we have to admit impossible worlds. But obviously impossible worlds,
representing explicit contradictions, cannot feature in any account
of rational attitudes. And on the FDE-worlds account of deductive
content, the obviously impossible worlds are all we’re left with. In
short, our question is difficult because it requires us to find worlds
which are impossible, but not obviously so.
Our problem, therefore, is not merely to find worlds not closed
under classical consequence. The problem is to provide a notion of a
world which is logically impossible, but not obviously so. Lewis (in
arguing against paraconsistent logic) puts the point nicely:
I’m increasingly convinced that I can and do reason about
impossible situations. … But I don’t really understand how
that works. Paraconsistent logic … allows (a limited amount
of) reasoning about blatantly impossible situations. Whereas
what I find myself doing is reasoning about subtly impossible
situations, and rejecting suppositions that lead fairly to blatant
impossibilities. (Lewis 2004, 176)
On Lewis’s analysis, ‘make-believedly possible impossibilities’ might
well have a use in the analysis of content, but:
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The trouble is that all these uses seem to require a distinction
between the subtle ones and the blatant ones (very likely context-
dependent, very likely a matter of degree) and that’s just what I
don’t understand. (Lewis 2004, 177)
Hintikka (1975), whilst addressing the logical omniscience problem
head-on, makes a similar point (see §5.3). He argues that, for
epistemic purposes, impossible worlds must be ‘subtly inconsistent’
worlds which ‘look possible but which contain hidden contradictions’
(Hintikka 1975, 476–8). The core problem with FDE worlds (and
will all similar approaches) is that they are either logically possible,
or blatantly impossible.
How can we make sense of a world being subtly impossible? We
present one attempt in the next section.
9.5 Vague Logical Information
Jago (2013b, 2014a) argues that we should view the problem of
informative inference as an instance of the problem of vagueness. It
seems that the deductive moves from A ∧B to A, or from A→ B and
A to B, are uninformative. All such moves seem utterly trivial. The
problem then is that any deductive inference can be reconstructed
by chaining together enough of these seemingly trivial inferences. If
each step is trivial and uninformative, then we seem committed to
saying that the entire deductive inference is trivial and uninformative.
Yet some deductive inferences are not trivial, and can be informative.
Something is amiss here. Dummett makes a similar point:
When we contemplate the simplest basic forms of inference,
the gap between recognising the truth of the premisses and
recognising that of the conclusion seems infinitesimal; but, when
we contemplate the wealth and complexity of number-theoretic
theorems which, by chains of such inferences, can be proved
… we are struck by the difficulty of establishing them and the
surprises they yield. (Dummett 1978a, 297)
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According to Jago (2013b), the problem has the structure of a
sorites series. Suppose you’ve just marked 100 student essays and, as
it happens, each got a different percentage mark from all the others.
(So, each positive integer up to 100 is the grade of exactly one of the
essays.) The top-marked ones were great. The lowest marked ones
were pretty awful. But it’s hard to say precisely which ones were good,
which ones not good. Is it that all and only those with a mark over
40%, or 55%, or 68%, were the good ones? If so, what about the
essay which scored 40% (or 55%, or 68%)? Was it so much worse
that the essay which scored just 1% more? Surely not!
It seems absurd to pronounce for sure that only those essays scoring
over (say) 55%were any good. Since there’s no appreciable difference
in quality between each percentage point, it seems that, if we judge
any essay to be good, we should also judge the one scoring just 1%
less to be good, too. But, as the 100% essay is clearly good, we are
then at risk of judging, incorrectly, that all are good. The puzzle is to
make sense of truth and inference in a vague language, so that not
every essay is counted as being good.
Similarly, the task in the case of deduction is to make sense of a
notion of content such that some, but not all, valid deductions are
informative. And just as in the case of the essays, we have to do this
without drawing an artificially sharp line between those deductions
that are informative and those that are not. On this way of thinking
about things, the normative notion of logical content is a vague
notion, because chains of seemingly uninformative inferences can
give rise to informative deductions.
Saying that the content of logical inferences may be indeterminate
is not to provide a solution to these issues, however. It is merely to
indicate that the problem has a certain form, one which we meet in
other cases of vague predicates. Nor is this to say that we can pass
the buck, by placing the problem of logical information at the feet
of those working on theories vagueness in general. A philosophical
theory of vagueness, as commonly understood, is a theory of how
vagueness arises (is it metaphysical? semantic? epistemic?) together
with an account of how vague predicates work. If we agree that
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the language of logical information, content, and inference can be
vague, then a full solution will certainly need to appeal to a general
philosophical theory of vagueness. But a full solution to our present
problem requires more than this.
A solution to our problem should consist in a model of logical
information which explains why we find trivial inferences utterly
uninformative, yet capable of being chained together into informative
deductions. Let’s consider further the analogy with more common
cases of vagueness. In a deduction-sorites, each inference rule may
be associated with a tolerance principle, saying that if such-and-such
deduction is uninformative, then so is the one extended in such-and-
such way.
If we have a trivial derivation of A from premises Γ, for example,
then the tolerance principle associated with Disjunction Introduction
says we also have a trivial derivation of A∨B from Γ. If we write the
relationship of trivial derivation as ‘⊢triv’, then this tolerance principle
can be written:
Γ ⊢triv A
Γ ⊢triv A ∨ B
There are similar tolerance principles for each connective, covering
both appearances of the connective on the right-hand side (as the
conclusion) and on the left-hand side (in the premises).
Together, these principles give us a proof system for ⊢triv, which
coincides with the underlying derivability relation. In other words,
Γ ⊢triv A iff Γ ⊢ A: all derivations are trivial! Since that’s clearly
wrong, at least some of these tolerance principles (expressed as proof
rules) are incorrect. Logic dictates that a solution must reject the
tolerance principle for at least one connective in each functionally
complete set (such as {¬, ∧}, {¬, ∨}, and {→,⊥}). If we did not, we
could infer that all derivations are uninformative. So one option may
be to reject the tolerance principles for some (e.g., ¬ and →) but not
all connectives.
We claimed in Jago (2014b), however, that all of these tolerance
principles should be rejected. The argument is that the inference
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rules for ‘∧’ and ‘∨’ stand to the meaning of those concepts just as
the inference rules for ‘→’ stand to its meaning. (That is not to say
that those rules constitute those meanings, but merely that there is a
clear relationship between meaning and inference rules.) So, if the
meaning of ‘→’ does not guarantee that uses of modus ponens are
uninformative, then neither can the meanings of ‘∧’ and ‘∨’ guarantee
that inferences involving ‘∧’ and ‘∨’ are uninformative. But what could
guarantee that a given kind of inference is always uninformative, if
not the meanings of the logical terms involved?
That, in short, is the case for thinking that each of these tolerance
principles should be rejected. As a consequence, any inference (other
than from a sentence to the very same sentence) might be informative.
But it does not follow from this that all inferences are informative. As
in the case of other tolerance principles, it is likely that most instances
are true, even though the universal generalization is false.
To solve paradoxes involving vagueness, it is not enough merely
to reject tolerance principles. One has to explain why they seem
so tempting in the first place. (And in deduction-sorites cases, it
seems, the tolerance principles are especially beguiling.) In general,
we might hold that tolerance principles are false but with a very high
degree of truth; or that they are false but any counter-instances are
unknowable, and hence unassertable; or that counter-instances shift
from precisification to precisification, and so cannot determinately
be recognized. Whichever explanation we use, a structure is required
which preserves what Fine (1975b) calls the penumbral connections.
In our case, if an inference is determinately informative, then any
inference which includes it is also determinately informative. (And
hence, if an inference is determinately uninformative, then any
inference which it includes is also determinately uninformative.)
Jago’s (2013b, 2014a, 2014b) models use proof rules as links
between worlds, rather than as closure principles on worlds. To
simplify somewhat: a proof rule directly connects a world where all
the premises but not the conclusion is true to a world that’s exactly
the same, except that the conclusion is true too, according to that
world. This connection is directed, from the ‘premise’ world to the
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‘conclusion’ world. Rules with two premises connect two premise
worlds to a conclusion world. (Since the worlds in question cannot
be logically closed, they are all impossible worlds. But they need not
be inconsistent: they could be consistent but incomplete.)
If our proof rules are taken from the sequent calculus, then there’s
a very direct relationship between proof rules and world-connections.
To each world w we can associate two sets of sentences, |w|+ and
|w|−: those that are true, according to w and those that are false,
according to w, respectively. Then each sequent rule of the form
Γ1 ⊢ Δ1
Γ2 ⊢ Δ2
generates a connection from w2 to w1 when |w1|
+ = Γ1 ∪Γ2, |w1|
− =
Δ1 ∪Δ2, |w2|
+ = Γ2, and |w2|
− = Δ2. (Note how the connection goes
from lower to upper sequent, for this is how, in practice, sequent
proofs are constructed.) Rules with two upper sequents generate two
of these connections (from the lower to each of the upper sequents).
Chaining these connections together gives a connected graph on
worlds. That total graph is a tree (that is, a connected, acyclic graph,
so that any two worlds are connected by exactly one path). Some
of its subtrees (those parts of the whole graph that are themselves
trees) correspond to proofs. That happens for a subtree T when three
conditions are met:
(9.1) For each leaf-world w (the world found at the end of some
branch) of T, |w|+ and |w|− overlap (so that some A is a
member of both);
(9.2) Every non-leaf node of T has at most two edges leading away
from it; and
(9.3) There are edges ⟨⟨w1,w3⟩⟩ and ⟨⟨w2,w3⟩⟩ in T only if the proof
system contains a rule-instance:
|w1|
+ ⊢ |w1|
− |w2|
+ ⊢ |w2|
−
|w3|
+ ⊢ |w3|
−
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These subtrees are world proofs. In effect, they uncover any hidden
contradictions in an inconsistent and incomplete world, by connecting
it to blatantly inconsistent worlds, according to which some A is both
true and false. Such blatantly inconsistent worlds aren’t epistemically
possible for any agent, and so can’t play a role in our notion of
epistemic content. But other inconsistent worlds may do so, if their
inconsistencies are buried deeply enough. (This raises an important
worry: don’t some people, rightly or wrongly, believe contradictions?
We’ll defer our discussion until §10.6.)
Our proposed epistemic possibility condition goes like this:
(EP) World w is epistemically possible just in case w isn’t the root
of any small world-proof.
This is an absolute notion of epistemic (im)possibility. If w is the root
of any small world-proof, then it is deeply epistemically impossible,
and not just epistemically impossible for some agent or other. Deep
epistemic impossibilities are not eligible for playing a role in epistemic
notions of content, and so cannot figure in our account of the content
of a deduction. All the worlds not ruled out by this criterion are
deeply epistemically possible, and together constitute epistemic space.
(We’ll discuss epistemic space in more detail in §10.3 and §10.4.)
‘Small’ is a vague concept. That is ultimately where vagueness
enters our account of information content. If it is indeterminate
whether w is the root of some small world-proof, then it is inde-
terminate whether w is an epistemically possible world, and hence
indeterminate whether w may play a role in any content. If A is true
according to w, then it will be indeterminate whether w is a member
of A’s content.
Let’s see how this is supposed to help with the problems of logical
information and informative inference. In Jago 2013b, the content of
A is analysed as a pair of sets of worlds: those according to which A
is true, |A|+, and those according to which A is false, |A|−. Call these
sets the positive and negative contents of A (so that a content as a
whole is a pair of a positive and a negative content). For sets Γ, we
have:
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|Γ|+ = ⋂
A∈Γ
|A|+ |Γ|− = ⋃
A∈Γ
|A|−
And finally, the content of a deduction from premises Γ to conclusion
A is defined as the set of all epistemically possible worlds according
to which Γ is true but A is false: |Γ|+ ∩ |A|−.
As a consequence, the clear cases of trivial inference all come out
as contentless and hence uninformative. Take modus ponens, from
A → B and A to B. Its content is defined as |A → B|+ ∩ |A|+ ∩ |B|−.
Suppose this set contains a world w. Then by definition, there are
sets of sentences Γ and Δ such that |w|+ = Γ ∪ {A → B,A} and
|w|− = Δ∪{B}. The sequent rule for→ (on the left) has this instance:
Γ,A ⊢ A,B, Δ Γ,A,B ⊢ B, Δ
Γ,A→ B,A ⊢ B, Δ
and so w is the root of a world-proof:
w
w2w1
where |w1|
+ = Γ ∪ {A}, |w1|
− = Δ ∪ {A,B}, |w2|
+ = Γ ∪ {A,B}, and
|w2|
− = Δ ∪ {B}. This is a world-proof (and not merely a world-
graph) because it is a tree, with leaf-worlds w1 and w2, in which |w1|
+
overlaps |w1|
− (they share A) and |w2|
+ overlaps |w2|
− (they share
B).
This world-proof is small (by any reasonable standard of proof
size). So by definition, w is not an epistemically possible world, and
hence is not a member of any sentence’s content. It follows that w
it cannot be a member of the content of any inference, contrary to
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our original assumption. So |A → B|+ ∩ |A|+ ∩ |B|− is empty, and
modus ponens is correctly deemed an uninformative inference by
our approach. Similar reasoning applies to other clear cases of trivial
inferences.
Yet not all valid deductions are deemed empty on this approach.
For large n, the deduction
p1,p1 → p2,p2 → p3,… , pn → pn+1 ⊢ pn+1
is contentful. Its content consists of epistemically possible worlds
according to which p1 and each pi → pi+1 (i < n) are true but pn
is false. There are infinitely many worlds w for which the shortest
world-proof withw at its root corresponds to n−1 applications of the
rule for ‘→’ on the left. (To see this, just consider a world according to
which nothing else is true or false, and then consider all the consistent
ways of extending w.) Since by assumption n is large, all such worlds
count as epistemically possible, and so the inference is contentful.
We can then formalize the notion of trivial inference by taking an
inference to be non-trivial just in case it is contentful, in the above
sense. Then a valid inference from Γ to A will be non-trivial just
in case there is some epistemic possibility according to which the
premises are true but the conclusion is false. So an inference is trivial
just in case every epistemic possibility which represents the premises
as being true does not also represent the conclusion as being false.
We will write ‘triv(Γ,A)’ for ‘the inference from Γ to A is trivial’.
To formalize the idea, we will need to be precise about which worlds
count as epistemic possibilities. The simplest way to do this is to fix,
artificially, precisely which world proofs are to count as the small
ones. Following Jago (2014b), we pick an integer n, and say that all
world proofs of size m ≤ n are small. Then, relative to our chosen
n, we can say precisely which worlds are epistemically possible, and
hence which inferences are trivial. We’ll then write ‘trivn(Γ,A)’ for
‘relative to our chosen n, the inference from Γ to A is trivial’.
Now for the formal details. We use the standard propositional
language ℒ from before, with each connective ¬, ∧, ∨, →, and ↔ as
a primitive (undefined) symbol.
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Definition 9.1 (Models) A model is a tuple M = ⟨⟨W ,N, 𝜌⟩⟩, where
W is a set of worlds, N ⊆W is the subset of normal worlds, and 𝜌
is a valuation relation (as in §5.4), relating (i) each atomic sentence
to exactly one truth-value at worlds in N and (ii) each sentence to
zero, one, or two truth-values at worlds inW −N. A pointed model
is a pair, ⟨⟨M,w⟩⟩ where w is a world inM. We abbreviate ⟨⟨M,w⟩⟩ to
Mw.
We then extend 𝜌 to all sentences at worlds in N via the standard
recursive clauses, as in §5.4. Then for worlds w ∈ N, 𝜌wA1 iff not
𝜌wA0, whereas for w ∈W −N, 𝜌w behaves arbitrarily.
Definition 9.2 (Rank) Given a model M = ⟨⟨W ,N, 𝜌⟩⟩ and a world
w ∈W, we define w’s rank, #w, as the size (number of nodes) in the
smallest world-proof rooted at w, if there is one, and 𝜔 otherwise.
The rank of modelM is min{#w ∣ w ∈W}.
Intuitively, a model counts as an epistemic space when its rank is
not small. If we select n as our artificial precisification of ‘small world
proof’, then only models of rank r > n count as epistemic spaces.
Definition 9.3 (Trivial consequence) For any n ∈ ℤ+ ∪ {𝜔}, A is an
n-trivial consequence of Γ, trivn(Γ,A), if and only if, for all pointed
modelsMw of rank r > n: 𝜌wB1 for each B ∈ Γ only if not-𝜌wA = 0.
As a definition of (a kind of) consequence, this definition is rather
unusual. This is because trivial consequence is not purely about truth-
preservation across all epistemic scenarios. In fact, no inference (other
than identity, A ⊢ A) is preserved across all epistemic scenarios.
Rather, a consequence counts as trivial in the current sense when
the truth of the premises guarantees avoidance of falsity for the
conclusion across all epistemic scenarios.
Because of this, trivn(Γ,A) behaves as a consequence relation in
some ways, but not in others, as the following results highlight. (For
proofs, see Jago 2014b.)
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Theorem 9.1 trivn has the following properties, for all n ≥ 1 ∈
ℤ+ ∪ {𝜔}:
(a) trivn ⊆ trivn+1: if trivn(Γ,A), then trivn+1(Γ,A).
(b) trivn is monotonic: if trivn(Γ,A) and Γ ⊆ Δ then trivn(Δ,A).
(c) trivn(Γ,A) only if Γ classically entails A.
(d) trivn is reﬂexive.
(e) triv0(Γ,A) if and only if A ∈ Γ.
(f) For n ≥ 1, trivn is non-transitive and does not satisfy cut: it
is not the case that if trivn(Γ,A) and trivn(Γ ∪ {A},B) then
trivn(Γ,B).
So long as n is not too small, the trivial consequences (so defined)
include all the inferences we usually call trivial. Table 9.1 gives some
examples, showing the minimal value of n for which trivn holds. It
is not the case that triv3({A ∨ B, ¬A},B) holds, for example. To see
why, consider a modelM containing a single world w ∈W −N such
that 𝜌w(A∨B)1, 𝜌w(¬A)1, and 𝜌wB0 (and that’s it for 𝜌). ThenM is of
rank 4 and represents the premises as being true, but the conclusion
as being false. That’s all we need for the inference not to be 3-trivial.
triv2({A ∧ B},A) triv3({A,B},A ∧ B)
triv2({A},A ∨ B) triv4({A ∨ B, ¬A},B)
triv3({A→ B,A},B) triv5({A→ B, ¬B}, ¬A)
triv7({¬(A ∧ B)}, ¬A ∨ ¬B) triv8({¬(A ∨ B)}, ¬A ∧ ¬B)
Table 9.1: Some trivial consequences
The notion of trivial inference is interesting in its own right, but it
also plays an important role in our account of fine-grained epistemic
and doxastic states. We’ll return to the idea in §10.5.
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9.6 What Is Said
We’ve been investigating the notion of informative logical reasoning.
This is one useful notion of content: the information contained
in a valid deduction. But it clearly isn’t the only useful notion of
information content. Here’s another: the information conveyed in
a speaker’s saying that such-and-such. This is the concept of what
is said in that utterance. There are good reasons for thinking that
this notion of content is distinct from the notion we’ve just been
discussing.
To get a handle on what we have in mind by ‘what is said’, consider
how:
If someone wants to say the same today as he expressed
yesterday using the word ‘today’, he must replace this word
with ‘yesterday’. … The case is the same with words like ‘here’
and ‘there’. (Frege 1956, 296)
Here, Frege is making the point that different words can be used to
say the same thing.We can ‘say the same thing’, but at different times,
by using ‘today’, ‘tomorrow’, ‘yesterday’, and so on, depending on
what day we speak. And by the same token, we can use the very same
form of words, in different contexts, to say different things. When
you utter the word ‘I’, you say something about yourself; but when
Franz or Mark uses ‘I’, they say something about Franz or Mark.
This all goes to show that the concept we have in mind, what is
said, should not be conflated with utterances (or sentence tokens),
nor with sentence types. What a speaker says is distinct from the
words she utters. We use the concept of what is said in the sense of
what is communicated in making a particular utterance, as opposed
to the particular way in which that content is communicated.
Saying the same thing by uttering different sentences is not a
phenomenon specific to indexicals (such as ‘here’ and ‘now’) or
to other context-sensitive words. Even with all contextual factors
accounted for, we can still say the same thing in different ways. Just
consider:
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(9.4a) It’s sunny and hot today.
(9.4b) It’s hot and sunny today.
Suppose Anna and Bec utter these in a conversation on the same
day, in the same place (and with the same conversational standards
for ‘sunny’ and ‘warm’ in play). Intuitively, it seems they are saying
the same thing as one another. It would be bizarre to interpret Bec
as disagreeing with Anna. Try this. Imagine Bec had instead replied
with, ‘no, actually it’s warm and sunny today’. That response would
be so bizarre, we would have to interpret her meaning using other
conversational clues: perhaps as wanting to emphasize the day’s
warmth. Either way, Bec says the same thing as Anna.
This is a purely logical case of same-saying. Anna and Bec say the
same thing because they use ‘and’ to connect two predicates, and (we
suggest) the order in which terms flank ‘and’ doesn’t affect what is
said.We’ll offer more examples like this in a moment. The immediate
point here is that same-saying is not a phenomenon generated only
by context-sensitive terms (as the initial quote from Frege may have
suggested).
Note that the correct explanation is not that speakers of (9.4a)
and (9.4b) say the same thing because those sentences are logically
equivalent.This explanation would have it that all logically equivalent
utterances say the same thing as one another. But this is not the case,
as the following example shows:
(9.5) The Liar is both true and false.
(9.6) Claims about large cardinal numbers are neither true nor false.
These utterances do not say the same thing, even though they are
(classically) equivalent. It may be that (9.5)’s speaker is a dialethist,
such as Priest (1979, 1987), who diverges from classical logic in
rejecting the Explosion Principle (that contradictions entail arbitrary
conclusions), whereas (9.6)’s speaker is a mathematical intuitionist,
such as Dummett (1978b, 1993b), who rejects Excluded Middle.
208 information and content
Each of these philosophical positions is completely different from the
other. It is absurd to think that, in stating their different philosophical
positions, they say the same thing as one another. So it is not the
case that, in uttering any two classically equivalent sentences, the
speakers thereby say the same thing as one another.What is said is a
hyperintensional notion of content.
Yet, as we saw with the example pair (9.4a) and (9.4b), the
‘anything goes’ approach to content we mentioned in §8.4 doesn’t
give an appropriate analysis of same-saying. Some logical relations
(including the one relating A∧B to B∧A) preserve same-saying. Here
are two further pairs in which, we think, an utterance of (a) says the
same as an utterance of (b):
(9.7a) Anna or Bec will pass, and Cath will pass too.
(9.7b) Either Anna and Cath will pass, or else Bec and Cath will.
(9.8a) Either Cath doesn’t like Dave or she doesn’t like Ed.
(9.8b) Cath doesn’t like both Dave and Ed.
These strike us as clear examples of same-saying. These same-
saying pairs suggest that commutativity for ‘and’, distributivity of ‘or’
over ‘and’, and the De Morgan equivalences, are all operations which
preserve same-saying. Replacing ‘and’ with ‘or’ in (9.4) also seems
to preserve same-saying, so we may add to the list commutativity
for ‘or’. And associativity for both ‘and’ and ‘or’ seems obviously to
preserve same-saying.
The following pair is perhaps more contentious:
(9.9a) Valeria is happy.
(9.9b) It is not the case that Valeria isn’t happy.
We think an utterance of either says the same as the other. Intuitionists
will disagree (at least for certain cases involving double-negations).
And to be sure, there may a difference in the meaning conveyed in
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English between ‘Valeria is happy’ and ‘Valeria is not unhappy’. But
the difference is a shade of meaning, not a difference in literal content;
and anyway, we don’t find this difference present when using ‘it is
not the case that’, as in (9.9b). So, we say, introducing or eliminating
double negations preserves what is said.
We may think of these transformations algebraically, in terms of
operations ⋏, ⋎, and − on contents. Then we can write our principles
as identities between same-saying contents: c1⋏c2 = c2⋏c1,−(c1⋏c2) =
−c1 ⋎ −c2, −−c = c, and so on. The examples suggest that we have a
De Morgan algebra: a bounded distributive lattice, with top element
W (the set of all worlds) and bottom element ∅, where − is an
involution which obeys the De Morgan laws (see, e.g., Balbes and
Dwinger 1975). But we don’t have a full Boolean algebra, since we
don’t in general have c ⋎ −c =W or −(c ⋏ −c) = ∅.
We can then use what we know of such structures to generate
further predictions about same-saying. One is that both ⋏ and ⋎ are
idempotent: c ⋏ c = c ⋎ c = c. And this seems intuitively right to us:
(9.10a) Valeria is happy.
(9.10b) Valeria is happy and Valeria is happy.
(9.10c) Valeria is happy or Valeria is happy.
all seem to say the same thing as each other (although the use of
(b) and (c) would call for a rather strange context, and so may
pragmatically convey more than an utterance of (a) alone).
Another consequence of this approach is that c1 ⋏ (c1 ⋎ c2) =
c1 ⋎ (c1 ⋏ c2) = c1, and so it predicts that each of
(9.11a) Bertie is snuffling, and either he’s snuffling or Lenny is
barking.
(9.11b) Either Bertie is snuffling, or he’s snuffling and Lenny is
barking.
(9.11c) Bertie is snuffling.
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says the same as the others. But this strikes us as a poor prediction:
(9.11a) and (9.11b) both say something about both Bertie and Lenny,
whereas (9.11c) says something about Bertie only. So, it seems, (9.11c)
can’t say the same thing as the others. If that’s right, then the algebra
in question is weaker than a distributive lattice.
Now let’s bring the discussion back to impossible worlds. If we
are to understand these same-saying contents as sets of worlds, then
we must restrict the worlds in question to those that obey these
operations. If A∧B is true according to one of the worlds in question,
then B ∧ A must be too (and so on for all the other principles just
discussed). To put things another way, the logic generated by the
algebra in question gives us closure conditions on worlds. Worlds
which do not meet those closure conditions are not eligible for
inclusion in same-saying contents. Those worlds still exist; it’s just
that we ignore them when we theorize about same-saying.Whatever
we deem the right algebra for same-saying contents, we can model it
using fine-grained worlds.
There is an objection to this approach, however. It seems that the
notion of a world, in and of itself, is doing little theoretical work in
this approach. All the work is done by selecting the right algebra. For
given that algebra, it doesn’t really matter what kind of entity the c1s
and c2s are. Formally, they could be sets of root vegetables, and the
approach would work just as well as if they were sets of worlds.
The objection then continues: surely a better approach is to select
some kind of conceptual tool which generates the appropriate algebra,
rather than being generated by it? Jago 2018b presents an alternative
approach, on which same-saying contents are sets of truthmakers.
Then two utterances say the same as each other just in case whatever
would make one true would also make the other true, too. On
that approach, the logic of same-saying equates to strict truthmaker
equivalence (Fine and Jago forthcoming). This generates all the same-
saying equivalences we viewed positively above, but does not imply
that either A ∧ (A ∨ B) or A ∨ (A ∧ B) says the same as A.
We can always mimic this approach using impossible worlds, by fo-
cusing on only those worlds which are closed under strict truthmaker
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equivalence. The objection, however, is that understanding contents
in terms of truthmakers generates the right results automatically,
without having to impose further restrictions (in the form of closure
conditions) on worlds. In that sense, it might be said to afford us a
better understanding of same-saying.
We’ll consider two responses on behalf of the impossible worlds
approach. The first claims that the truthmaker approach doesn’t
(clearly) give the best results after all. In strict truthmaker logic,
(A ∨ B) ∧ (A ∨ C) does not entail A ∨ (B ∧ C), and so distribution of
∨ over ∧ is not an equivalence. Yet utterances of the following pair
seem to say the same as one other:
(9.12a) Either Anna will pass, or both Bec and Cath will pass
(9.12b) Anna or Bec will pass; and also, Anna or Cath will pass.
We’ll grant that it’s hard to come to a clear view on this. But if we
agree that they do say the same thing, it follows that strict truthmaker
equivalence isn’t the logic of same-saying.
The second is a metaphysical response. Contents exist, and hence
we may existentially quantify over the constituents of those contents.
If those constituents include possible states of affairs, then we seem to
be saying that merely possible states of affairs genuinely exist. (This is
the stance of the genuine realist about merely possible worlds, applied
to states of affairs.) This cannot be right. If Franz is in Amsterdam,
he’s not in Italy. Both states of affairs are possible, but at most one
exists. If both existed, then Franz would be both fully in Amsterdam
and fully elsewhere.That’s impossible.We shouldn’t accept a semantic
theory which requires reality to be like that. There are a number of
responses available. One could go in for ersatz states of affairs, or
non-obtaining states of affairs, or non-existent states of affairs. But
all of these face issues of their own. (See Jago 2018b for an in-depth
discussion of the options.)
A positive reason for analysing same-saying contents in terms
of possible and impossible worlds, rather than in terms of possible
states of affairs, is that it will then integrate well with other notions
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of content (such as the information contents of §9.5 and doxastic
contents of §10.5). All such contents are defined on the domain of
worlds. This allows us to speak of one content including, overlapping,
or being disjoint from another, even when they are different kinds
of content (informational and same-saying, say). This is important
when we want to investigate, say, how the content of what a trusted
speaker says affects what their hearer thereby comes to believe.
Chapter Summary
We conceptualize information in terms of ruling out scenarios (§9.2).
We discussed informative identity statements, which give rise to
Frege’s puzzle (§9.3), and the problem understanding how a valid
logical inference can be informative (§9.4). We gave an analysis of
informative logical inferences in §9.5, on which the content of a
valid deduction is often indeterminate. A consequence is that it is
indeterminate exactly which logical inferences are informative.We
then analysed a rather different notion of content, concerning what
is said by a speaker in making an utterance (§9.6).
10
Epistemic and Doxastic
Contents
10.1 Belief States
Analyses of belief often focus primarily on individual beliefs, analysed
as a relation between an agent and a sentence or proposition. But this
isn’t the only approach. One may, instead, focus on the agent’s total
belief state. That approach is appealing if we follow Dennett (1987)
and Stalnaker (1984) in analysing belief as a dispositional, functional
state, essentially tied to action. Recall (§8.2) Stalnaker’s idea that
Representational mental states should be understood primarily
in terms of the role that they play in the characterization
and explanation of action. … Our conceptions of belief are
conceptions of states which explain why a rational agent does
what he does. (Stalnaker 1984, 4)
An agent who is disposed to act in certain ways in a range of
possible circumstances thereby has certain beliefs and desires. Being
so disposed to act is precisely what it is to have those beliefs and
desires, on this view. But we can’t assign belief-desire pairs on the basis
of single actions. There’s any number of belief-desire explanations
of Anna’s taking an umbrella this morning. (Does she want to avoid
getting wet? Does she want a makeshift weapon to hand? Does she
merely like the look of carrying an umbrella, whatever the weather?)
When we factor in the agent’s overall pattern of behaviour, by
contrast, we can attempt a general rational explanation by ascribing
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beliefs and desires. The important point here, for present purposes, is
that belief is ascribed holistically, as part of a rational explanation of
the agent’s behaviour. So a philosophical explanation of belief should
begin with holistic belief states. Individual beliefs are found further
downstream.
The worlds approach model of belief (which we met in §1.2 and
Chapter 5) naturally gives us an analysis of a total belief state, in
the first instance. An agent’s total belief state can be conceptualized,
at a high level of abstraction, as a function on circumstances. The
function categorizes those circumstances, depending on whether
the agent can rule out a given circumstance. A state of complete
ignorance corresponds to a function which, like a huge shrug of the
shoulders, rules no circumstance out. Acquiring some information
(or at least, what the agent takes to be information) corresponds to
ruling out some of these potential circumstances. The agent’s state is
effectively saying, things aren’t like that. (This way of thinking about
things naturally ties in with the worlds approach to information from
Chapter 9.We’ll say more about the relationship in §10.5.)
This is a very general approach to thinking about representational
states, and we can use it to conceptualize both knowledge and belief.
Let’s revisit our weather example from §9.2, in which we discussed
the Bar-Hillel-Carnap theory of semantic information (Bar-Hillel and
Carnap 1953). Suppose you consult the UK Met Office website and
discover that it often rains in Manchester, something you previously
didn’t know.You then form the belief that it often rains there and, let’s
suppose, this belief counts as knowledge. Prior to consulting the Met
Office, you had no idea about Manchester’s average rainfall. As far as
you were concerned, it might rain seldom there, as in Cambridge. But
now you know better: Manchester is much wetter than Cambridge.
In your previous state, scenarios in which Manchester’s climate is
drier than Cambridge’s were epistemic possibilities for you. If asked
whetherManchester is as those scenarios say it is, you might have said
‘it might be, for all I know’. This shrugging, non-committal attitude
towards a scenario is what we mean by saying that the scenario is
epistemically possible for you at that time. The epistemically possible
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scenarios are the ones that represent a way the world might well be,
for all you know.
Now that you know that it often rains in Manchester, however,
those scenarios in which Manchester is mostly dry are no longer epis-
temically possible for you. In gaining your new piece of knowledge,
you ruled out those scenarios as ways the world might be. Gaining
new knowledge goes hand in hand with ruling out various scenarios
as ways the world might be, as far as you’re concerned.
Bar-Hillel and Carnap (1953), Chalmers (2002a, 2010), Hintikka
(1962), Lewis (1975, 1986b), and Stalnaker (1976b, 1984) all
develop a variation on this basic idea. It forms the basis of the
Bar-Hillel-Carnap theory of semantic information (1953), on which
information is conceptualized in terms of excluding certain worlds.
Hintikka’s (1962) semantics for epistemic logic (§5.1) can be seen in a
similar light. Its crucial innovation was to add epistemic accessibility
relations to the space of worlds. These relativize the process of ruling
out worlds to specific worlds: the worlds are ruled out, from the
perspective of world w, may differ from the worlds ruled out from
the perspective of some other world w1. As we put things in §5.1: the
worlds accessible from w need not be those accessible from w1.
We analyse an agent’s total state of knowledge or belief, at worldw,
in terms of all worlds accessible from w. We can recapture individual
beliefs or bits of knowledge by looking at what those worlds represent
in common. Agent i believes that A (at w) when all worlds accessible
from w, for i, represent that A. One very happy aspect of the worlds
approach is the way the analyses of information and of belief (and
knowledge) interact. In Chapter 9, we conceptualized information in
terms of a partition on worlds, and we’ve just conceptualized belief
in terms of epistemic accessibility relations on worlds.
How do these two approaches interact? Gaining information leads
to new beliefs (and, in the right circumstances, to new knowledge).We
can conceptualize this dynamic process in terms of an update on the
agent’s epistemic accessibility relations.The content of a learned piece
of information restricts the agent’s accessibility relations to the worlds
contained in that content. The dynamics of information update and
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the subsequent effect on belief, which we briefly introduced in §5.5,
was studied by Baltag et al. (1998), Segerberg (1995), Van Benthem
(2011), Van Ditmarsch (2005), and Van Ditmarsch et al. (2008).
(Baltag and Renne (2016) give an overview of the field.)
What we want to bring out here is the deep connection between the
philosophical view of belief as a dispositional, functional state, and
the worlds semantics. In making the case for the semantics, we may
appeal to its usefulness in the sciences as well as to its philosophical
underpinning. Not many theories have it so good, and we shouldn’t
pass up on those benefits lightly.
10.2 The Impossible Worlds Approach
The main drawback when this approach to belief is presented in
terms of possible worlds is the logical omniscience problem, which we
discussed in some detail in §5.1. The objection hits the philosophical
analysis of belief states just as hard. By now, our response should be
no surprise: we suggest an analysis of belief (and knowledge) states
in terms of possible and impossible worlds. That is, we maintain the
analysis of belief (and knowledge) in terms of epistemically possible
scenarios, but we do not require that these be metaphysically or
logically possible. What seems possible, from the cognitively limited
perspective of a real-world agent, need not be metaphysically or even
logically possible. Epistemically accessible worlds must seem possible
to the agent in question but, as we discussed in §9.5, an impossible
world may well seem possible.
On reflection, there’s nothing in the philosophical motivation for
the dispositional, functional account of belief states which rules out
this impossible worlds approach. On Stalnaker’s view, we analyse
belief states ultimately in terms of our conception of rational action,
where:
What is essential to rational action is that the agent be
confronted, or conceive of himself as confronted, with a range
of alternative possible outcomes of some alternative possible
actions. (Stalnaker 1984, 4)
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Although ‘rational’ plays an essential role in Stalnaker’s explanation,
‘possible’ does not. All the work is done by ‘alternative outcomes’, so
long as we understand the range of alternatives in question in a broad
enough way. (We’ll discuss whether the impossible worlds approach
adequately captures the rational component in §10.3.)
We’re going to discuss two philosophical features of the impossible
worlds approach to belief states: what it says about Frege’s problem,
which we presented in §9.3, and what it says (or doesn’t say) about
scepticism.
In §9.3, we asked how it is that ‘James Newell Osterberg is Iggy
Pop’ is informative, when ‘Iggy Pop is Iggy Pop’ is not. There is an
analogous problem for belief and knowledge: how can one believe
(or know) that Iggy Pop has turned 70, without thereby believing
(or knowing) that Osterberg has turned 70? Since Osterberg is Iggy
Pop, why are we not entitled to replace ‘Iggy Pop’ with ‘Osterberg’,
inferring belief (or knowledge) that Osterberg has turned 70?
In general, Frege’s problem of belief concerns the failure of the
inference from ‘x believes that Fa’ and ‘a = b’ to ‘x believes that
Fb’. The problem is to account for the failure, within a semantically
plausible general theory.
The impossible worlds approach solves the problem smoothly. Sup-
pose that a is b. Then it’s necessary that a is b, and so metaphysically
impossible that a and b are distinct. Given Nolan’s Principle (or one of
the stronger principles) from §8.4, we infer that there are impossible
worlds according to which a isn’t b. We may then reasonably assume
that there is an impossible world w according to which a is F, but
which doesn’t say that b is F. (This is implied directly if we assume
either (8.6) or (NP+) from §8.4.) Then, by taking world w to be an
epistemic possibility, we can model agents as believing that Fa but
not that Fb. On this approach, the inference from ‘x believes that Fa’
and ‘a = b’ to ‘x believes that Fb’ fails.
This solution falls out of the impossible worlds approach in a
natural way. If an agent believes something under her a-concept, but
not under her b-concept, then it must be acceptable both to theorize
in terms of a-representations which are not b-representations, as in
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the case of our world w, and to take that world to be epistemically
accessible for that agent. For in general, we informally understand
‘epistemically accessible world’ in terms of what could be the case,
for all the agent knows. If she doesn’t know that a is b, then some
world according to which a isn’t b is accessible to her. The solution
falls out of our general understanding of epistemic accessibility.
Now let’s consider what consequences, if any, the impossible worlds
approach (as applied to knowledge) has for scepticism.You know that,
if you’re currently reading this book, then you’re not in some devilish
sceptical scenario. You’re not having some super-realistic dream
whilst really in bed, you haven’t been reduced to a brain hooked up
to a hallucination-machine by an evil scientist, or anything like that.
These are good things to know. But the antecedent is correspondingly
hard to know. For if you know that, then you know that you’re safe
from scepticism.
The key premise in this kind of reasoning, which went by without
much fanfare, is Closure under Known Implication, one version of
which we already met in §5.1 as closure condition (C6):
(C6) If an agent knows that A and knows that A implies B, then she
knows that B.
Those of a knowledge-positive disposition then reason by modus
ponens. You know you’re reading this book. So, you infer, you’re not
in a sceptical scenario. Scepticism is defeated! But this seems too easy.
How, given the mere possibility of sceptical scenarios, are you so
sure that you know you’re in fact reading this book? The knowledge-
negative alternative is to reason by modus tollens: since you don’t
know that you’re not in a sceptical scenario, you don’t know that
you’re currently reading this book. These alternatives, dogmatism via
modus ponens on (C6) or scepticism via modus tollens, seem equally
unattractive.
A third approach is to deny (C6). Then you seem to have the best
of both worlds: knowing that you’re reading this book, even though
you can’t in general rule out sceptical scenarios. Both Dretske (1970)
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and Nozick (1981) make this move. According to Dretske, Mark
knows he’s been writing with Franz, even though he can’t completely
rule out a (wildly implausible) alternative, featuring a convincing
Franz-impersonator, set on co-authoring a book about impossible
worlds. According to Nozick, Franz knows where his house keys are,
even though he can’t completely rule out the (wildly implausible)
scenario in which they’ve been stolen and replaced by useless replicas.
For Nozick, one’s belief (and for Dretske, one’s evidence) that A
must be sensitive in the proper way to the truth of A. They express
this idea counterfactually: had A been false, one would not have
believed (have had evidence for) A. Had Mark not been writing
with Franz, he wouldn’t have believed he was. (That’s true because
the counterfactual selects the closest antecedent worlds, and these
are worlds free of Franz-impersonators, in which Mark and Franz
never agree to write together. Franz-impersonators belong to distant
worlds.) In each case, (C6) fails. Good riddance, say Dretske and
Nozick.
An impossible worlds approach to knowledge can be a hostile
environment for closure principles on knowledge, including (C6).We
showed in Chapter 5 how impossible worlds can be put to use to
invalidate closure principles. All that’s needed for a closure principle
to fail is a single epistemically possible world in which the known
premises hold but the putatively known conclusion does not. In
particular, all that’s needed for (C6) to fail is a world not closed under
modus ponens to count as epistemically possible for some possible
agent.We argued in §8.2 that there are such epistemic possibilities,
and so we deny (C6). The stage seems set for us to add ‘solving
scepticism’ to our list of benefits of the impossible worlds approach.
That would be far too quick. Epistemic closure fails, we’ve argued,
because epistemic agents lack the cognitive resources to draw out
all consequences of what they know. Take our chess players from
§8.2. One player has a winning strategy available to her, yet doesn’t
know how best to proceed. That’s because working out the winning
strategy is just too complex. Compare this with a task the agent can
easily compute. Nothing we’ve said so far speaks to that case. We
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deny closure in hard cases, but this leaves open the possibility of
closure for easy cases.
Spelling out ‘closure for easy cases’ isn’t straightforward. Suppose
we did it as follows:
(10.1) If an agent knows that A and that A implies B, and there’s an
easy argument from ‘A’ to ‘B’, then she knows that B.
The problem here is that easiness isn’t transitive. There may be an
easy argument from A1 to A2, from A2 to A3, and so on, right through
to some An. Chaining all these arguments gives us an argument from
A1 to An; but this may not itself be an easy argument. But if easy
arguments bring closure in their wake, then so will the long, difficult
arguments we get by chaining them. Indeed, if we restrict ‘argument’
to ‘deductively valid argument’, every argument is a chain of easy
arguments, and so ‘easy’ closure entails full closure. So this attempt
to limit closure to ‘easy’ cases hasn’t got us anywhere.
Here’s a better way to capture a restricted version of closure:
(10.2) If an agent knows that A and that A → B, then she is in a
position to know that B. If she then competently deduces and
hence comes to believe that B on this basis (whilst retaining
what she knows), she thereby knows that B.
Hawthorne (2005, 29) and Williamson (2000, 117) endorse a similar
epistemic closure principle. We find this weak closure principle
plausible. It says that competent deduction preserves knowledge.
It’s hard to see how things could be otherwise. This principle, weak
as it is, is strong enough for scepticism to bite. For suppose you
competently deduce as above:
(10.3) I’m reading Impossible Worlds.
(10.4) If I’m reading Impossible Worlds, then I’m not in a sceptical
scenario.
(10.5) Therefore, I’m not in a sceptical scenario.
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Yet, it seems, you don’t know that conclusion. Then you can’t have
known both premises. But (10.4) is a priori and easily established; it’s
hard to see how you could fail to know it, given that (as a rational
person) you believe things to be so. Conclusion: you don’t know
(10.3). Scepticism prevails.
We’re not arguing for scepticism. We think we know stuff. Our
point is merely that the impossible worlds approach as such doesn’t
help with the deep philosophical issue of scepticism. Indeed, we’d be
dubious of any formal semantics that claimed to do better. Scepticism
is a deep philosophical problem, which requires a philosophical
solution.
10.3 The Problem of Bounded Rationality
Any attempt to deal with the knowledge and beliefs of rational
but non-ideal agents faces a deep problem. What must they know
(or believe), given what else they know (or believe)? This is the
issue of the granularity of epistemic and doxastic states, which we
encountered in §8.4. There, we argued that there are no non-trivial
closure conditions on epistemic states. So we reject closure conditions
(C1–C2) and (C4–C8) for knowledge, and (C1)–(C8) for belief. ((C3)
is valid for knowledge simply because knowledge is factive, which
guarantees that one cannot know contradictory things.) This ensures
that epistemically possible worlds include logically impossible worlds,
some of which are not closed under modus ponens.
We also accept a weak epistemic closure principle, (10.2). But
this in itself tells us nothing directly about the nature of epistemic
possible worlds. It tells us that certain agents are in a position to know
something, not that they do in fact know it. That’s compatible with
epistemically possible worlds obeying no purely epistemic closure
principles whatever. (Rather, we should capture (10.2) in terms of a
constraint on accessibility relations: doxastic accessibility must align
with epistemic accessibility to the extent required by (10.2).)
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The difficulty we find in accounting for rational yet non-ideal
agents is that, from the theorist’s point of view, the rational component
seems in deep conflict with the non-ideal component. Since such
agents are non-ideal reasoners, they don’t know all that follows from
what else they know. Yet since they are rational, the ‘anything goes’
approach, on which knowing something does not imply knowing
anything else in particular, would seem inappropriate.
It’s sometimes said that rational but non-ideal agents know
whatever follows easily from what they know. Chalmers (2010),
for example, says that
it is plausible that p is epistemically possible when one could not
easily come to know that ¬p given what one already knows.The
corresponding notion of deep epistemic possibility is something
like the following: it is deeply epistemically possible that pwhen
¬p is not easily knowable a priori. (Chalmers 2010, 105–6)
This is a natural thought. But teasing out the details is not at
all simple. Suppose that one could easily come to know that A,
given what one knows. Then, given Chalmers’s suggestion, ¬A isn’t
epistemically possible. If this implies that A is epistemically necessary
(for that agent, given what she already knows), it immediately follows
that she knows that A. This gives us the ‘easy closure’ principle, (10.1)
from §10.2: the agent knows whatever follows easily from what she
knows. Yet this can’t be right, as we saw in §10.2, for easiness isn’t
transitive. Accepting (10.1) forces us to treat our agent as knowing
whatever follows deductively from what she knows, given that any
deductive reasoning can be broken down into discrete easy chunks.
Any closure principle on knowledge is vulnerable to this kind of
reasoning. That’s the nature of closure principles: they are all-or-
nothing beasts. But ‘all’ is too much closure, and ‘nothing’ is too
little rationality. This is what we will call (following Jago (2014a))
the problem of bounded rationality: the conflict between normative
principles of rationality which govern concepts like belief, and our
limited cognitive resources.
Let’s take a moment to review just what rationality seems to
require of belief states. Why is it, exactly, that the ‘anything goes’
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approach seems inadequate? Davidson (1985), Dennett (1987),
Stalnaker (1984), and many others emphasize how belief ascription
is a normative practice, whose purpose is ultimately to make rational
sense of action. To ascribe a belief, we must first treat the agent in
question as a rational being. It makes no sense to attribute, say, beliefs
that A and that B, without thereby (perhaps implicitly) ascribing the
belief that A ∧ B. Moreover, on this view, there’s no question of what
a belief is, outside this normative practice. As a consequence, belief
simply cannot be as fine-grained as the ‘anything goes’ approach
allows. The deep objection to the ‘anything goes’ approach to belief
(and cognate concepts), therefore, is that the analysis fails to capture
its essential rational basis.
The problem isn’t limited to analysing belief. The problem of
rational knowledge (Jago 2014b) is that the following platitudes are
incompatible:
(i) Rational agents seemingly know the trivial consequences of
what they know,
(ii) Rational agents do not know all logical consequences of what
they know.
Here, we’re using ‘trivial’ (as we did in in §9.5) in a way that includes
all the basic inference steps (such as an instance of modus ponens
or Disjunction Introduction), but which doesn’t include all valid
inferences, many of which are highly non-trivial.
The problem is that ‘trivial’, like ‘easy’, isn’t transitive. Closure
under trivial consequence brings full closure in its wake. So (i),
interpreted as a closure principle, directly conflicts with (ii). Note
that, in this formulation, the logical omniscience problem is just one
half (ii) of the problem of rational knowledge. The deep problem
is to avoid logical omniscience without losing sight of the agent’s
rationality.
Bjerring (2010, 2012) argues that no solution to these problems is
possible. He teases out requirements that epistemic space, the space
of all epistemically possible worlds, should satisfy. He then shows
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that they are jointly inconsistent. We can set out the essence of his
argument as follows. Take any world. If it fails some trivial inference,
such as representing both A and B but not A ∧ B, then it is blatantly
not a way the world might be. Even rational agents with very limited
resources recognize this. So such worlds are not epistemic possibilities
for any agent. They should play no role in epistemic space. It follows
that all worlds in epistemic space, the deeply epistemically possible
worlds, are closed under all trivial inferences. But, as we’ve already
seen (§9.5), closure under trivial deductive consequence generates
full deductive closure.
An adequate response to the problem must argue that such worlds
are (deep) epistemic possibilities, even though they are not closed
under trivial (or easy) inference. Our approach (as in Jago (2014a))
is to distinguish sharply between what a world represents as not
being the case, on the one hand, and what the world does not
represent as being the case, on the other. Ordinary possible worlds
are maximally consistent, and so do not distinguish between not
representing something as being the case and representing something
as not being the case. Our worlds, however, can be incomplete. So,
to represent A as not being the case, a world must explicitly say it is
not the case that A, or ¬A. Contrast this with a world which is silent
on A: it says neither that A, nor that ¬A.
Following Jago (2014a), we argue that whether a world is deeply
epistemically possible depends only on what it represents.Worlds are
debarred from being deep epistemic possibilities when they represent a
blatant impossibility as being the case. Blatant impossibilities include
blatant contradictions. So, a world which represents that A ∧ ¬A,
or which represents both that A and that ¬A, is ruled out. It is not
deeply epistemically possible: it cannot be treated as an epistemic
possibility, for any possible agent. Similarly, if an agent can easily
infer A ∧ ¬A from what a world represents, then that world is ruled
out. (We discussed one way to make sense of this idea in §9.5. We’ll
return to the idea in §10.4.)
Contrast this situation with the case in which one can easily infer
some A from what a world represents, where that world doesn’t
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itself represent that A. Such worlds are not ruled out from contention
as deep epistemic possibilities, we claim, for they do not explicitly
deny A. They say nothing about A explicitly (even though A follows
easily from what they do say). There is no tension between what they
explicitly affirm and what they deny. (This doesn’t affect our analysis
of knowledge and belief as kinds of necessity, reflecting what’s true
according to all worlds accessible to an agent.)
To motivate the idea, consider how every story you’ve ever heard
is partial in what it explicitly represents. For any story, there are some
facts it remains completely silent on. (We’ll say more on how fictions
work in Chapter 11.)We’re never told what Holmes had for breakfast
the day he first met Watson. Either he had toast or he didn’t. Yet the
story doesn’t say he had toast, and doesn’t say he didn’t. The story is
partial.We don’t, on that basis, reject the Holmes-stories as epistemic
impossibilities. Rather, we treat them as partial representations of
what we take to be determinate and complete states of affairs. That’s
how we should think of incomplete worlds when we’re assessing
whether they count as epistemic possibilities. So we should allow
that they’re deeply epistemically possible, just so long as they don’t
explicitly represent some blatant impossibility.
10.4 Bounded Rationality and Vagueness
We have to admit, we find puzzling the picture of bounded rationality
we’ve described. We’ve argued (following Jago 2014a) that it’s
legitimate to treat incomplete worlds as epistemic possibilities. But
as a result, we will have epistemic states which do not capture trivial
logical truths, which can easily be recognized as valid. Incomplete
worlds need not represent trivial logical truths, such asA∨¬A. Having
accepted such worlds as epistemic possibilities, we find ourselves
with agents who do not believe A∨¬A. How can we call such agents
rational?
This is the problem of bounded rationality emerging again. An
agent who does not believe all consequences of what she believes
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must fail to believe some trivial consequence of what she believes.
But we cannot say that she fails to believe that consequence, without
thereby treating her as being irrational. (And perhaps, in that case,
we should not describe her cognitive state in terms of belief at all.)
There is a parallel to the literature on vagueness here. (In what
follows, we draw on Jago 2014b.) Consider the essay marking
example from §9.5, in which each of 100 essays, ranging from
excellent to dire, gets a different mark. It seems absurd to pronounce
for sure that only those essays scoring (say) 55% or more were any
good.Was the 54% ‘not good’ essay that much worse than the ‘good’
one scoring just 1% more? Yet we can’t capture what’s wrong with
this by saying: if one essay was good, then so was the one scoring
just 1% less. That principle entails that all or none of the essays were
good, and that’s clearly wrong.
One response to the problem is that, although there is a fact out
there about precisely which essays were good, we can’t pinpoint
that fact with any precision (Williamson 1994).We just can’t know
enough about how ‘good essay’ is used to determine precisely which
essays were the good ones. And since we shouldn’t assert what we
don’t know (according to Williamson (1996, 2000)), we can’t ever be
in a position to assert things like ‘only the essays scoring over 55%
were any good’. (DeRose (1992), Hawthorne (2004), Stanley (2005),
and Schaffer (2008) all support this knowledge norm for assertion.)
Jago (2014b) argues that something similar happens in the case
of knowledge and belief ascriptions. A non-ideal agent will fail to
know (or believe) some trivial consequence of what else she knows
(or believes). This is an epistemic oversight: a particular case in which
the agent fails to know (or believe) a particular trivial consequence of
what she knows (or believes). But knowledge and belief ascriptions
are part of a normative practice of explaining behaviour.We cannot
be in a position to know, and hence can never assert, just which trivial
consequence an agent fails to know (or believe). Epistemic oversights
exist, but we can never put a finger on them.
The considerations here are very similar to those we met in §9.5.
The idea pursued there was that the content of valid deductions is
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indeterminate, because it may be indeterminate whether a world w is
deeply epistemically possible. The related idea here is that states of
belief and knowledge are themselves vague, because it’s indeterminate
which logical consequences of her beliefs an agent believes. These
ideas are deeply connected. If it is indeterminate whether an inference
is informative, then it may be indeterminate whether an agent who
determinately believes its premises thereby believes its conclusion.
Belief (and knowledge) states are themselves vague. It’s indetermi-
nate what an agent believes (or knows), given what else she believes
(or knows). It might be determinate that our agent believes that A,
but indeterminate whether she believes that B, for some related B.
Yet there must be constrains on the extent of this indeterminacy.
Something like the following must hold:
(Triv) If it’s determinate that an agent knows that A, and the
inference from ‘A’ to ‘B’ is trivial, then she cannot determinately
fail to know that B.
A principle along the lines of triv brings with it considerable
explanatory power, if we also accept either knowledge or determinate
truth as the norm of assertion (Williamson 1994). Suppose that one
may assert only what is determinately true. (This is implied by taking
knowledge as the norm of assertion, since one cannot know what’s
indeterminate.) Then one can assert that agent x believes that A, but
not B, only if it is determinate both that x believes that A and that
she does not believe that B. But, if the inference from ‘A’ to ‘B’ is
trivial, this is precisely the situation ruled out by triv. So, when ‘A’
trivially entails ‘B’, we can never assert that an agent believes that A
but not that B. In general, we can never assert any failure of trivial
closure in an agent’s belief state.
This feature, we think, is what gives the misleading impression that
belief states are closed under trivial consequence. As we have seen,
they cannot be closed under trivial consequence. Yet we can never
discern or assert any counter-instance.We mistakenly go from our
inability to falsify the closure principle through counter-examples to
its truth.
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10.5 Belief and Trivial Inference
In this section, we’ll provide formal models of belief (and knowledge),
following Jago (2014b), which capture the idea that belief (and
knowledge) states are themselves vague (§10.4). We’ll then show
how triv from §10.4 falls out of these models. This section is
largely a technical exercise in showing how precise formal models
can validate triv. We follow the general approach of Chapter 5, by
imposing doxastic and epistemic accessibility relations on a domain
of epistemic scenarios. Our domain is an epistemic space (§9.5),
consisting of deep epistemically possible worlds. To model belief,
we add a doxastic accessibility relation between worlds in the space
for each agent under consideration. We can model knowledge by
imposing further conditions (including reflexivity) on these relations.
(Reflexivity ensures that knowledge implies truth.) And we can model
both knowledge and belief by adding a doxastic and an epistemic
accessbility relation for each agent, restricted so that the former
implies the latter. (This ensures that knowledge implies belief.) To
keep the presentation simple, we’ll focus on models with doxastic
accessibility relations only.
As we saw in §9.5, epistemic space is a vague notion. It is
indeterminate just which impossible worlds count as deep epistemic
possibilities, and hence indeterminate which worlds make up epis-
temic space. The make-up of epistemic space is governed by our
analysis of deep epistemic possibility (§9.5):
(EP) World w is (deeply) epistemically possible just in case w isn’t
the root of any small world-proof.
A world-proof is a structure imposed by reinterpreting sequent
calculus rules as relations betweenworlds. Its size reflects how difficult
it is (in terms of number of rule-applications) to uncover a hidden
contradiction within a world.
If it is indeterminate whether a world is deeply epistemically
possible, then it may be indeterminate whether that world is
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epistemically accessible for any agent. As a consequence, belief states
may be indeterminate (just as the information contents of §9.5 may
be indeterminate). Nevertheless, if we impose accessibility relations
on epistemic space in the ordinary way, then many facts about an
agent’s belief will be determinate. As a very simple example, consider
the following model, with w1 the only possible world:
w1p 1 q 1
w2 p ∧ q 1
w3 p ∧ q 1 p 1
w4 p ∧ q 1 q 1
a
a
a
a
Here, w1 is a possible world representing that p and that q, and
hence that p ∧ q. By contrast, w2, w3, and w4 are all incomplete but
consistent worlds, representing just p ∧ q, just p ∧ q and p, and just
p ∧ q and q, respectively.
In this model, agent a at w1 believes that p ∧ q, but not that p or
that q. Since both w1 and w2 are consistent, neither are associated
with a world proof, and so, determinately, both are deep epistemic
possibilities. (We argued in §10.3 that this is reasonable, for an agent
may view w2 as an incomplete description of a possible world.) So,
it’s determinate that our agent believes that p ∧ q and determinate
that she doesn’t believe that p. Then there should be no problem with
our asserting that she believes that p ∧ q but not that p.
This is deeply problematic. In §10.4, we argued that there must be
epistemic oversights: cases in which the agent fails to believe trivial
consequences of what she believe. But we also claimed that there are
no determinate cases of an epistemic oversight. They exist, but we
can never put our finger on one.We are never in a position to say that
our agent’s belief state gives out at this particular point.We suggested
the triv principle:
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(Triv) If it’s determinate that an agent knows that A, and the
inference from ‘A’ to ‘B’ is trivial, then she cannot determinately
fail to know that B.
Our simple model above invalidates this principle. To capture it,
epistemic models require a little more structure.
The suggestion in Jago 2014b is that an agent’s epistemic accessibil-
ity relation itself is indeterminate, and the indeterminacy is not merely
due to the indeterminacy of epistemic space. In our model above, all
four worlds are eligible epistemic possibilities.The suggestion is that a
highly incomplete word like w2 can never be determinately accessible
for an agent. A more complete version of w2 might represent that
p (as w3 does) or that q (as w4 does). A more complete version still
would represent both that p and that q (as w1 does).
One alternative version of a’s epistemic accessibility relation
considers only worlds which are explicit about p, as in this model:
w1p 1 q 1
w2 p ∧ q 1
w3 p ∧ q 1 p 1
w4 p ∧ q 1 q 1
a
a
Another alternative considers only worlds which are explicit about
q, as in this model:
w1p 1 q 1
w2 p ∧ q 1
w3 p ∧ q 1 p 1
w4 p ∧ q 1 q 1
a
a
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What’s determinate is whatever holds relative to all of these
alternatives. The determinate accessibility relations, for example,
are those that hold in all alternative models: from w1 to w1, in this
case. But this doesn’t mean that our model shrinks to w1:
w1
p 1 q 1
a
In this single-world model, agent a is logically omniscient (since w1 is
a possible world). On our approach, by contrast, it’s determinate that
some incomplete world is epistemically accessible. That guarantees
that the agent’s belief state isn’t logically closed. But it’s indeterminate
which incomplete worlds are accessible, and so indeterminate where
the failure of closure occurs.
(How we interpret this multiplicity of models, philosophically, is
up for grabs. One option is to say that one model gets things right,
but we can’t ever know which. This is the epistemicist approach to
vagueness (Williamson 1994). Another option is to say that no one
model gets things right, for each model is precise in a way that reality
is not. Rather, what’s true amounts to what is the case according to
all the models (and so equates to what’s determinately true). This
is the supervaluationist approach to vagueness (Fine 1975b). Both
approaches to vagueness have their problems, of course. The aim
here isn’t to solve the problem of vagueness, but to bring attempted
solutions to that general problem to bear on the specific problem of
epistemic oversights.)
Now for the formal details, which we give for multiple agents. We
use our standard propositional languageℒwith knowledge operators
Ki for each agent i and an operator ‘△’, read is ‘it is determinately the
case that …’.We define ‘▽A =df ¬△¬A’, read as ‘it is indeterminate
whether …’. These operators allow our object language to express
matters which are (or are not) vague. For convenience, we’ll phrase
our semantics for the ‘Ki’s in terms of epistemic projection functions
(which we encountered in §5.1).
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Definition 10.1 (Epistemic models) An epistemic model for k agents
is a tuple M = ⟨⟨W ,N, 𝜌, f1,… , fk⟩⟩, with W, N, and 𝜌 as in def-
inition 9.1, and each fi is the epistemic projection function for agent
i, assigning a subset ofW to each w ∈W. As before, a pointed model
is a pair, ⟨⟨M,w⟩⟩ where w is a world inM. We abbreviate ⟨⟨M,w⟩⟩ to
Mw. The rank ofMw is #w, as given by definition 9.2.
Given the precise projection functions f1,… , fk, we then define the
alternative projection functions, one for each sentence A for each
agent i, as follows.
Definition 10.2 (A-variant of fi) Given a modelM as above, we set:
fAi w =
⎧
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎩
(fiw ∩ {w ∣ A ∈ V
+w}) if fiw ⊆ {w ∣ A ∉ V
−w}
∪ (fiw ∩W
P)
fiw otherwise
Let fℒi = {fi} ∪ {f
A
i ∣ A ∈ ℒ}.
Definition 10.3 (Alternative sequences) For an epistemic model M
for k agents as above, let AM = {⟨⟨g1⋯ gk⟩⟩ ∣ gi ∈ fℒi , i ≤ k}. If
𝛼 ∈ AM is an alternative sequence, then 𝛼
i (for i ≤ k) denotes the ith
member of 𝛼, i.e., an alternative projection function for agent i.
Next, we define a notion of truth for the whole language, relative
to an alternative sequence.We extend the ‘𝜌’ notation, writing ‘𝜌𝛼wA1’
to mean that A is true at w, relative to alternative sequence 𝛼.
Definition 10.4 (𝛼-truth) Given an epistemic modelM as above, we
define 𝜌𝛼w as follows. For possible worlds w ∈ N and where A is an
atom, negation, conjunction, disjunction, or material implication, we
set 𝜌𝛼wA1 iff 𝜌wA1, with 𝜌w as in definition 9.1. For the remaining
cases (with w ∈ N), we set:
(SK) 𝜌𝛼w(KiA)1 iff 𝜌w1A1 for all w1 ∈ 𝛼
iw
(S△) 𝜌𝛼w(△A)1 iff 𝜌𝛽wA1 for all 𝛽 ∈ AM
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In all these cases, we set 𝜌𝛼w△A0 iff not 𝜌𝛼wA1. For impossible worlds
w ∈W −N, we set 𝜌𝛼wA1 iff 𝜌wA1 and 𝜌
𝛼
wA0.
Definition 10.5 (n-entailment) Given a pointed epistemic modelMw
whereM = ⟨⟨W ,N, 𝜌, f1,… , fk⟩⟩, A is true inM
w iff 𝜌
⟨⟨f1⋯ fk⟩⟩
w A1. Then,
for any n ∈ ℤ+ ∪ {𝜔}, logical n-entailment, ⊨n, is defined as:
Γ ⊨n A iff, in every pointed model M
w of rank r ≥ n where
w ∈ N, each B ∈ Γ is true inMw only if A is true inMw.
It is then easy to see that ⊨n extends classical (propositional)
entailment:
Theorem 10.1 For any n ∈ ℤ+ ∪ {𝜔}: if Γ classically entails A, then
Γ ⊨n A.
Proof: By contraposition. If Γ ⊭n A, then for some pointed model
⟨⟨W ,N, 𝜌, f1,… , fk⟩⟩
w of rank r ≥ n with w ∈ N, each B ∈ Γ is true
but A is not. Set VA = 1 iff 𝜌
⟨⟨f1⋯ fk⟩⟩
w A1. Then it is easy to see that V
is a classical valuation function over atoms {p,△A,KiA ∣ p,A ∈ ℒ}.
Since VB = 1 for each B ∈ Γ but VA = 0, it follows that Γ does not
classically entail A. ∎
Now recall the formal notion of n-trivial consequence, trivn(Γ,A),
from §9.5 (definition 9.3). Both of our key formal concepts, n-
entailment and n-trivial inference, are parameterized by an integer
(or 𝜔) n, which we think of as an artificial precisification of vague
epistemic space. Given any such precisification, we can show that our
models imply triv: if it’s determinate that an agent knows each of the
premises Γ of a trivial inference from Γ to A, then it’s not determinate
that she fails to know that A.
Theorem 10.2 For any n ∈ ℤ+∪{𝜔}, if trivn(Γ,A) then {△KiB ∣ B ∈
Γ} ⊨n ¬△¬KiA.
Corollary 10.3 For any n ∈ ℤ+ ∪ {𝜔}, if trivn(Γ,A) then {△KiB ∣
B ∈ Γ} ∪ {¬KiA} ⊨n ▽KiA.
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Corollary 10.4 For any n ∈ ℤ+ ∪ {𝜔}, if n ≥ 3, then ⊨n ¬△¬Ki(A ∨
¬A) and ¬Ki(A ∨ ¬A) ⊨n ▽Ki(A ∨ ¬A).
Proof sketch: Suppose that trivn(Γ,A). Then for any pointed epis-
temic model of rank r > n where Γ is true, A is not false. Suppose
also that △KiB for each B ∈ Γ is true in some Mw. Then, for
each alternative accessibility relation and each i-accessible world
w′, B is true at that world. Then A is not false at w′. But, since the
alternative projection function f Bi forces a stance on A, A is true at
each worldw′ ∈ f Bi w. ThusKiA is true atw relative to any alternative
sequence containing f Bi . Then since ¬KiA is false atw relative to some
alternative sequence, △¬KiA is false, hence ¬△¬KiA is true, inMw.
Corollary 10.3 follows given ▽A =df ¬△A ∧ ¬△¬A, and corollary
10.4 is a special case. Full proofs can be found in Jago 2014b. ∎
However we choose a precise delineation of ‘epistemic scenario’
and ‘trivial consequence’, if the inference from Γ to ‘A’ is trivial then
determinate knowledge of Γ entails the agent does not determinately
fail to know that A, just as our principle triv from §10.4 says.
Equivalently (as corollary 10.3 says), if agent i does not know some
trivial consequence ‘A’ of what she knows, then it is indeterminate
whether she knows that ‘A’. So, on the account proposed, there are no
determinate epistemic oversights. Each case of an epistemic oversight
is an indeterminate case.
Since what is indeterminate is not rationally assertible, it is then
never rational to assert that agent i suffers from a particular epistemic
oversight. If an agent is not logically omniscient, then we can be
sure that she suffers from some epistemic oversight. Indeed, it is
determinate that real-world agents are not logically omniscient,
and hence determinate that real-world agents suffer from epistemic
oversights. But we can never say what they are: we cannot locate
them in a rational agent’s epistemic state.Whenever we focus on a
particular trivial consequence ‘A’ of agent i’s knowledge, it is never
rational to assert that she does not know thatA (even if that’s the case).
In this way, our formal models support our philosophical contention
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that epistemic oversights are always elusive, just as counterexamples
to tolerance principles for vague predicates are.
10.6 Believing Contradictions
There’s a worry that’s been building up since §9.5, where we
introduced our concept of epistemic space. There, we excluded
explicitly contradictory worlds (according to which some A is both
true and false) from epistemic space.We also excluded worlds from
which we can reach explicitly contradictory worlds in a relatively
short number of steps.All these excluded worlds are associated with a
small world-proof, and are excluded on that basis. Our key principle
is this:
(EP) World w is epistemically possible just in case w isn’t the root
of any small world-proof.
For some worlds, it’s indeterminate whether they satisfy the criterion
(because it’s indeterminate whether any associated world-proof is
small). But it’s determinate that explicitly contradictory worlds are
not epistemic possibilities (for any agent). So they played no role in
our analysis of epistemic and doxastic states (§10.5).
The objection is simple: surely there are agents who believe explicit
contradictions.Whether they’re right or wrong to do so isn’t the point,
for beliefs needn’t be true, or even reasonable. People can believe all
sorts of things. There’s even a well worked out philosophical view,
dialethism, according to which contradictions can be true. And yet,
we’re saying that it’s impossible to believe a contradiction. How can
we square this?
Take the case of Graham Priest, dialethism’s foremost proponent
(Priest 1979, 1987, 2014, 2016b). Few people on earth are more
rational and logically adept. Fewer still know more about negation.
So when Priest says, clearly and repeatedly, that he believes contradic-
tions, and backs this up with sophisticated philosophical and logical
argument, how can we disagree with him?
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Dialethists clearly believe something when they assert a contradic-
tion.We follow Jago (2014a, §7.5) in thinking that their assertions
mean something a little different from what they would seem to mean.
In particular, the dialethist may mean something a little different from
what other English speakers typically mean by ‘not’. The evidence for
this comes out in the logical rules she takes to govern her concept of
negation. In classical and intuitionistic logic, the logical rules for ‘not’
allow us to link assertions to denials (or what we accept to what we
reject).
Suppose in a conversation we keep track of the things we accept,
Γ, and the things we reject, Δ, by writing: Γ ⊢ Δ. Then, if we accept
A, we should reject ¬A, and vice versa:
Γ,A ⊢ Δ
Γ ⊢ ¬A, Δ
Γ ⊢ A, Δ
Γ, ¬A ⊢ Δ
These are the sequent rules for classical negation.The dialethist rejects
them both. Her concept of negation differs from the classical one.
(She readily agrees, for she finds the classical notion incoherent.) The
question, then, is what is typically expressed in English by ‘not’.
The line in Jago 2014a, §7.5, then goes as follows. In communicat-
ing with each other, we need some way to indicate what we accept
and what we reject (or deny). We could have evolved green and red
lights on our heads, so that uttering ‘A’ with a green light amounts
to accepting that A, whereas uttering ‘A’ with a red light amounts
to denying it. Or we could put a thumb up or down as we utter ‘A’.
But there’s a simpler way: we use ‘no’, ‘not’, and cognates, to signal
disagreement and denial. (That’s a very useful tool, since we can then
deny a denial, by using ‘not’ twice.)
This argument is part conceptual, part empirical. The conceptual
part is that, to engage in the kind of discursive practices our complex
interactions require of us, we need a mechanism for signalling
acceptance and rejection of contents. The empirical part is that
English speakers typically use ‘not’ and ‘no’ for that purpose. But
we’re free to step out of that practice. Dialethist uses of ‘not’ may
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well express their non-classical, non-explosive concept of negation.
They believe those contents, which they express using ‘not’ and we
express using ‘dialethist negation’. But those contents are not literally
contradictions, because contradictions are those involving negation,
the concept expressed in standard English by ‘not’. Dialethists believe
what they say when they say, for example, ‘the Liar is both true and
not true’. Their assertions are contentful and meaningful. But they
don’t believe that the Liar is both true and not true.
Chapter Summary
We outlined the case for making belief states the primary focus of our
analysis (§10.1), and for including impossible (as well as possible)
worlds in that analysis (§10.2). This allows us to deny various closure
principles, although this probably won’t help defeat worries about
external-world scepticism (§10.2).
The issue that concerned us most is the problem of bounded
rationality (§10.3): belief states seem to be closed under ‘easy’ trivial
consequence, but not under full logical consequence, and yet the
former implies the latter. Our solution was that some trivial closure
principle must fail on a given belief state, yet it is indeterminate
just where this occurs (§10.4). We cannot know, or be in a position
that entitles us to assert, which trivial consequence of her beliefs an
agent fails to believe. We gave formal models of belief states alone
these lines, and showed that they respect the indeterminacy-of-closure
intuition, in §10.5. Finally, in §10.6, we discussed how we might
square this approach, which says that no one can genuinely believe
a contradiction, with the fact that some people seem to believe just
that.

11
Fiction and Fictional Objects
Co-authored with Christopher Badura
11.1 Problems of Fiction
Our ability to tell fictional stories, to engage with them, to think
about their characters, and to reason about the situations they find
themselves in, is an important part of being human. Tales, novels,
plays, and operas represent things as being such-and-so. Besides
enjoying their fictional contents, we can learn a lot from them. But
how can this be, given that, in general, they are no true representations
of reality?
In this chapter, we will set out some philosophical issues of fiction
and discuss to what extent impossible worlds help with them. We
will tackle two problems in particular. These can be mapped to a
prima facie intuitive distinction between two kinds of fiction-related
discourse. Some features are taken as true of fictional characters like
Heathcliff,Gandalf, and SherlockHolmes,within the fictions in which
they appear. It is true in the respective fictions that Sherlock Holmes
is a detective and that Gandalf is a wizard. Call this intra-fictional
discourse.
We also ascribe to those characters features they don’t have in
their respective fictions.We say that Heathcliff is a fictional character
due to Emily Brontë and that Holmes is more famous than any real
detective.These claims are not true in the stories: within the respective
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fictions, Holmes avoids celebrity and Heathcliff is not fictional at all,
but a very real, tormented hero. Call this extra-fictional discourse.
The distinction between intra-fictional and extra-fictional discourse
may not be sharp in all cases (Pelletier 2003), but it seems robust
and intuitive enough. Fictional characters enjoy a double life. In Kit
Fine’s words:
On the one hand, they have certain properties within the
contexts in which they appear; they love and hate, thrive and
fail, and live their varied lives. On the other hand, they also
relate to the real world; they are created by authors, read by
readers, and compared, for better or worse, with one another
and with what is real. (Fine 1982, 97)
We start by focusing on one side of this double life, the intra-
fictional one.What does it mean that something is true in a fiction?
Fictions are not, on the whole, true, nor do their authors generally aim
for them to be. (Recall the proviso, ‘any resemblance to real people
or events is purely coincidental’.) But in intra-fictional discourse we
can truthfully talk about what happens in a story. We can do so
even when such truths are not explicitly stated in the fiction.When
Heathcliff and Catherine meet for the final time, Heathcliff is dressed
in the manner of an eighteenth-century country gentleman and not
as a circus clown. That’s an intra-fictional truth about the world of
Wuthering Heights. Yet the text of that scene never explicitly says
anything about how Heathcliff is dressed. So what is true within
the fiction ofWuthering Heights must go beyond what’s explicitly
written in the text. The problem is to explain how this is so: how
it is true in Wuthering Heights that Heathcliff was dressed in the
manner of an eighteenth-century country gentleman, and not as a
circus clown, at his final meeting with Catherine.
The second problem we will discuss is that of fictional entities
such as Holmes, Gandalf, Catherine, and Heathcliff. As fictional
characters, it seems that they exist in the fictions of Sherlock Holmes,
The Lord of the Rings, andWuthering Heights, and not in reality. If
this means that there really are no such things as Holmes, Gandalf,
Catherine, and Heathcliff, how can we make true claims about them
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in extra-fictional discourse? How can we (let’s assume, truthfully)
say that Holmes is more famous than any real detective, that Emily
Brontë created Heathcliff, and that Kate Bush’s Heathcliff is the same
Heathcliff as Emily Brontë’s? How can it be true that Kate Bush and
Emily Brontë are speaking about the same Heathcliff, if there is no
such thing?
Let us start with the first issue: truth in fiction.We have a range
of intuitions about what’s true in a given fiction (Woodward 2011).
The issue is how to systematize them.
11.2 Truth in Fiction
We commonly talk of the worlds of fiction (‘in Star Trek’s world …’,
‘in the world of The Lord of the Rings…’). So we might understand
what’s true in a fiction along the lines of truth relative to a world.
But in general, many worlds (including many possible worlds) will
be compatible with the explicit text ofWuthering Heights. Which of
these worlds is the world ofWuthering Heights?
It’s not even clear that the world of the fiction must be compatible
with everything stated in the text. Sophisticated ‘unreliable narrators’
explicitly state something that turns out later on not to be true in the
fiction. The narrator may make ironic or tongue-in-cheek remarks.
Further subtleties involve the author-narrator distinction and the
positing of a fictional or implicit author (Currie 1990). But since our
aim here isn’t to attempt a full theory of truth in fiction, we’re going
to ignore these subtleties. We want to focus on the role impossible
worlds may play in a good theory.We shall only take into account
reliable and literal narration, in which a narrator’s explicitly uttering
that A is sufficient for A to be true in the fiction. This seems to be the
default case.
(Heyd (2006) proposes to account for unreliable narration prag-
matically, via Gricean maxims. Perhaps non-literal speech and genre
conventions, such as characters speaking in verse (Walton 1990), or
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mentions of ‘555’ numbers in American television (Hanley 2004),
should also be dealt with pragmatically.)
The set of sentences explicitly and literally uttered by the narrator
gives the explicit content of a fiction.We thus endorse the following
principle as a default rule:
(Explicit) If A occurs explicitly in the story f , then A is true in f
(and so ‘in f , A’ is true).
The worlds complying with the explicit content ofWuthering Heights
are all worlds in which Heathcliff is adopted by Mr Earnshaw, comes
to own Thrushcross Grange andWuthering Heights, marries Isabella,
and so on. Although the explicit content of the novel narrows down
the class of worlds to those compatible with it, we cannot get to a
unique world we can call the world ofWuthering Heights. Fictions
are incomplete. Given a fiction f , there are sentences A such that
neither it nor its negation is true in f .
In an extremely influential paper, Lewis (1978) proposes that we
associate a plurality of possible worlds with the fiction and then
analyse truth in the fiction as whatever is true according to all those
worlds. He considers three accounts of how these worlds are selected.
In the first, truth in fiction is a matter of what’s true at all those worlds
‘where the fiction is told, but as known fact rather than fiction’ (Lewis
1978, 40):
(Fiction1) ‘In fiction f , A’ is true iff A is true at every world where
f is told as known fact rather than fiction. (Lewis 1978, 41)
This approach generates too few truths-in-fiction. To understand
Wuthering Heights, we need to understand something of the so-
cial customs of late eighteenth-century England. Heathcliff leaves,
becomes wealthy, and returns as a gentleman. To understand the
importance of those events, we need to understand something of
England’s attitudes to class and gender relations in the eighteenth
century. Emily Brontë took for granted that her contemporary readers
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would easily grasp these, so didn’t include any explicit facts about
class and gender relations in her text. But fiction1 ignores these.
There will be worlds whereWuthering Heights is told as known
fact but eighteenth-century English social relations are turned on their
heads. So, according to fiction1, it won’t come out true inWuthering
Heights that Heathcliff exerts social power over Catherine. And there
are plenty more contingent actual-world facts which should appear in
the world ofWuthering Heights, but which are ignored by fiction1:
that there’s gravity, that it obeys an inverse-square law, and so on.
Fiction1 generates too few truths because it includes too many
worlds. Perhaps we should consider just those worlds closest to our
own which are compatible with the text. This approach ignores all
those which differ radically from our own, in ways not required by
Wuthering Heights’s being told as known fact. This is Lewis’s second
analysis:
(Fiction2) ‘In fiction f , A’ is true iff some A-world where f is told as
known fact differs less from the actual world than any non-A-
world where f is told as known fact. (Lewis 1978, 42)
This approach seems to include too much of the actual world
in the world of the fiction (Currie 1990, Proudfoot 2006). In the
closest worlds to ours compatible with Wuthering Heights being
told as known fact, Jeremy Corbyn is Labour leader in 2017. So
fiction2 treats the fact of Corbyn’s leadership in 2017 as a truth of
Wuthering Heights. That’s rather surprising.Wuthering Heights is
about Catherine and Heathcliff’s story, not Corbyn’s. The approach
also fixes too much of our physical law. Since there are in fact no
ghosts, fiction2 implies that any ghost story should be understood
as a story in which people merely hallucinate or imagine ghosts.
Fiction2 delivers strange consequences for non-realistic fiction.
What kind of world is closest to our own, whilst realizing everything
explicitly described in The Lord of the Rings? Perhaps one in which
the goings on inMiddle Earth take place in a bubble universe, causally
isolated from our own reality, and with its own laws of nature.We
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might picture a world like that as a perfect duplicate of our own
reality, but with a Middle Earth-universe tacked on the side. For
any such world, the smaller its Middle Earth bubble is in time and
space, the more similar it is to our own reality. The closest such world
is probably one in which the Middle Earth bubble vanishes from
existence the moment the story closes. Yet it doesn’t seem right to say
that it’s true in the fiction that Middle Earth annihilates an instant
after Sam comes home, draws a deep breath and says, ‘Well, I’m
back’.
A compromise involves similarity, not with actual fact, but with
the ‘generally prevalent beliefs … of the author and his intended
audience’ (Lewis 1978, 44). (Lewis speaks of ‘overt beliefs’: these are
what almost everyone believes, almost everyone believes that almost
everyone believes, and so on.) We consider a world which realizes
the overt beliefs of Emily Brontë and her readers. We then move to
the closest worlds at whichWuthering Heights is told as known fact.
Whatever is the case at those worlds is what’s true in Wuthering
Heights. This is Lewis’s third analysis:
(Fiction3) ‘In fiction f , A’ is true iff for each collective belief world
w of the community of origin of f some A-world where f is told
as known fact differs less from w, than does any non-A-world
where f is told as known fact. (Lewis 1978, 45)
A worry here is how we balance the author’s beliefs with her
audience’s in arriving at a ‘collective belief’ world (Bonomi and Zucchi
2003). Take a novel written in Nazi Germany by a progressive author,
opposing the regime. Is the collective belief world one of progressive
anti-Nazi feeling? Or are the author’s beliefs outweighed by her
audience’s predominantly Nazi ideology?
We find fiction3 the most promising of Lewis’s proposals. In the
next section, we’ll refine it using impossible worlds, together with
ideas from belief revision theory.
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11.3 Hyperintensional Fictions
In each of the analyses we’ve looked at so far, truth-in-fiction relies
on possible worlds where the story is told as known fact. But an
inconsistent (or otherwise impossible) story can’t be known, and so
can’t be told as known fact. So what should we say about truth in
inconsistent fictions?
There are different sources of inconsistent fiction. One is narrative
oversight, in which the inconsistency is accidental to the plot.Watson’s
war wound is in his shoulder in some stories; in others, it’s in his
knee. It’s also a given that he has only one wound. We might take
the fictional truth to be given by whatever’s true in some maximally
consistent fragment of the story, or we might take it to be whatever’s
true in all of them (Lewis 1978, 46). On the former,Watson’s wound
is in his shoulder, andWatson’s wound is in his knee, but it’s not both.
Truth-in-fiction is non-adjunctive: A and B can each be true in the
fiction without A ∧ B being true in the fiction. (This is a version of
the subvaluational ‘fragments of belief’ approach from §8.2.) On the
latter approach, it’s true in the fiction that Watson’s war wound is
either in his shoulder or his knee, but neither disjunct is true in the
fiction.
Not all inconsistent fictions are due to narrative oversight. Some
are intentional; some blatantly so:
Carefully, I broke the tape and removed the lid. The sunlight
streamed through the window into the box, illuminating its
contents, or lack of them. For some moments I could do nothing
but gaze, mouth agape. At first, I thought that it must be a trick
of the light, but more careful inspection certified that it was no
illusion. The box was absolutely empty, but also had something
in it. Fixed to its base was a small figurine, carved of wood,
Chinese influence, Southeast Asian maybe.
I put the lid back on the box and sat down hard on the armchair,
my mental states in some disarray. I focused on the room. It
appeared normal. My senses seemed to be functioning properly.
I focused on myself. I appeared normal. No signs of incipient
insanity. Maybe, I thought, it was some Asian conjuring trick.
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Gently, I reopened the box and gazed inside. … The box was
really empty and occupied at the same time. The sense of touch
confirmed this. (Priest 1997b, 575–6)
This is the central passage of Graham Priest’s short story, Sylvan’s
Box. The narrator is Priest himself (or, a fictional version of him).
Qua author, he asks us: what’s true in this fiction? The most
straightforward reading takes the narrator’s statements at face value.
It’s true, in the fiction of Sylvan’s Box, that Priest discovers a box
that is both empty and not empty. The obtaining of a contradiction is
essential for understanding the story. But no operation on maximally
consistent fragments of the story will deliver the result that, in Sylvan’s
Box, a box is both full and empty at the same time.
Hanley (2004) and Nolan (2007) challenge the view that the
contradiction is essential to Sylvan’s Box. Both opt for a reading under
which Priest, as narrator, falsely believes that there is a simultaneously
full-and-empty box. His actions are understandable, in light of his
false beliefs. That’s surely one possible interpretation and, as such,
there’s nothing wrong with it. One might read Priest’s text that way
if taken as an attempted statement of historical fact. But we don’t see
why wemust understand the story in this way. Is an author powerless
to make her characters perceive and judge veridically and her narrator
speak accurately? Surely not.We think the ‘Principle of Poetic Licence’
(Hanley 2004, 121, attributed to Harry Deutsch) is plausible:
(PPL) For any A, one can write a story in which A is true.
Other impossible fictions suggest that the inconsistent (or otherwise
impossible) reading must be available. Proudfoot (2006) discusses
the comedy film Last Action Hero, in which the central plot device
involves a teenage boy, Danny, who finds himself in the fictional
world of his favourite film hero, Jack Slater. Slater’s evil nemesis
later escapes to the real world and Danny and Jack have to follow.
Throughout the film, various human characters become fictional, and
various fictional characters become human. We take it that this is
metaphysically impossible: each real human is essentially human and
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so necessarily non-fictional. But it doesn’t make sense of the plot
to claim that Danny is hallucinating. If the impossible reading is
available here, it should be available also for Sylvan’s Box.
Hanley (2004) challenges our assumption, explicit, that the
utterances which constitute the story are all true in that story (§11.2).
(We assumed this with the proviso that unreliable narration and non-
literal speech should be treated pragmatically.) But whilst explicit
implies that truth-in-Sylvan’s Box is inconsistent, we don’t need to
rely on explicit to make that case. Even if explicit failed for each
particular contradiction occurring explicitly in a story, this would
not stop implicit contradictions being true in the story. There are
inconsistent time travel stories in which no contradiction is presented
explicitly, for example. We may need a good deal of reasoning to
unpack the inconsistency. Rather, our argument above was based on
intuitive judgements about what’s true in Sylvan’s Box and in Last
Action Hero, which are then systematized into a cohesive (but not
consistent!) narrative.
Let’s return to Priest’s story and the morals he draws from it. It is
not true in Sylvan’s Box that Priest finds himself levitating, dressed
in a tutu. Yet that would be classically entailed by a contradiction,
such as the box’s being empty and not empty at the same time. So
what’s true in this fiction isn’t closed under classical entailment:
in understanding the story one has to draw inferences –
often non-monotonic ones – from what is explicitly presented,
together with background information. … Clearly, however, the
deductive canons employed cannot be those of classical logic.
… The logic of the story must be paraconsistent. (Priest 1997b,
580)
If the logic of this fiction is paraconsistent, not supporting the
inference from a contradiction to arbitrary conclusions, then the
worlds of the fiction must include impossible worlds. But exactly
which logic is the ‘logic of Sylvan’s Box’? It seems that some inferential
principles must apply: Sylvan’s Box is (explicitly) set near Canberra
and so we may infer that it is set in Australia, although this is not
stated explicitly. Assumed background knowledge (that Canberra is
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in Australia) allows us to infer an implicit truth of the fiction from an
explicit one.We infer this conclusion using the transitivity of ‘located
within’: if x is located within y and y within z, then x is located in z.
Modus ponens is required to make sense of that reasoning.
Other logical principles seem equally necessary to make sense of
the story. In the story, the box is empty. It also has something in it.
Those truths of the fiction are, strictly speaking, not explicit in the text.
What’s explicit is their conjunction (expressed with ‘but’). Yet it seems
clear that the conjuncts are also true in the fiction. Further exploration
of the text may provide evidence that the standard introduction and
elimination rules for conjunction, disjunction, and implication, plus
double negation introduction and elimination, are all fine in Sylvan’s
Box. This might give reason to think that the logic of this fiction is
a paraconsistent logic in which ‘→’ is not the material conditional.
One of the relevant logics of Chapter 6 may then fit the bill.
That may be the right logic for Sylvan’s Box. But what, in general,
is the right logic of the ‘in fiction f ’ operators? It is this logic, if one
exists, which deserves the label ‘the logic of fiction’. We are not sure
that one logic may be singled out as the logic of fiction. Recall the
Principle of Poetic Licence (PPL) from above: for any A, we can
always create a fiction in which A is true. So, for any candidate ‘logic
of fiction’, it seems we can create a fiction which breaks the rules of
that logic (Proudfoot (2018) makes a convincing case for this).
(Actually, PPL suggests, but does not imply, that conclusion. For
that, we’d need a stronger principle: that for any A1,… ,An and C,
we can create a fiction in which each Ai is true but C is not. This
echoes the discussion of Nolan’s Principle (NP), and the stronger
(NP+), from §8.4.)
11.4 A Formal Semantics
We’ll now set out an account of truth in fiction, as developed
by Badura and Berto (2018). It’s based on Lewis’s third analysis
(fiction3 from §11.2), expanded to include impossible worlds and
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considerations from cognitive science (Nichols and Stich 2003),which
inspired our treatment of the logic of imagination in Chapter 7. The
key idea is that fiction involves a kind of belief revision.
The semantics for doxastic and epistemic logics of belief revision
involves worlds ordered (usually, totally) by some plausibility relation
(Grove 1988, Segerberg 1995, 2001).We can think of the ordering
of worlds in terms of spheres, nested around a core, as in the
standard Lewis semantics for counterfactuals (Lewis 1973b). But
here, the spheres do not model objective similarity. Instead, they
model subjective plausibility, or degrees of belief entrenchment. The
innermost sphere is the set of worlds that realize certain beliefs. The
closer other worlds are to the core, the more plausible they are for
the relevant agent(s). These worlds are more likely to be embraced as
fallback belief-positions, after new information induces an agent to
revise her beliefs.
Roughly, we take ‘in fiction f ,A’ to be true when, having revised
the relevant agents’ beliefs with f ’s explicit content, all the most
plausible worlds are A-worlds. To achieve this, we think of revisions
as soft upgrades (Baltag and Smets 2011, Van Benthem and Liu 2007),
in which the fiction’s explicit content leads to a reordering of the
set of worlds. Our motivation for this comes from Currie (1990),
Lewis (1978), Walton (1990), and others, who claim that, in engaging
with fiction, we play a game of pretence or make-believe. (Matravers
(2014) challenges that this is the crucial distinction between fiction
and non-fiction. However, what matters for our purposes is just that
it be one feature of fiction.)
Nichols and Stich (2003) give a cognitive model of pretence that
resembles ideas from belief revision theory.Our cognitive architecture
comprises a ‘world box’, accessed when we engage in pretence via the
pretence premises, and a ‘belief box’, from which we pick background
beliefs to integrate into our pretence. We then consider those worlds
where the pretence premises obtain and that are most plausible in
terms of our background beliefs, adjusted to make room for the
explicit pretence premise itself.The content of the pretence is whatever
holds in all such worlds.
250 fiction and fictional objects
In the preference-based belief revision semantics, agents order the
set of worlds based on how strongly they take the various worlds as
candidates for actuality. Let ‘v ≤w u’ stand for ‘v is at least as plausible
as uwith respect tow’ (for a given agent). In one kind of soft upgrade,
new information that A reorders the worlds so that A-worlds become
the minimal elements in the new ordering, ≤Aw. Then, if A is true in v
but not in u, v ≤Aw u.
Think of an agent reading a fiction as being faced with new
information, sequentially upgrading beliefs with each sentence the
agent reads. One needn’t actually believe what one reads, of course.
Nichols and Stich (2003) suggest a mechanism for quarantining the
update, by indexing worlds by their previous position in the ordering.
When the pretence ends, one will recover the initial ordering from
the index.
To make sense of truth in fiction, we have to consider the beliefs
of a community of agents. For Lewis’s fiction3, these are the overt
beliefs of the community of origin of the fiction. We depart from
Lewis in two ways. First, we consider the beliefs of the community
of interpretation, rather than the community of origin.We want to
model the interpreting community’s reasoning on the fiction. Second,
rather than overt beliefs, we take common ones: that is, the beliefs
such that everyone has them, everyone believes that everyone has
them, and so on.This is a merely practical choice: it replaces the ‘most’
quantifier over beliefs with ‘all’. When we evaluate ‘in fiction f , A’,
we look at all worlds (possible or not) that are minimal with respect
to the common belief worlds of the community of interpretation after
upgrading with the explicit content of f .
Now let’s present the formal semantics. (For ease of exposition, we
will not take into account Nichols and Stich’s (2003) considerations
about quarantining.) As before, we use a propositional language ℒ
built in the usual way using ¬, ∧, ∨, modalities ◻ and ◇, the strict
conditional J, and, for each fiction f , an ‘in the fiction’ operator ‘In f ’.
A multi-agent plausibility model for a finite set of agents Ag is
a tuple ℳ = ⟨⟨W ,N, { i≤w ∣ i ∈ Ag,w ∈ W}, 𝜌⟩⟩, where W is a set
of worlds, N ⊆ W is the set of normal worlds, each i≤w is agent
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i’s plausibility ordering on W with respect to w ∈ W, and 𝜌 is a
valuation relation (see §5.4 and §7.2), relating formulas to 1, 0, both,
or neither at the various worlds.We assume each i≤w to be transitive
and well-founded, so that we can always determine the most plausible
worlds, min(i≤w, S) = {v ∈ S ∣ (∀u ∈ S)v i≤wu}, for any S ⊆W. Well-
foundedness implies reflexivity and total ordering, so that any two
worlds are comparable with respect to each i≤w.
Given individual orderings, it is a non-trivial task to come up with
a group ordering G≤w for some group of agentsG ⊆ Ag. Such a group
ordering reflects whether the agents can agree for every set of worlds
on some set of most plausible (or preferred) worlds. This amounts
to a voting problem among infinitely many (or at least arbitrarily
finitely many) alternatives. Our approach is therefore constrained
by Arrow’s (1950) impossibility theorem for social choice functions
(and Leitgeb and Segerberg’s (2007) analogue for belief revision).
These results show that, given certain conditions on the group of
agents, a group preference ordering cannot be obtained.The reasoning
assumes that any preference ordering is permissible. In our case,
however, an upgrade requires that the worlds where the story is
told as known fact be considered at least as plausible as any world
where the story is not told as known fact. So Arrow’s impossibility
result does not straightforwardly apply in our case.We will assume a
transitive and well-founded group ordering, based on the individual
orderings.
Now for some conditions on the valuation relation 𝜌. For every
w ∈ N and every atom p we require that 𝜌wp1 or 𝜌wp0 and not
both. (This is the Classicality Condition from §6.1. It extends to
every formula of ℒ by induction and guarantees that normal worlds
are maximally consistent.) The semantic clauses for the extensional
connectives and the modal operators are as in the semantics of §7.2.
(In particular, at non-normal worlds 𝜌 relates formulas to truth values
directly and is not subject to the Classicality Condition.)
A is commonly believed at w by a group of agents when everyone
in the group believes A, believes of everyone in the group that she
believes A, and so on.World w is a common belief world of a group
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G at world w1 if everything that’s commonly believed at w1 is true
at w. Let’s denote w1’s set of common belief worlds by CB
w1
G .
Recall that a soft upgrade with A reorders the worlds so that all
the A-worlds are then considered more plausible than all the worlds
where A is not true. Formally, following Van Benthem and Liu (2007),
the new ordering is defined by the following conditions:
(C1) For all u, v ∈W, if 𝜌uA1 and it is not the case that 𝜌vA1, then
u i≤
A
wv.
(C2) Otherwise, the old ordering remains.
Given we assume a version of (NP), we have some world in the
model in which A is true and some world where it’s not true. So
the upgraded relation will be non-empty. The upgrade also preserves
transitivity and well-foundedness. In our modelling, A is going to be
part of the explicit content of the fiction.
We can add additional constraints on the upgraded relation: for
instance, that (non-normal) worlds which make A true and false are
less plausible than those making A only true. Or, if the agent follows
some pragmatic rules of interpretation, certain worlds obeying those
rules might be considered more plausible (for such a pragmatic-based
approach, see Bonomi and Zucchi 2003). But for simplicity, let’s just
stick with the above conditions.
Next we define, for every S ⊆W, the set of most plausible worlds
for agent i after the upgrade:
min(i≤
A
w, S) = {v ∈ S ∣ ∀u ∈ S ∶ v i≤
A
wu}
For the corresponding definition for a group of agents G, we simply
substitute ‘G’ for ‘i’.
Finally, here’s our definition of truth in fiction. Let F be the explicit
content of fiction f . For w ∈ N:
(S1 In f ) 𝜌w(In f A)1 iff, for every world w1 ∈ min(G≤
F
w,CB
w
G) and
every B ∈ F: 𝜌w1B1 only if 𝜌w1A1; and
(S2 In f ) 𝜌w(In f A)0 otherwise.
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Thus, A is true in fiction f iff every world considered by group G
most plausible with respect to their common beliefs, revised in line
with the explicit content F of the fiction, makes A true.
This view has some advantages with respect to Lewis’s possible-
worlds-only approach, for the most plausible worlds can be impossi-
ble. Engaging with Sylvan’s Box might not require us to revise our
ordering much, up to the point where the empty-and-not-empty box
appears. Nolan and Hanley say that the most plausible worlds are
those where Priest, as the narrator, has false beliefs (relative to the
fiction).We take the most plausible worlds as those that comply with
the obvious intended reading of Sylvan’s Box. Priest has true beliefs,
relative to the fiction, in which there genuinely is an empty-and-not-
empty box. This does not trivialize the theory: the inference from
In f (A ∧ ¬A) to In f B does not go through.
So we can deal with blatant contradictions that are essential to the
plot.What about the case of accidental contradictions? Our approach
ensures the truth-in-the-fiction of each sentence of the explicit content,
even if one contradicts another. But their conjunction need not be true-
in-the-fiction. Since we have impossible worlds around, Conjunction
Introduction might fail for this particular case. But it need not. It
might be that the initial order prefers paraconsistent worlds over all
other inconsistent words, in such a way that contradictory sentences
generate their inconsistent conjunction, but without explosion. So
what a model says about accidental contradictions depends very
much on its initial ordering.
This approach faces a couple of worries.The notion of a plausibility
ordering is rather vague (just as similarity between worlds is). Our
assumption that agents each come equipped with a plausibility
ordering has to be viewed as something of an abstraction. Badura
(2016) and Badura and Berto (2018) provide responses to this worry.
Here,wemerely note that the assumption is standard in contemporary
epistemic-doxastic logics.
Another objection is that, on our analysis, truth-in-fiction depends
too heavily on the community of interpreters. We allow what’s true
in a given fiction to change over time, as the communal beliefs of
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its readers change. Lewis, by contrast, insists that ‘what was true in
a fiction when it was first told is true in it forevermore’ (1978, 44).
One might even object that our notion isn’t a notion of truth, since it
fails the governing norm that truth is stable over time (Wright 1992).
On our story, the explicit content of a fiction is treated in an
objective, fact-of-the-matter way. One can always check what the
author wrote. The worry concerns a fiction’s implicit content. Do our
interpretations of the fiction aim to discover objective facts about its
implicit content, or do they somehow influence that content, as on
the model we’ve presented?
If we go to the literary studies department, we’ll always find
differing interpretations, with differing claims about what’s true in a
given fiction. Plausibly, those theorists are each taking something from
the fiction’s explicit content and evaluating it from the standpoint
of their own (shared) knowledge, background, and context. Theirs
is a partly creative enterprise, constrained by communal beliefs
and norms, as well as by the fiction’s explicit content. Differing
interpretations of a fiction need not be in strict competition, when
given in different historical and social contexts.
Ours is a contextualist notion of truth in fiction. An analogy with
contextualism about knowledge (DeRose 1992, 2002, Lewis 1996) is
helpful. You’re in a long queue to post a letter. ‘They’re open until 6’,
the person in front of you says, ‘and the queue is always shorter then’.
What matters to you is whether your informant really knows that the
post office is open until 6. For contextualists, that depends on how
high the stakes are for you, the ascriber of knowledge. If it’s vital that
you get the letter in the post today then, in your context, there are
more possibilities of error floating around and so it’s correspondingly
harder for you truthfully to ascribe knowledge. It’s even harder for
the students in the epistemology class to ascribe knowledge to the
person in the queue, for they might (for all they know) be brains
in vats. In these ways, the truth of ‘she knows’ may vary with the
context of the ascriber.
Our view of ‘true in the fiction’ is analogous. The truth of ‘… is
true in the fiction’ may vary with the context of the interpreter. Lewis
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(1978, 44) objects that ‘that would mean that what is true in a fiction
is constantly changing’. But not so. What changes is the property
picked out by ‘true in the fiction’. It’s not that what the person in
the queue knows changes with the importance of your letter (or
with how much epistemology you’ve been reading). What changes is
what property ‘knows’ picks out. Similarly, different communities of
interpretation pick out a different property with ‘true in the fiction’.
We think the analogy between truth in fiction ascriptions and
knowledge ascriptions is more than superficial. ‘Knows that A’ means
something like ‘A is true in all contextually uneliminated scenarios’
(Lewis 1996, 551). Similarly, ‘A is true in the fiction’ roughly means ‘A
is true in all the contextually most plausible scenarios’. In both cases,
the relevant context is the context of the ascriber (or interpreter). Had
the Lewis of ‘Elusive Knowledge’ (1996) revisited ‘Truth In Fiction’
(1978), perhaps he would have arrived at a theory similar in spirit to
ours?
11.5 Realism and Fictionalism about
Fictional Entities
Let’s move on to the ontology of fictional objects. (We draw on Berto
and Plebani 2015, chapter 13.) Heathcliff is a fictional character
created by Emily Brontë. Sherlock Holmes is more famous than any
real detective. This is extra-fictional discourse: seriously asserted,
believed, and seemingly true, in which we seem to refer to fictional
characters. We may also quantify over fictional characters, in ways
which are difficult to paraphrase away (Van Inwagen 1977):
(11.1) There are characters in some nineteenth-century novels who
are presented with a greater wealth of physical detail than is
any character in any eighteenth-century novel.
(11.2) Some characters in novels are closely modelled on actual peo-
ple,while others are wholly products of the literary imagination,
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and it is usually impossible to tell which characters fall into
which of these categories by textual analysis alone.
If these are literally true, there must be something in the world
that makes them true. Realist abstractionists about fictional objects,
including Peter Van Inwagen, Saul Kripke, Tatjana von Solodkoff,
Amie Thomasson, and Nicholas Wolterstorff, take extra-fictional
discourse at face value. According to them, fictional objects are real,
existent, abstract entities. That they’re abstract explains why we
couldn’t stumble upon Holmes or Heathcliff.
Some versions of realist abstractionism have it that fictional objects
are abstract productions (Fontaine and Rahman 2014, Salmon 1998,
Thomasson 1999, Voltolini 2006). They are artefacts, brought into
reality by the creative activity of authors as they write. Unlike
other abstract objects like functions or sets, Heathcliff was created
by Brontë and depends on her ontologically: had she not written
Wuthering Heights, there would be no Heathcliff. Other versions of
realist abstractionism differ on this.According to Wolterstorff (1961),
Heathcliff exists before Brontë thinks about him: she selects, rather
than producing, her characters. Van Inwagen (1977) is non-committal
between the creationist and the non-creationist variant.
The creationist version faces issues (Yagisawa 2001).We have some
idea of what creation involves for concrete things: what it means
for a craftsman to create a chair, or for a mother to create her baby.
But it is mysterious what happens when an abstract object is created.
Creation seems to involve causation. How can this be, if created
abstract objects are devoid of causal features?
One may worry that the creative process looks too fuzzy. Exactly
when did Holmes begin to exist? When Conan Doyle set out to write
a novel involving a detective? When he wrote down the first sentence
of A Study in Scarlet? Or perhaps when he wrote the whole first
novel, or the first two? Or does Holmes’s reality involve collective
intentionality? If so, how many readers are needed? Ten or ten
thousand? One way to respond to these worries is to point out that
creation of physical artefacts is also fuzzy: just when did the table
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or the sculpture begin to exist? If there is similar vagueness in both
cases, then it can’t be a problem specifically for the creationist view
of fictional objects.
A more serious worry is that creationists seem unable to get the
modal profile of fictional entities right (Jago 2014a, §5.5). If Holmes
is a detective, he is inessentially so: he could have been a chemist, or
a violinist. He might have done all the things Watson did and vice
versa. But if a fictional entity is created by an author’s description
of them, then it seems that that description will be essential to the
character. In writing about a detective living at 221b Baker Street,
Conan Doyle creates an entity whose identity is built from those
properties. But then, Holmes will be essentially a detective living at
221b Baker Street. That’s the wrong result. Of course, Conan Doyle
could have written about a detective living elsewhere, or about a
violinist. But that character would have been created from a different
piece of writing, and so wouldn’t have been Holmes.
The non-creationist version of the view faces issues too. Sainsbury
(2010) raises the selection problem: how could Brontë select one
specific abstract entity, rather than another, to be Heathcliffe? We’ll
discuss the issue in §11.6, where we explore Meinongian theories of
fictional characters, which face the exact same issue.
Realist abstractionists of all kinds face a worry with negative
existentials: sentences in which we deny the existence of something.
Sensible adults deny that Holmes, Heathcliff, or the Big Bad Wolf
exist. A father who reassures his son that the Big Bad Wolf doesn’t
exist aims to speak the strict and literal truth. Negative existentials
about fictional objects typically count as extra-fictional discourse,
not as intra-fictional ascriptions: inWuthering Heights, Heathcliff
very much exists. That’s why ‘the Big Bad Wolf doesn’t exist’ needs a
treatment along the same lines as ‘Heathcliff is one of Brontë’s fictional
characters’. But realist abstractionists must break this intuitive
uniformity: they say, seriously and literally, that Holmes, Heathcliff,
and the Big Bad Wolf exist.
Van Inwagen (1977, 308) admits that what to do with ‘Mr.
Pickwick does not exist’ is ‘a very complicated question’. Perhaps
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these non-existence claims should be read as implicitly restricted
quantifications.We are not really claiming that there is no such thing
as Heathcliff, on this view, but rather that Heathcliff is not to be
found in the realm of concreta (Goodman 2004, Thomasson 1999).
We don’t think that’s plausible. Uses of ‘there is’ are often restricted,
as in, ‘there’s no wine left’. But restriction is much harder with ‘does
not exist’, which naturally takes the unrestricted reading (Walton
2003). Restricted readings still make sense when made explicit:
‘there’s no wine left in the house’. But ‘Donald Trump does not exist
in California’ seems nonsense. So we should take ‘Heathcliff does not
exist’ as an unrestricted claim, which realist abstractionists will have
to deny.
In the light of all these issues, antirealism about fictional characters
becomes attractive. Fictionalism about a discourse (§2.8) takes claims
in the area as valuable and useful but not generally true, for the things
seemingly talked about are really not there. Talk of fictional objects
seems to be a paradigmatic case in point.According to Walton (1990),
we play collective games of make-believe when engaging with fiction,
involving prescriptions that such-and-such must be pretended.
But as we’ve already seen, we can’t analyse all talk of fictional
characters using the fictionalist’s ‘in the fiction’ operator (Van Inwagen
2003).We can’t say:
(11.3) InWuthering Heights, Heathcliff is a fictional character due
to Brontë.
(11.4) InWuthering Heights,Heathcliff is played by Laurence Olivier
in the classic 1939 movie.
The embedded sentences are external to Brontë’s fiction, yet still
seemingly about Heathcliff. The problem extends to quantification
over characters, as in,
(11.5) If no character appears in every novel, then some character is
modelled on another character (Van Inwagen 2003, 137).
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How can we understand this literal truth, if there literally are no
fictional characters?
One option for fictionalists about fiction goes as follows (Jago
2014a, §5.5). Names like ‘Heathcliff’ surely have a meaning (else we
couldn’t truthfully say, ‘in the fiction, Catherine marries Heathcliff’).
So they have a semantic value, to which we can refer and over
which we can quantify. But that semantic value isn’t a fictional
person. ‘Heathcliff’ doesn’t refer to its semantic value. It refers to
nothing, since Heathcliff doesn’t exist. Brontë’s text associates various
properties with that semantic value, which can then be accessed by
the ‘inWuthering Heights’ operator.
Extra-fictional discourse is then understood by paraphrase, in terms
of the semantic values of fictional names. So, (11.3) says something
like: Brontë created the meaning associated with ‘Heathcliff’; and
(11.4) says something like: Olivier played a role based on the
meaning Brontë associated with ‘Heathcliff’. Van Inwagen’s (11.5)
says something like: if no semantic value of a name-in-fiction is
shared by all novels, then some semantic value of a name-in-fiction
is modelled on some other. Quite a mouthful. No wonder we talk,
loosely, in terms of characters! But don’t let this loose talk fool you,
says the fictionalist. There are no fictional characters.
A third position on the ontology of fictional objects, differing from
both realist abstractionism and fictionalism, is theMeinongian option.
Let’s take a look.
11.6 Non-existent Objects and Impossible
Worlds
According to Meinongians (§2.3), fictional characters are non-
existent objects. Meinongianism is a form of realism about fictional
objects, in that such things are taken as being parts of reality, available
for reference and quantification. But, for Meinongians, this is not the
same as existing. Meinongians agree with the folk that ‘Heathcliff
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does not exist’ is literally true. No convoluted story about negative
existentials is needed.
Non-existent fictional entities straightforwardly accommodate
extra-fictional ascriptions, such as ‘Heathcliff is a purely fictional
character’. But things get more complicated with intra-fictional
discourse.To appreciate the issue, we need to say something about the
Comprehension Principle problem.Meinongians need some ‘principle
of comprehension’ for their objects, telling us which objects are
admitted in the theory and what properties they can bear. A naïve
version of Meinongianism subscribes to what Parsons (1980) calls
the ‘Unrestricted Comprehension Principle’ for objects:
(UCP) For any condition A[x] with x free, some object satisfies A[x].
(It’s unclear whether even Meinong ever endorsed something like
this.) Here,‘A[x]’ is a condition such as ‘x is a detective, x lives at 221b
Baker Street, x is a cocaine addict, x is Moriarty’s arch-enemy, …’.
(UCP) guarantees that some object is characterized by the condition:
call it ‘Sherlock Holmes’. Then A[Sherlock Holmes] is literally true.
But this can’t work, for one can prove anything whatsoever from
(UCP) (Priest 2005, xix). Let A[x] be x = x ∧ B, with B an arbitrary
formula. By the (UCP), something, b, is such that b = b ∧ B, from
which B follows by Conjunction Elimination.
Nuclear Meinongians like Jacquette (1996), Parsons (1980), and
Routley (1980) limit the principle to a restricted vocabulary. They
make a distinction between two kinds of predicates, nuclear and
extranuclear (with corresponding properties). Nuclear predicates
deal with ordinary features of objects: ‘is blue’, ‘is tall’, ‘kicked
Socrates’, ‘was kicked by Socrates’, ‘kicked somebody’, ‘is golden’,
and ‘is a mountain’ (Parsons 1980, 22–3). Extranuclear predicates
express logical, ontological, or intentional notions like ‘is fictional’,
‘is possible’, ‘is thought about by Meinong’, ‘is consistent’ (Parsons
1980, 22–3). Only nuclear predicates are allowed to deliver objects. It
is essential that existence be extranuclear, so that one cannot stipulate
things into existence by including ‘x exists’ in a condition.
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Both naïve and nuclearMeinongianism entail literalism about intra-
fictional discourse (Fine 1982). Fictional non-existents like Holmes
literally have the properties they are characterized as having. Holmes
literally is a detective and literally lives at 221b Baker Street. But
this is problematic. Until 2002, 221 Baker Street (there’s really no
221b) hosted the Abbey Road Building Society. It has never been the
home of any detective. It is literally false that that 221 (or 221b) is
(or was) Holmes’s residence. In one of the stories, Holmes has tea
with William Gladstone. But Gladstone never had tea with Holmes,
or with any other non-existent entity.
Did Holmes live in a non-existent counterpart of 221(b) Baker
Street? Did he have tea with a non-existent counterpart of Gladstone?
That seems inconsistent with the data. We want to say that some
things in fiction (like Napoleon inWar and Peace) exist, just as much
as we want to say that Holmes doesn’t exist. There’s no evidence
that ‘Napoleon’ is ambiguous between an existent person and a non-
existent fictional character.
Besides, literalism severs intuitive connections between properties.
If Holmes really is a detective because he is so characterized (and the
feature of being a detective is nuclear), why can’t we shake hands
with him?We fail to accommodate the insight that if something really
is a detective, then it must be a concrete object, with a spatiotemporal
address and causal powers. It should, in particular, exist. This is,
however, denied to Holmes by Meinongians of all kinds.
Dual copula theorists like Zalta (1983, 1988) fare better than
nuclearMeinongians. Recall from §2.3 that they propose a distinction
between two ways in which things can be ascribed properties.
There’s ordinary predication, expressing property-instantiation or
exemplification, and there’s encoding. Encoding a property does not
in general entail exemplifying it. Non-existent objects can encode
features of any kind (except properties like encoding F: see Rapaport
1978). On this view, Holmes encodes, but does not exemplify, being
a detective. So this view is free from literalism.
Priest (2005) offers a third Meinongian option, with a Qualified
Comprehension Principle (see Berto 2012):
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(QCP) For any condition A[x], with x free, some object satisfies A[x]
at some world.
When object o is characterized as A[x], A[o] need not hold at the
actual world (though it may). It holds at some world or other. Berto
(2008) calls this view modal Meinongianism. There is no restriction
at all on A[x] in (QCP). And since ‘satisfying’ expresses ordinary
property-instantiation, there is no need for Zalta’s dual copula.
The world which realizes the characterized condition may be an
impossible world. The modal Meinongian theory needs impossible
worlds, just as accounts of imagination (Chapter 7), epistemic
and doxastic contents (Chapter 10), and truth in fiction (§11.3)
do. With impossible worlds in play, logically, metaphysically, and
mathematically impossible contents can all be employed in the
characterization of objects, via (QCP).
Modal Meinongianism puts a limit on what Meinong called the
Principle of Independence of Sosein (the having of properties by
objects) from Sein (their existential status). For modal Meinongians,
some but not all properties are independent from existence. Those
which involve the having of causal features, or spatiotemporal
location all entail existence (at the actual world). Non-existents like
Holmes may bear only those properties that fail to entail existence,
such as being self-identical, or being a fictional character, or being
thought about by Mark on a Monday morning. But they cannot bear
existence-entailing properties, such as being a detective, or being a
cocaine addict.
Crane (2013) proposes a similar framework. He also distin-
guishes between existence-entailing features, which he connects
with Lewisian-Armstrongian natural properties, and non-existence-
entailing, ‘pleonastic’ features. Non-existents like Holmes or Pegasus
may instantiate features only of the latter kind andmay be represented
by intentional agents as instantiating features only of the former kind.
Holmes is not a real detective. But he really is a fictional detective
and is so insofar as he is represented as a detective by Conan Doyle
and his readers.
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Modal Meinongianism with (QCP) faces the following issue: what
if we characterize something as being actually thus-and-so? If we
characterize a character as being an actual detective, does (QCP)
deliver an entity that’s a detective at the actual world? Hopefully not,
for we would soon fall into absurdity.We could characterize an actual
detective just like Holmes, which conflicts with the facts about our
world. Or worse still, we could characterize an actual round square,
which cannot be part of any possible world.
How can (QCP) avoid this worrying implication? It seems difficult,
given that ‘actual’, ‘actually’, and ‘at the actual world’ function
by latching on to the actual world, @. Statements embedded
within ‘actually’ always refer back to @ for their evaluation. As
a consequence, all truths are necessarily actually true. Obama is
necessarily actually the first president of colour (even though he isn’t
necessarily the first president of colour). ‘Actually’ is a rigidifier for
descriptions. So, if ‘x is actually F’ is to be true at some world, then
something must be F in the actual world. Now let our characterizing
condition A[x] be of the form: ‘actually, B[x]’. Then (QCP) entails
that something satisfies ‘actually, B[x]’ at some world and hence that
something satisfies ‘B[x]’ in the actual world. Since this works for
any B, we soon run into absurdity.
Impossible worlds to the rescue! The argument above relies on the
semantic clause for the ‘actually’ operator:
(SAct) ‘Actually, A’ is true at world w iff A is true at @.
Like all semantic clauses we’ve considered, this should hold of
necessity: it applies to all possible worlds w. But it should not apply
to impossible worlds. (SAct) tells us that it is impossible for ‘actually,
A’ to be true and for ‘A’ to fail to be actually true. So there should
be an impossible world where ‘actually, A’ is true, for any A which
isn’t actually true. So we can infer from ‘actually, A’ being true at
w to A being actually true only when w is a possible world. But the
world invoked by (QCP) need not be a possible world. The argument
breaks down and the problematic conclusion is blocked (Berto 2012,
Priest 2005).
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Many realist theories of fictional objects, including non-creationist
realist abstractionism and all the Meinongian views we’ve discussed,
face the selection problem (Sainsbury 2010), mentioned in §11.5. On
all these views, fictional characters exist as abstract or nonexistent
entities, independently of the author’s intentions and actions. In
writing her fiction, she selects some of these abstract or nonexistent
entities to be her characters. She pins a name on them, but does not
endow them with new properties: Holmes was a fictional detective
(even though he hadn’t appeared in any fiction) before Conan Doyle
came along.
How is this achieved? Not through some causal interaction,
since we have no causal connection with abstract or non-existent
entities. Can an author single out a specific fictional object using a
definite description? The problem with this suggestion is that, if a
Comprehension Principle delivers Heathcliff, it also delivers other
entities extremely similar to Heathcliff. There’ll be a whole host of
abstract or non-existent entities, differing in (fictional) height by
a few millimetres, or in their time of birth by a few seconds, but
otherwise alike and as described by Brontë.Which of these is the real
Heathcliff? How could Brontë pick just one of them out? Which one
is the Heathcliff she refers to?
Perhaps Brontë’s Heathcliff is an incomplete object, having no
exact height (to the millimetre) and no precise time of birth (to the
second)? Perhaps Brontë’s Heathcliff has the (fictional) properties
she explicitly attributes to him inWuthering Heights, and no more?
Heathcliff is (fictionally) ‘tall, athletic, well-formed’, but is he neither
(fictionally) 6ft, nor (fictionally) taller, nor (fictionally) shorter? We
do not want to say that it is true in the fiction that Heathcliff is a
vague, fuzzy entity with no particular height, weight, time of birth,
and so on. In the fiction, he’s human, and it’s a feature of all humans
that they have a precise height at each time.
One bold reply to the selection problem, endorsed by Priest
(2016b, chapter 11), has it that we select non-existents via acts of
mental pointing. Brontë focuses on Heathcliff through her ‘primitive
intentionality’, singling the character out via pure thought. But it’s
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hard to see how this can help with the problem of distinguishing
between all the candidate Heathcliffs, each ‘tall, athletic, well-formed’
but differing slightly in their height. Presumably Brontë didn’t
specify, in her mind, Heathcliff’s height to the millimetre. So it isn’t
clear how she could then intend one rather than another of the
candidate Heathcliffs. It could be that ‘mental pointing’ selects one
of the candidates by pointing at random. Then Heathcliff will have
(fictional) properties, such as his precise height, which go beyond
what we can discover.
An alternative Meinongian response to the selection problem,
sketched by Fine (1982) and developed by Berto (2012, chapter 9)
and Priest (2016b, chapter 14), drops the realist assumption. On this
view, some non-existents are dependent on the mental activities of
authors. Heathcliff is available for reference and predication thanks
to Brontë’s creative skills. Brontë didn’t have to select Heathcliff from
a pre-established domain. Rather, she somehow produced him and
named her product ‘Heathcliff’. We then use ‘Heathcliff’ with the
intention of sticking to that original reference.
The view is similar to creationist abstractionism (§11.5). It faces
the same problems and seems to add some new ones for good measure.
If an author creates something, doesn’t it follow that what she created
exists? The Oxford English Dictionary has it that ‘to create’ means
‘to bring into existence’. This is fine for realist abstractionists. For
Meinongians, though, Heathcliff does not exist. Claiming that one
can create non-existents seems to challenge the ordinary meaning of
words.
Chapter Summary
We began with the problem of what counts as true in a given fiction,
which goes beyond what’s explicitly given in that fiction (§11.2).
We then considered the problem of inconsistent fictions, which are
naturally handled using impossible worlds (§11.3). We presented an
account of truth in fiction, which develops one of Lewis’s analyses
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into an approach which can handle inconsistent fictions with ease
(§11.4). We then turned to our second main topic: how we should
think about fictional entities. We contrasted realism and fictionalism
about fictional characters (§11.5).We found the problems for realism
to be serious. We then considered a third option, which takes the
Meinongian line that fictional characters are non-existent objects
(§11.6). We considered several versions of this idea and their various
issues.
12
Counterpossible Conditionals
Co-authored with Rohan French, Graham Priest, and David Ripley
12.1 Why Counterpossibles?
One of the most discussed applications of impossible worlds has
to do with the treatment of counterpossible conditionals. These are
counterfactuals whose antecedent is true at no possible world. As
you may recall from §1.3, the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics has it that,
if there are no A-worlds, A ◻→ B comes out automatically true.
The conditional with the same antecedent and opposite consequent,
A ◻→ ¬B, comes out true, too, for the same reason. In general,
all counterpossibles are vacuously true. The standard treatment of
counterfactuals implies vacuism about counterpossibles.
To many, including Brogaard and Salerno (2013), Bernstein (2016),
Bjerring (2014), Krakauer (2012), Nolan (1997), and Priest (2008),
vacuism seems wrong (§1.3). These authors have come up with
numerous examples of counterfactuals with impossible antecedents,
such that the consequent matters for the truth value of the whole.
Recall Nolan’s (1997) pair of Hobbes-sentences from §1.3:
(1.18) If Hobbes had (secretly) squared the circle, sick children in
the mountains of South America at the time would have cared.
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(1.19) If Hobbes had (secretly) squared the circle, sick children in
the mountains of South America at the time would not have
cared.
The intuition is that Hobbes’s squaring the circle would have made no
difference with respect to the life of those sick children. The second
Hobbes-sentence should, then, be true for this reason, and for the
same reason, the first Hobbes-sentence should be false. (Bernstein
(2016) gives a similar argument.)
Other examples of non-vacuous counterpossibles arise with non-
causal notions of ‘making a difference’. Anna and her singleton,
{Anna}, are modally inseparable: necessarily, one exists just in case the
other does. Yet we can make good sense of the idea that a particular
set’s existence depends on a general framework of sets, in a way that
Anna’s existence doesn’t.
(12.1) If there hadn’t been any sets, {Anna} wouldn’t have existed.
is true, whereas
(12.2) If there hadn’t been any sets, Anna wouldn’t have existed.
is false. For whether or not sets exist makes no difference to Anna’s
existence.
Brogaard and Salerno (2013) propose that counterpossibles such
as these can help in the analysis of a thing’s essence. They agree with
Fine’s (1994) idea that {Anna} is not involved in Anna’s essence,
even though the two are modally inseparable. They argue that
we can explain this using the difference in truth-value between
(12.1) and (12.2).We agree that there’s a link between essence and
counterpossibles such as these, but we’re not so sure about Brogaard
and Salerno’s direction of explanation. Couldn’t it be that (12.2) is
false because Anna’s essence doesn’t involve any sets? If so, it may
be that essences play a role in explaining counterfactuals (including
counterpossibles), and not vice versa.
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The rest of this chapter will be largely structured as a dialogue with
Timothy Williamson, who presents a series of powerful objections
to non-vacuism (Williamson 2007, 2010, 2017). Discussing these
objections will give us the opportunity to delve into the details
of a non-vacuist theory of counterfactuals with impossible worlds.
In §§12.3–12.5, we’ll discuss three arguments against non-vacuist
semantics and, in §12.6, we’ll discuss Williamson’s attempts to
undermine the intuitive pull of non-vacuism.
12.2 A Semantics for Counterpossibles
The obvious way to free the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics from vacuism
is to expand it by adding impossible worlds. Start with a standard
propositional language ℒ like the one of §4.1 and add our counter-
factual conditional ◻→, so that if A and B are formulas, then so is
A ◻→ B.
A frame ℱ is now a triple ⟨⟨W ,N, {RA ∣ A ∈ ℒ}⟩⟩, with W the
set of worlds, N ⊆ W the subset of normal (possible) worlds, and
each RA an accessibility relation onW (one for each formula in the
language). We read ‘RAww1’ as meaning that w1 is ceteris paribus
like w, but A is true at w1. (For this reading to make sense, we’ll need
an extra constraint on each RA; see below.)
A frame becomes a model ℳ = ⟨⟨W ,N, {RA ∣ A ∈ ℒ}, v⟩⟩, when
endowed with a valuation function v assigning truth values (0 or 1)
to atoms at worlds in N and to all formulas at worlds in W − N.
(So as before, impossible worlds are worlds where complex formulas
are treated as atomic.) The truth conditions for the operators other
than ◻→ at w ∈ N are as in §4.1. For simplicity, we do without the
accessibility relation for ◻ and ◇, which we treat as unrestricted
universal and existential quantifiers over possible worlds. As for the
counterfactual:
(S◻→) vw(A ◻→ B) = 1 if for all w1 such that RAww1, vw1B = 1, and
0 otherwise.
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Logical truth and validity are, respectively, truth and truth preser-
vation at all normal worlds in all models. This gives us classical S5
modal logic for the extensional connectives and ◻ and ◇. The only
operator that looks at impossible worlds is ◻→. With no constraints
on the accessibility relationsRA, we have a basic system of conditional
logic.
Stronger systems can be obtained, as usual, by adding constraints
on the accessibility relations. Their intended understanding clearly
motivates the following:
(12.3) If RAww1 then vw1(A) = 1
(12.4) If vw(A) = 1 then RAww
The former says that A is true at all RA-accessible worlds. The latter
says that, if A is true at w, then nothing is closer to w than itself. This
corresponds to what Lewis (1973b) called ‘Weak Centring’.
These conditions have an effect only when w is a possible world,
since the RAs are not involved in determining the truth value of
anything at an impossible world. They guarantee, respectively, that
‘◻→’ satisfies counterfactual self-implication and modus ponens:
(12.5) ⊨ A ◻→ A
(12.6) A,A ◻→ B ⊨ B
These inferences are clearly desirable for the counterfactual condi-
tional.
The semantics is non-vacuist. To see this, consider this model, with
N = {w}:
w w1
p ∧ ¬pRp∧¬p
Atw, p∧¬p ◻→ q is false, even though the antecedent is contradictory.
For w can access the impossible world w1 (via Rp∧¬p), where q is not
true, even though p ∧ ¬p is.
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12.3 The Strangeness of Impossibility
Condition
In order for the RAs genuinely to express world similarity, we would
need to impose a comparative similarity relation on worlds, or a
‘system of spheres’, expanding Lewis (1973b)’s approach with the
addition of impossible worlds. We will not set things up in this way.
The problem of how similarity should work when impossible worlds
are around is a tricky one. Some of the issues are orthogonal to
the topics we are to discuss in this chapter. However, one further
constraint on the RAs will play an important role in our discussion,
the Strangeness of Impossibility Condition:
(SIC) If vwA = 1 for some w ∈ N and RAww1, then w1 ∈ N.
If A is true at some possible world w, which looks via RA at w1, then
w1 is possible, too. The thought expressed by the constraint is the
prima facie plausible one that, to evaluate the truth at a possible
world of a conditional with a possible antecedent, we never look at
impossible worlds. Thinking in terms of closeness between worlds,
the condition says that any possible world is closer to a possible
world w than any impossible world is. Impossible worlds are kept
at a distance for as long as they can be: they’re strange. (Hence the
name, due to Nolan (1997). Jago (2014a) and Mares (1997) also
endorse the approach.)
With (SIC) in place, it is easily checked that our semantics validates:
(12.7) ◇A,A ◻→ B ⊨ ◇B
It has further important consequences for validity, connected to an
objection raised by Williamson (2007) over an impossible worlds
logic for counterfactuals:
We may wonder what logic of counterfactuals [non-vacuists]
envisage. If they reject elementary principles of the pure logic
of counterfactual conditionals, that is an unattractive feature
of their position. (Williamson 2007, 174)
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Williamson does not make explicit which logic he has in mind
as ‘the pure logic of counterfactual conditionals’, or which of its
principles are ‘elementary’. But he makes use of a weak counterfactual
logic, presented proof-theoretically (2010, 85).We assume that the
distinctively counterfactual axioms and rules of this system give a
sense of what Williamson means. We will consider three (using ‘⊢’
for theoremhood and ‘↔’ for material equivalence):
(12.8) ⊢ A ◻→ A
(12.9) If ⊢ A↔ B then ⊢ (A ◻→ C) ↔ (B ◻→ C)
(12.10) If ⊢ B1 ∧ ⋯ ∧Bn ⊃ C then ⊢ (A ◻→ B1) ∧ ⋯ ∧ (A ◻→ Bn) ⊃
(A ◻→ C)
Of these, our semantics verifies only (12.8). So should (12.9) and
(12.10) be endorsed?
The former has it that whenever A and B are provably equivalent,
then so too are A ◻→ C and B ◻→ C. If the extensional fragment
of the logic is classical (as in our semantics), then any classical
contradiction is provably equivalent to any other. So (12.9) implies
that p ∧ ¬p ◻→ C is provably equivalent to q ∧ ¬q ◻→ C, for any
choice of p,q, and C. In particular, p ∧ ¬p ◻→ q ∧ ¬q is provably
equivalent to q∧¬q ◻→ q∧¬q. But the latter is provable, given (12.9),
and hence so is the former:
⊢ p ∧ ¬p ◻→ q ∧ ¬q
Quite generally, (12.8) and (12.9) imply that any provably con-
tradiction counterfactually implies any other. But why think this?
If Graham Priest really had found a box that’s both empty and not
empty (as in his story, §11.3), would it really be both raining and
not raining in Amsterdam? We don’t think that’s plausible. Since we
reject the conclusion, but find (12.8) hard to deny, we reject (12.9).
Similar problems arise in connection with (12.10). Classically we
have ⊢ (p ∧ ¬p) ⊃ q. From (12.10), we infer
⊢ ((p ∧ ¬p) ◻→ (p ∧ ¬p)) ⊃ ((p ∧ ¬p) ◻→ q)
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from which, using (12.8), we obtain:
⊢ (p ∧ ¬p) ◻→ (p ∧ ¬p)
This gives us ⊢ (p ∧ ¬p) ◻→ q. If we accept all that, then any
contradiction will counterfactually imply anything at all. But why
think this? It’s wrong to think that, were it raining and not raining,
giraffes would stand on their horns. So one of (12.8), (12.10), and
classical logic must go.We reject (12.10).
Williamson’s principles combine to yield bad predictions about
counterfactuals with contradictory antecedents. Counterfactual sup-
positions can take us beyond logical bounds; they can lead us to
entertain situations in which logically equivalent claims come apart,
or in which a claim can hold without all its consequences holding. For
non-vacuists, these are not ‘unattractive features’ of their view; rather,
they provide one of the main intuitive motivations for it. Of course,
such intuitions can be challenged: we will come to this in §12.6. But
simply assuming that they are wrong would be dialectically unhappy.
Non-vacuists should reject (12.9) and (12.10). There are closely
related principles they may accept, however:
(12.11) If ⊢ A↔ B then ◇A ⊢ (A ◻→ C) ↔ (B ◻→ C)
(12.12) If ⊢ B1 ∧ ⋯ ∧ Bn ⊃ C then ◇A ⊢ (A ◻→ B1) ∧ ⋯ ∧ (A ◻→
Bn) ⊃ (A ◻→ C)
These are just like (12.9) and (12.10), except that the validities they
yield have as a premise that a certain claim is possible.
Our semantics validates ◇(A ∧ ¬A) ⊢ B for any A and B, and so
the arguments above against (12.9) and (12.10) do not extend to
(12.11) and (12.12).With (SIC) in place, we never have to go outside
the domain of possible worlds to evaluate an inference, so long as the
antecedents of all the conditionals we are dealing with are possible.
As a result, all the valid inferences of merely-possible-world semantics
(including (12.9) and (12.10)) are recoverable enthymematically,
simply by adding suppressed premises of the form ◇A (as in (12.11)
and (12.12)). In that sense, adding impossible worlds loses us nothing.
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We get a lot from accepting (SIC). But is it acceptable? Some
authors (Bernstein 2016, Nolan 1997, Vander Laan 2004) have
argued against it. In particular, counterexamples have been proposed
to (12.7), which follows from (SIC). Nolan (1997, 2017) offers these:
(12.13) If intuitionistic logic came to be thought of as a much
more satisfactory basis for mathematics by experts, and if
intuitionistic investigations led to breakthroughs in many areas,
… then intuitionistic logic would turn out to be correct after
all. (Nolan 1997, 550)
(12.14) If Gödel had believed Fermat’s Last Theorem to be false, it
would have been. (Nolan 1997, 569)
(12.15) If the bag had 63 balls in it, 63 would have been a square
number. (Nolan 2017, 17)
Each of these conditionals has the right form to be a counterex-
ample to (12.7): a possible antecedent and an impossible consequent.
But are they true? The context for (12.14) involves a person in awe
of Gödel’s ability, who thinks that whatever was believed by Gödel
in mathematics must be true. It seems to us that intuitionistic logic
would not turn out to be correct even if most experts agreed on its
value, and that Fermat’s Last Theorem would stay true, even if Gödel
had believed otherwise.
For (12.15), the context is one in which a person teaches a boy
how square numbers work by arranging balls in a square grid,
then putting them in a bag and counting the balls that come out.
Sometimes the total is 16, sometimes 25, and so on. The conditional
is then uttered by the person on an occasion where 63 balls are
counted. In this case, we agree with Nolan (2017, 17) that (12.15)
would be an appropriate thing to say. But it still does not sound
literally true to us. Uttering (12.15) in that context seems to us way
to convey the thought that some miscounting must have taken place.
In that respect, it’s like ‘if Trump were smart, I’d be a monkey’s
uncle’, whose antecedent is possibly true while its consequent looks
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like a metaphysical impossibility. We don’t utter such things as a
commitment to their literal truth.
One way to motivate (SIC) is by analogy with what Bennett (2003,
227) calls counterlegal conditionals. (We thank Jorge Ferreira for
calling our attention to this point.) When we evaluate ordinary
counterfactuals, we look at worlds like the world of evaluation, up to
or around the time of the antecedent, and which are nomologically
possible (Bennett 2003, 198). So we already have a ‘Strangeness
of Nomological Impossibility Condition’ in play in the evaluation
of ordinary counterfactuals. Nomologically possible worlds form a
sphere, in that they are closer to the base world than nomologically
impossible ones. So when we evaluate ordinary counterfactuals
whose antecedents comply with our laws, we never look beyond
nomologically possible antecedent-worlds.
Things are different when we deal with counterlegals, whose
antecedents are causally or nomologically impossible: ‘if gravity
obeyed an inverse cube law, then our months would be shorter’.
Then we need to move beyond the nomologically possible, and look
at the antecedent-worlds that are nomologically most similar to the
base world, despite breaking some of its causal laws. (While Bennett
doubts that there is any principled way to do it,we aremore optimistic.
Thought experiments in the natural sciences often have us suppose
situations which violate actual physical laws, often with widespread
consensus. This suggests that there is a principled way to evaluate
the corresponding counterfactual formulations.)
Analogously, we claim that something like (SIC) is in play with
counterfactuals whose antecedents do not violate a law which is
absolutely necessary. Possible worlds form a sphere, in that they
are closer to the base world than impossible ones.We only look at
impossible worlds when the antecedent forces us to move outside the
sphere of absolute possibility.We do it when engaging in philosophical
or logical thought experiments, as when we counterfactually suppose
a logical or mathematical theory we deem (necessarily) wrong, in
order to draw unpalatable consequences from it, by way of reductio.
(We will come back to reductio reasoning in §12.5.)
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12.4 Substitutivity of Identicals
What does our approach to counterpossibles say about identity and
the substitution of rigidly coreferential terms? To investigate the
issue, we extend our language with n-ary predicates for each n, the
two-place identity predicate, ‘=’, and a set of individual constants,
with the usual rules of well-formedness. In particular, if ‘a’ and ‘b’
are any constants, then ‘a = b’ is an atomic formula. (Extending the
semantics to the quantifiers is a non-trivial matter, due to the presence
of impossible worlds.We need not go into details here, for they are
not germane to what follows; but see Priest’s ‘matrix semantics’ (2008,
chapters 18 and 23).)
Models now contain a domain and an interpretation function,
assigning an element of the domain to each constant, a subset of the
domain to each monadic predicate, and (for n > 1) an n-tuple to each
n-ary predicate. For atomic sentences other than atomic sentence
letters and worlds w ∈ N, vw is defined in the usual way, in terms of
the interpretation. In particular, an atomic identity statement ‘a = b’
is true iff ‘a’ and ‘b’ denote the same element of the domain. (As
before, when w ∈W −N, vw treats all sentences as atomic.)
As a consequence, v always satisfies these constraints when w ∈ N:
(12.16) vw(a = a) = 1
(12.17) For atomic A, if vw(a = b) = 1 then vw(A) = vw(A[b/a])
(12.18) For any w1 ∈ N, vw1(a = b) = vw(a = b)
It is then easy to establish that, if A is any sentence in which a does
not occur within the scope of a ‘◻→’, w ∈ N, and vw(a = b) = 1, then
vw(A) = 1 iff vw(A[b/a]) = 1. So the Substitutivity of Identicals, as
we will call it, holds in such contexts.
As there are no constraints on v at impossible worlds, Substitutivity
of Identicals does not hold for impossible worlds, just as we would
expect.As a consequence, Substitutivity of Identicals is not valid when
substitution is within the scope of counterfactuals, for counterfactuals
substitutivity of identicals 277
may look to impossible worlds. Again, that’s to be expected when
impossible antecedents are around. For example,
(12.19) If Hesperus were not Phosphorus, then modern astronomy
in particular would be badly mistaken.
That’s true, and Hesperus is Phosphorus; yet it’s not the case that
(12.20) If Phosphorus were not Phosphorus, then modern astronomy
in particular would be badly mistaken.
Rather, it would be (mainstream) modern logic in particular that is
badly mistaken.
Now consider the following pair, from Williamson (2007, 174–6):
(12.21) If Hesperus had not been Phosphorus, Phosphorus would
not have been Phosphorus.
(12.22) If Hesperus had not been Phosphorus, Hesperus would not
have been Phosphorus.
We take the appropriate evaluation of these to be as follows: (12.21)
is false and (12.22) is true. Had Hesperus not been Phosphorus,
nothing would have followed about the self-identity of Hesperus or
Phosphorus. This seems to suggest that surrendering metaphysical
truths in a counterfactual supposition does not force us away from
logical truths concerning the same subject matter. Our semantics
agrees on this. As an instance of (12.5), (12.22) is valid, whereas the
fact that Hesperus is Phosphorus does not imply (12.22). In general,
on our semantics, a = b does not entail a ≠ b ◻→ a ≠ a.
Substitutivity of Identicals can fail on our semantics only when
the substitution in question is within the scope of a counterfactual.
Counterfactuals create hyperintensional contexts. Our counterfac-
tuals are sensitive to distinctions between impossibilities, which are
invisible in a standard intensional framework using possible worlds.
Yet Williamson (2007, 175) finds this ‘highly implausible’. The rea-
son for this has two premises. Hyperintensionality, he claims, occurs
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only in constructions that are ‘about representational features’, such
as epistemic and intentional contexts. But, he adds, counterfactuals
are not about representational features in this way.
There is reason to doubt each of Williamson’s premises. First,
one might think, with Lycan (2001), that counterfactuals do involve
epistemic features (and for reasons wholly independent of the non-
vacuism debate). If so, then Williamson’s argument falls apart. The
failure of substitution in (12.21) and (12.22) would be of a piece with
the failure that occurs when we note that it is a priori that Phosphorus
is Phosphorus, but not that Hesperus is Phosphorus. (Brogaard and
Salerno (2013, 654) appeal directly to the alleged epistemic aspect
of counterfactuals to explain failures of substitutivity like this.)
One might even agree with Thomasson (2007) that metaphysical
modality itself involves representational elements, even when carefully
contrasted with epistemic modalities.
That’s all rather controversial, and one may not want to commit
to any of those views. But even if we decide against them all, we
should question the other Williamsonian premise. An operator’s
being hyperintensional does not entail its being representational or
broadly epistemic. According to Nolan (2014), there are hyperinten-
sional contexts that are not ‘about representational features’, and
counterfactuals may well be among these.Metaphysical grounding
is often taken to be a wholly worldly, non-representational, but
hyperintensional concept (Correia and Schnieder 2012, Fine 2012b).
If disjuncts ground disjunctive states of affairs or propositions (as
many grounding theorists suppose), then that A is a ground for that
A∨(A∧B), but not vice versa. So grounding is hyperintensional, since
A ∨ (A ∧ B) is logically equivalent to A. Wilson (2018) argues that
non-vacuism follows from a counterfactual approach to grounding.
Similarly, essence is a hyperintensional metaphysical concept which
is frequently taken to be wholly non-representational. We can derive
‘Anna exists’ from ‘{Anna} exists’ and vice versa, and yet what’s
essential to Anna’a existence differs from what’s essential to {Anna}’s
existence. In particular, {Anna}’s essence depends on Anna, whereas
Anna’s essence doesn’t depend on {Anna} (Fine 1994). It seems
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essential that the state of affairs that it’s raining or not raining
somehow involve the state of affairs that it’s raining. But that state
of affairs isn’t essential to that Trump will be impeached or he won’t.
These logically equivalent complex states of affairs have different
essences, and yet there’s nothing representational or epistemic to them
or their essences.
To see how counterfactuals might be hyperintensional without
being about representations, simply return to the semantics we
sketched above. Assume, together with Barcan, Kripke (1971), and
Williamson (2007, 161), that if a = b, then it is necessary for a to
be b. Notice that our semantics above conforms to this: the truth
values of identity statements ‘a = b’ do not change across possible
worlds. Then a’s not being b is a way things just cannot be.Worlds
at which a is not b are impossible worlds. There need be nothing
epistemic about this, any more than there is about a world which
hosts a physical impossibility, such (supposing Einstein was right) as
something travelling faster than the speed of light.
One may grant thatWilliamson’s argument about ‘representational
features’ is problematic, but still think that counterfactuals allow
for substitution of identicals. Williamson (2007, 174) bolsters this
impression with the following argument:
(12.23) If the rocket had continued on its course, it would have hit
Hesperus.
(12.24) Hesperus = Phosphorus
(12.25) Therefore, if the rocket had continued on its course, it would
have hit Phosphorus.
This, Williamson claims, is ‘unproblematically valid’ (2007, 174).
We agree that the argument steps are truth-preserving, but deny
that this is so in virtue of their logical form alone. The argument
isn’t logically valid. The steps are truth-preserving (and necessarily
so) because the conditional’s antecedent is possible (and necessarily
so), and this gives the misleading impression that the argument is
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formally valid. But the antecedent’s being possible is a metaphysical,
not a logical fact. To make the argument formally valid, we need
to add, as an additional premise, that the rocket’s continuing on its
course is possible. Then, given (SIC), the argument is formally valid.
12.5 Reductio Arguments
AnotherWilliamsonian objection to non-vacuism about counterpossi-
bles comes from reductio arguments (Williamson 2007, 2017). These
are crucial to mathematics as it is practised.Williamson attempts to
show that non-vacuists must hold current standard mathematical
practice to be mistaken.
Although Williamson admits that reductio arguments need not
be formulated in terms of counterfactuals, he takes it as legitimate
to do so. And indeed, it is tempting to assert counterfactuals when
reporting a particular line of reasoning by reductio: ‘it can’t be that
A, because if it were that A, then it would be that B; but B is wrong,
so A too must be’. That’s valid on our semantics: A ◻→ B, ¬B ⊨ ¬A.
(Weak Centring guarantees that the base world is an A-world if a
B-world. But since we check for validity at a possible world, such a
¬B-world can’t be an A-world, so must be a ¬A-world.)
The trouble stems from certain counterpossibles that can be used
in reductio reasoning in this way. Since the reasoning is good, the
counterpossibles ought to come out true.However,Williamson claims
that non-vacuists cannot make good on this prediction. He considers
the following examples (Williamson 2017):
(12.26) If there were a largest prime p, p! + 1 would be prime.
(12.27) If there were a largest prime p, p! + 1 would be composite.
(12.28) If there were a largest prime p, p! + 1 would be both prime
and composite.
Williamson considers the following proof that there is no largest
prime. First, establish (12.26) and (12.27) on their own merits, using
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standard reasoning.Next, conclude (12.28) from them. Finally, appeal
to our knowledge that no number is both prime and composite to
conclude that there is no largest prime. As above, the final step of
this reasoning is unproblematic for vacuists and non-vacuists alike.
The alleged trouble for the non-vacuist is in getting (12.26)–(12.28)
to come out true.
Williamson’s worry is that a non-vacuist can’t appeal to the usual
mathematical reasoning we’d use to justify these.We could, ordinarily,
reason that p! + 1 is not divisible by any n ≤ p, so (if p is the largest
prime) p! + 1 has no prime factors and must therefore be prime.
However, we’re assuming a number of mathematical results here.
How can the non-vacuist be sure that they would hold, were there a
largest prime? In general, non-vacuists deny that logical entailments
carry across to valid counterfactuals:A ⊨ B does not imply⊨ A ◻→ B.
So, if p were the largest prime, might it not be the case that p! + 1 is
divisible by some n ≤ p? How could we be sure either way? But if
we don’t have access to that reasoning, on the assumption that p is
the largest prime, how can we ensure that (12.26) is true?
Similarly, we could ordinarily reason that, if p were the largest
prime, then everything greater, including p! + 1, would be composite.
We could then reason, on this basis, that p! + 1 would be both prime
and composite. But what entitles the non-vacuist to this reasoning?
Perhaps p! + 1 would not be greater than p, or perhaps Conjunction
Introduction would not be valid, were there a greatest prime.
We think the answer to the puzzle lies in the context sensitivity of
counterfactual utterances. Anna can truthfully say ‘if I’d hit you, it
would have hurt’ (because she’s got a mean punch); but she can also
truthfully say ‘if I’d hit you, it wouldn’t have hurt’ (because Anna
wouldn’t hurt anyone, so would have punched softly). Suppose, in a
friendly conversation with no threat of violence, you ask Anna how
strong she is. ‘Let’s just say’, she replies, ‘that if I’d hit you right then,
it would have hurt’. That seems true (given how strong she is). But
now suppose you and Anna are play-fighting. ‘Watch it!’, you say, as
a mock punch comes a little close. ‘Don’t worry’, she says, ‘if I’d hit
you then, it wouldn’t have hurt’. In this way, ‘the truth conditions
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for counterfactuals … are a highly volatile matter, varying with every
shift of context and interest’ (Lewis 1973b, 92).
Any broadly Kratzer, Lewis, or Stalnaker-like approach to coun-
terfactuals (Kratzer 1981, 1986, Stalnaker 1968, 1984) essentially
involves two ingredients. It has an underlying space of worlds, plus
some apparatus for focusing on the ones relevant to interpreting the
counterfactual at hand in any particular case.All existing approaches
to counterfactuals, vacuist and non-vacuist alike, take the second
ingredient to be sensitive to the context in which a counterfactual
occurs. There is simply no other way to get sensible results.
In the context of reductio reasoning, all the usual rules of reasoning
must remain available. Similarly, if a counterfactual is uttered in
that context, or in the context of reporting on such a proof, then
the usual mathematical principles can be called upon to support
the counterfactual. In the case of (12.26)–(12.28), in such contexts,
conversational participants hold fixed what they know about the
additive and multiplicative structure of the natural numbers. With
such facts fixed, (12.26) and (12.27) follow easily, with (12.28)
following by Conjunction Introduction.
But those mathematical facts need not be held fixed in every
conversational context.We might be discussing mathematical finitism
(as in Van Bendegem (1994)), and say, quite correctly, that if there
had been a greatest number, there would have been a greatest prime
number. In that context, we clearly are not retaining the mathematical
fact that every number has a successor. Or we might be discussing
what the physical world would be like if there were a largest prime
number.Again, we cannot allow all of the facts of standard arithmetic
to carry over.
As a consequence, valid logical and mathematical reasoning does
not automatically carry over into counterfactual reasoning, as a
matter of the logic of counterfactuals. A’s entailing B does not
imply that A ◻→ B is valid. But, as we have seen, there may be
contexts in which A ◻→ B is true and justifiable on the basis of
A’s entailing B. They include the context of a reductio proof, or
of explaining or reporting on such a proof. So the non-vacuist can
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justify (12.26)–(12.28) and, more generally, she can justify this area
of mathematical practice.
It may even be that vacuism about counterfactuals has the
most trouble in capturing mathematical practice. The vacuist easily
gets the result that (12.26)–(12.28) are true, since she takes all
such counterpossibles to be trivially true. But now consider a
mathematician explaining principles of constructive mathematics.
In the following Q&A, someone raises an objection, ‘but given what
you’re saying, had it been that ¬¬A, then A, and so …’. ‘No!’ replies
the speaker, pointing out that Double-Negation Elimination isn’t
constructively valid. She rejects as false the counterfactual, ‘had
constructive mathematics been correct, Double-Negation Elimination
would still have been valid’. Her attitude seems to be part of accepted
mathematical practice. Vacuists have trouble in accommodating
this. (They may take such counterfactuals to be unassertible, or
otherwise out of place conversationally. But they can’t capture the
mathematician’s attitude that those counterfactuals are false.)
12.6 Intuitions for Non-Vacuism
We’ve been defending non-vacuism about counterfactuals from a
range of objections. But what are the positive arguments in its favour?
Our support for non-vacuism largely rests on our ordinary-language
judgements about the truth of a range of counterpossibles, such as the
Hobbes-sentences (1.18) and (1.19), and the Anna-{Anna} sentences
(12.1) and (12.2). (Jenny (2018) and Nolan (1997) offer further
arguments.)
Williamson (2007, 2017) worries about this kind of motivation.
He grants that the intuitions behind those judgementsd are present,
but argues that they are not veridical. Here, we consider three
Williamsonian arguments in this ballpark.
Thinking it Through
The first concerns the following example, due to Nolan (1997). (See
also the discussion in Brogaard and Salerno (2013)). Suppose that
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you were asked, ‘what is 5 + 7?’ and answer ‘12’. Now consider the
following sentences:
(12.29) If 5 + 7 were 13, you would have got that sum right.
(12.30) If 5 + 7 were 13 you would have got that sum wrong.
(12.29) seems false and (12.30) true. But if (12.29) really is false
then so is vacuism, since it’s necessary that 5 + 7 isn’t 13. Here is
Williamson’s response to this case:
[Such examples] tend to fall apart when thought through. For
example, if 5 + 7 were 13 then 5 + 6 would be 12, and so (by
another eleven steps) 0 would be 1, so if the number of right
answers I gave were 0, the number of right answers I gave would
be 1. We prefer (12.30) to (12.29) because the argument for
(12.30) is more obvious, but the argument for (12.29) is equally
strong. (Williamson 2007, 172, our renumbering)
It seems to us, though, that the argument for (12.29) is not equally
strong, for two reasons. First, having concluded that 0 = 1, it
proceeds to substitute ‘1’ for ‘0’ within a counterfactual. But in general,
that move is invalid (§12.4). Second, whether a particular chain of
reasoning succeeds or fails in supporting the truth of a counterfactual
depends on context, and in particular on which truths about the case
need to be held fixed to legitimate the reasoning (§12.5).
In this case, all we need to hold fixed for (12.30) to be true is that
the questioner asked what 5 + 7 is, that the answer given was 12, and
that 12 is not 13. Williamson’s argument for (12.29) needs to hold
fixed all of that, plus facts about decrementing left and right addends.
He must assume that 5 + 7 = 13 ⊢ 5 + 6 = 12 and its subtraction-
generated cousins remain true, as well as facts connecting ‘number
of right answers’ given to whether someone gets an answer right.
Some counterfactual contexts may support our retaining all of
those facts, but not all will. The contexts in which (12.29) comes out
true are thus a proper superset of those in which (12.30) comes
out true. For to suppose that 5 + 7 is 13 is to suppose that the
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additive structure of the numbers is something other than it actually
is. Without some special context (such as during a mathematical
proof, or reporting on mathematical reductio reasoning, as in §12.5),
we have reason to expect that we should not hold fixed facts about
incrementing and decrementing under such a supposition. So without
some special context, we should expect that (12.30) is true whilst
(12.29) is not. And it is no good forWilliamson to place his argument
within one of those special contexts. For as long as there is some
context in which (12.29) is false, vacuism is too.
A Heuristic?
Let’s go back to our first Hobbes-sentence:
(1.18) If Hobbes had (secretly) squared the circle, sick children in
the mountains of South America at the time would have cared.
No matter how we come at this sentence, we find it stubbornly
wearing the appearance of a falsehood.Williamson’s (2017) expla-
nation for this appeals to a kind of error theory. We naturally take
counterfactuals of the form A ◻→ B and A ◻→ ¬B to be contraries:
‘if you were to win the lottery you would be happy’ and ‘if you were
to win the lottery you would not be happy’ cannot both be true.
(Williamson suggests that we may confuse A ◻→ ¬B with ¬(A ◻→ B),
thus taking them to be contradictories. But whether or not this is so,
contrariety is all his explanation requires.)
This natural tendency is taken as the result of a fallible heuristic
for counterfactual conditionals:
(HCC∗) If you accept one of A ◻→ B and A ◻→ ¬B, reject the other.
(Williamson discusses two potential heuristics, (HCC) and (HCC*),
with (HCC) telling us: If B and C are inconsistent, then treat A ◻→ B
and A ◻→ C as inconsistent. Williamson prefers to use (HCC*) as
it does not make use of the notion of inconsistency. We stick with
Williamson’s preference here.)
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If we evaluate A ◻→ ¬B to be true, then (HCC∗) councils that we
take A ◻→ B to be false. This is Williamson’s explanation of why we
take (1.18) to be false (erroneously, in his opinion).
It’s unclear whether our reasoning in the case of (1.18) is guided by
any such heuristic; and even if it were, it’s doubtful that (HCC∗) is the
right heuristic. It has little plausibility when A is obviously impossible,
as Williamson (2017, §6) acknowledges. It’s easy to accept both of
(12.31) If it were raining and not raining, it would be raining.
(12.32) If it were raining and not raining, it would not be raining.
contrary to (HCC∗)’s advice, for example.
Nevertheless, Williamson (2017, §6) maintains that (HCC∗) plays
a role when we evaluate a counterpossible to be false.We disagree.
Suppose we’re asked,
(12.33) If intuitionist logic were correct, would Excluded Middle be
valid?
(Imagine we’re feigning ignorance, for the benefit of our logic class.)
We evaluate by considering situations in which intuitionist logic is
correct. We know what these are like, because we understand the
principles of intuitionist logic, BHK interpretations, Kripke semantics,
and so on. In every such situation, Excluded Middle is not valid. So
we judge that
(12.34) If intuitionist logic were correct, then Excluded Middle
would not be valid.
is true. But in exactly the same way, we judge that
(12.35) If intuitionist logic were correct, then Excluded Middle
would be valid.
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is false. The reasoning, via BHK interpretations or Kripke models
or whatever, directly leads to our judgement of (12.35)’s falsity. It’s
not like we first have to work out what we think about (12.34), and
then infer which stance to take on (12.35).Williamson’s heuristic has
nothing to do with it.
Exactly the same goes for Nolan’s first Hobbes-sentence,
(1.18) If Hobbes had (secretly) squared the circle, sick children in
the mountains of South America at the time would have cared.
According to Williamson, we assesses the conditional by imagining
situations in which Hobbes squared the circle. In that situation, it’s
false that the sick South American children care about Hobbes’s
achievement. But from there, we can infer, directly, that (1.18) is false.
We needn’t go via (1.19)’s truth and (HCC∗).
Vacuous Quantification
A third argument against non-vacuist intuitions takes the form of
an analogy between counterpossibles and vacuous universal quan-
tification. The ‘logically unsophisticated’, according to Williamson
(2007, 173), find it intuitive that ‘every golden mountain is a valley’
should be false, given that ‘every golden mountain is a mountain’ is
true, on the grounds that being a mountain and being a valley are
incompatible properties. However, both claims are true, vacuously,
if there are no golden mountains. People extrapolate wrongly from
familiar (non-vacuous) cases.
Williamson (2017, §6) expands the point. We know that dolphins
don’t have arms or legs and that unicorns have horns, so it’s tempting
to judge the following as false:
(12.36) Every dolphin in Oxford has arms and legs.
(12.37) Every unicorn is hornless.
Yet these claims are true on the standard treatment of quantifiers,
because there are no unicorns or dolphins in Oxford.
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The intended analogy with vacuous quantification is clear. The
‘logically unsophisticated’, such as Franz and Mark, will intuitively
judge counterpossibles like (1.18) and (12.2) to be false. But we
make the same mistake as in the case of vacuous quantification.
Since there are no situations which verify the antecedent, those
counterfactuals are true. And, as in the quantification case, contrary
pairs of counterfactuals will both be true when there are no situations
to verify their antecedents.
But hang on a minute! We’d better not take the analogy too
seriously. For by actualist lights, there are no situations verifying
the antecedent of any counter-to-fact conditional. If a situation is
contrary to fact, then it doesn’t exist. If we understood conterfactuals
as quantifiers over existing situations, then we’d end up treating them
all as material conditionals, with all contrary-to-fact cases coming
out trivially true. (One might insist, with Lewis, that there really do
exist merely possible situations. But that extreme metaphysical view
can’t be required to make sense of counterfactuals.)
To make any sense, the analogy to quantification must be situated
within a model (or a pretence, or whatever) in which there exist non-
actual situations. Then we can take seriously the point that we make
mistakes with vacuous quantification. Sure, if there are no situations
to verify the antecedent, then we may have a true counterfactual
which we’re liable to judge as false. So the question is, in general, are
there (or should there be) such situations in our best semantic models?
In the case of counterpossibles, the question becomes: should there
be impossible situations in our semantic models? But this is a key
point at issue in the vacuist-non-vacuist debate. It seems dialectically
illegitimate to assume that only possible situations may play a role in
our models.
Chapter Summary
There are prima facie reasons to think that vacuism, the view that
all counterpossibles are trivially true, is incorrect (§12.1). We then
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offered an impossible worlds semantics for counterfactuals, which
makes room for non-trivial counterpossibles (§12.2). The semantics
raises a number of questions. One principle which pins down its
application is the Strangeness of Impossibility condition, which says
that, for any given possible world, any impossible worlds is further
away from it than any possible world is (§12.3). We discussed a
number of Williamson’s objections to the non-vacuist approach in
the context of (SIC), and argued that they can be overcome.
We then raised the question of whether counterfactuals in general
(including counterpossibles) should permit the substitution of rigidly
coreferential terms, again by considering Williamson’s arguments
against non-vacuism (§12.4). The third case that Williamson makes
against non-vacuism is that it does not make good sense of the way
reductio arguments are used in mathematical practice. We showed
how non-vacuists can resist this argument (§12.5). Having defended
non-vacusim against Williamson’s objections, we then considered a
range of arguments in its favour (§12.6).
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